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I. THE QUEST FOR COHERENCE
[C]onstitutional standing [is] ... a word game played by secret rules. 2
"Come, Watson, come!" he cried. "The game is afoot." 3
It is almost de rigueur for articles on standing to quote Professor
Freund's testimony to Congress that the concept of standing is "among
the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law."'4 One of the
traditional criticisms of standing law is that it is confusing and seem-
ingly incoherent. Even the staunchest judicial advocates of the doctrine
readily admit as much: "We need not mince words when we say that
the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete
consistency .... ,,5
Nevertheless, the courts treat standing as a "bedrock requirement"
delimiting the scope of the judicial process. 6 It is generally accepted
black letter law that the "case or controversy" requirement of article III
means that a party who invokes the court's authority must show per-
sonal injury or "injury-in-fact." ' 7 The Burger Court has expanded the
2. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing majority
opinion).
3. A. C. DOYLE, The Adventure ofthe Abbey Grange, in 2 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HoLMEs
636 (1930).
4. Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966).
5. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.); see also Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely
worthless as such."); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95, 97 ("Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain
meaning and scope."). ProfessorJaffe has noted that even "Justice Frankfurter found himself
reduced to a nearly unprecedented degree of inarticulateness" in discussing standing. Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1961). Jaffe was
referring to Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in I nited States ex rel. Chapman l. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953), where the Justice noted that: "It would not further
clarification of this complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose
problems is in any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual
situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases." Id. at 156.
This article focuses on the purely constitutional, article III law of standing. The concept
of standing probably raises all or most of the same problems in other areas such as adminis-
trative law, antitrust, and the fourth amendment. I do not treat then] here. For a cogent
explanation of the policy considerations that make the stakes in the standing analysis some-
what diflerent in administrative law. see Stewart, The Rebinmation oflimnri.an .ldmnitratne f.au'
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1742 (1975). For" a discussion of the way in which fourth amendment
standing reflects the same considerations and entails the same problems presented by article
III standing, see notes 591 & 722 hfnia.
6. I'alleY Foige 454 U.S. at 471.
7. The "injury in fact" terminology comes [oino the majnrit. opinion in Data Pre.'ong.
397 ".S. at 152. The introduction of the inj lWu -in-fact criterion was part of an cllort to ex-
pand standing. Se Simon v. Eastern Kenttu k% Wellarc Right%. M)g.. -126 U.S. 26. 39 1976).
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"irreducible minimum" to include the requirements that the plaintiff
also show that the injury was caused by the defendant's allegedly illegal
conduct and that the injury is one that can be redressed by the court's
decision. 9 The net effect has been increasingly to restrict citizens'
claims against their government. The Court has insisted on these min-
ima with an amazing degree of orthodoxy: "Any other conclusion," the
Court has warned, "would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to
set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New
England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Govern-
ment by means of lawsuits in federal courts." 10
Despite the purported constitutional warrant and the seeming clar-
ity of the new black letter, standing law remains largely intractable. We
have traditionally bridged the gaps in one of two ways. The traditional-
ists have attempted to harmonize the cases in terms of a coherent doc-
trine of standing I or to elaborate a coherent doctrine in place of
standing. 12 Others have acknowledged openly the doctrinal and con-
ceptual inconsistencies of the cases and accounted for them in either a
Realist or post-Realist manner. Commentators in this group have con-
cluded that the doctrine of standing is either a judicial mask for the
exercise of prudence to avoid decisionmaking' 3 or a sophisticated ma-
nipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their merits. 14
8. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
9. The causation/redressibility requirement first appeared in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973), and was constitutionalized in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504
(1975).
10. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
11. Section V of this article attempts to demonstrate that the Court has not been suc-
cessful in articulating such a coherent doctrine, either in majority opinions or in dissents. For
attempts by scholars to harmonize the law, see Brilmayer, TheJurisprudence of Article III: Perspec-
tives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Burnham, Injury for
Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights Are Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at
Work, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 57 (1985); Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). See also Stewart, supra note 5, at
1723-41.
12. Scholars who have attempted such analyses include Albert, Standing to Challenge Ad-
ministrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425, 425-29 (1974);
Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wisc. L. REV. 37; Nichol,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984); Schnurer, "More than an Intuition, Less than a
Theory ": Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564 (1986) (student author).
See also Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 41 (1982). For a discussion of
the problems with these analyses, see note 88 infra and accompanying text.
13. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 119-27 (1962).
14. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1698, 1715 n.72 (1980) ("Doesn't the fact that the Court issues so many inconsistent
decisions tend to indicate that the entire concept of standing is awfully prone to manipulation
and incoherence?"). Although it is probably impossible to document, I suspect that most
academics and practicing lawyers at least share the suspicion that standing law is nothing
more than a manipulation by the Court to decide cases while not appearing to decide their
merits.
Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this thesis appeared in the first edition of H.
FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERALJURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 319-23 (1st ed. 1984) [here-
inafter H. FINE & M. TUSHNET (1st ed.)]. Originally, Professors Fink and Tushnet suggested
that:
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The purpose of this article is to suggest an alternative vision. Its
modus operandi is to employ recent scholarship on human cognition to
map the underlying conceptual structure of standing law and, thus, to
provide a better understanding of its incoherences. Implicit in this ap-
proach is the assertion that concepts do matter: that one cannot ac-
count for standing doctrine simply in terms of instrumental
manipulation. Rather, the underlying concepts frame and constrain the
instrumentalist choices. The basic tools, which I explain in Section II
and employ throughout, are the concepts of cognitive models and
metaphors.
Part of this endeavor will involve a challenge to the historical as-
sumption that the Constitution speaks to the question ordinarily
thought to be comprehended within the rubric of standing. Rather, a
painstaking search of the historical material demonstrates that-for the
first 150 years of the Republic-the Framers, the first Congresses, and
the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either that standing
is a component of the constitutional phrase "cases or controversies" or
that it is a prerequisite for seeking governmental compliance with the
law. I will show that the modern doctrine of standing is a distinctly
twentieth century product that was fashioned out of other doctrinal
materials largely through the conscious efforts ofJustices Brandeis and
Frankfurter. I will use the materials on models and metaphors to de-
scribe how this shaping was effectuated.
I am not so heretical as to suggest that there is no such thing as an
article III "case or controversy" requirement that limits the judicial
power to actual disputes. But a fuller account of our history shows that
article III was not limited to the kinds of private disputes characterized
by standing. I argue that there are serious negative consequences to
the idea that the legal system is or should be circumscribed by such a
concept. This article seeks instead a historically more accurate and
democratically more meaningful approach to the uses of adjudication
in a self-governing society.
A recent case, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,15 highlights the dysfunc-
tional aspects of current standing doctrine that justify this endeavor.
The doctrines are manipulated to allow the Court to reach the merits openly in some
cases while disguising its rulings on the merits in other cases.... It may be that the
Court conceals its rulings on the merits by using the injury-causation test in cases
where it believes the public disapproval of an overt rejection of the claims on the
merits would exceed public disapproval of an apparent door-closing decision, and
conversely that it rules on the merits openly where it believes that public approval of
the rejection of the claims would exceed public approval of the denial of standing.
Id. at 319. It would be difficult to document this hypothesis, and there are counter-examples
that suggest this is only a partial truth. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 742-743 infra. The
second edition of the casebook no longer contains this passage, but it suggests a similar
theme in its discussion of standing doctrine. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 303, 321 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter H. FINK & M. TusHNE" (2d
ed.)].
15. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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Adolph Lyons was stopped for a traffic violation by Los Angeles police
officers. He was subjected to a restraining chokehold and severely in-
jured. He claimed that the police were employing such chokeholds
routinely, even though they were not threatened with the use of deadly
force by the victim. The record demonstrated that the chokeholds were
often fatal.
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Lyons did not have standing to
obtain an injunction barring the practice. In the majority's view, it was
entirely speculative that Mr. Lyons would ever again be subjected to
this potentially fatal practice. 16 The four dissenters complained that:
"The court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional viola-
tions from the equitable powers of a federal court. . . . The federal
judicial power is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic con-
situtional violation." 17
On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the
majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective dam-
age remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional
violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about
the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying
reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary
injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was
pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles
police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the
practice.18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same
substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held
that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against
nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that
sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case.19
There are many other examples of dysfunctionality; I will discuss
them in later sections. At this point, it may be more helpful to describe
some of the problems of standing law that I hope to illuminate.
1. The historical conundrum.
The notion that standing is a bedrock requirement of constitutional
law has a surprisingly short history. Frothingham v. Mellon,20 which re-
16. See zd. at 106 n.7 ("[I]n any event .... Lyons would have to credibly allege that he
faced a realistic threat from the future application of the City's policy.").
17. Id. at 137 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
18. Id. at 116 n.3.
19. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Garner applied the fourth amendment
to invalidate the fleeing felon doctrine of the common law. Under Garner, an officer must have
probable cause to believe the suspect dangerous before he or she may resort to deadly force
to prevent escape. For a discussion of the metaphors underlying the Garner decision, see
Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14 N.Y.U. REv. OF
LA-,v & Soc. CHANGE 679 (1986).
20. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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jected a taxpayer suit to enjoin a federal spending program, is generally
thought of as the first modem standing case. 21 In fact, it is not.
Fairchild v. Hughes,22 decided a year before Frothingham and authored by
Justice Brandeis, was the first case to reject a taxpayer suit because the
"[p]laintiff's alleged interest in the question submitted is not such as to
afford a basis for this proceeding. ' 23 The Frothingham Court reached its
conclusion that Ms. Frothingham could not sue without citing or identi-
fying any precedent either for that conclusion or the premises it offered
in support of that conclusion. 24
Perhaps more surprising, Frothingham was preceded by three federal
and two state taxpayer actions that the Court adjudicated on the mer-
its.25 Moreover, as late as 1935, neither Professors Frankfurter nor
Hart discussed Frothingham, Fairchild, or the concept of standing in their
writings on article III justiciability limits on federal courts.26 All of this
21. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 (1968) ("This Court first faced squarely the ques-
tion whether a litigant asserting only his status as a taxpayer has standing to maintain a suit in
federal court in Frothingham v. Mellon .... ") (footnote omitted). Typically, contemporary
casebooks on the law of federal courts and on constitutional law discuss Frothingham but fail
altogether to note its predecessor, Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922). See, e.g., M.
REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 16-17 (1983); P. Low & J.
JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS 40 (1987); H. FINK &
M. TUSHNET (2d ed.), supra note 14, at 295-96; D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MATER-
IALS 12-13 (3d ed. 1982); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW 1543-44 (11th ed. 1985); W.
LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1632-34 (5th ed. 1980); accord H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 158-60 (1953). The one contemporary exception is P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM (2d ed. 1973), which notes both Fairchild and Frothingham. Id. at 180, 181.
22. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
23. Id. at 129. In Frothingham, too, the plaintiff's claim was rejected because she failed to
show that she had "sustained ... some direct injury. . ., and not merely that [s]he suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally." Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488.
24. Id. at 486-89. Fairchild, in contrast, relied on two of the general justiciability cases
and one of thejus tertii cases. See note 330 infra.
25. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906);
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Leser v. Garnett,
258 U.S. 130 (1922) (the companion case to Fairchild).
26. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVIDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAw 194-363 (1932); Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 93-95 (1935). In his casebook, Professor Frankfurter de-
voted almost 200 pages to the scope of the judical power and to questions ofjusticiability,
treating such classic federal courts issues as advisory opinions, political questions, and legisla-
tive courts. The casebook does not invoke either the term or the concept of standing, does
not include either Frothingham or Fairchild, and does not treat any of the cases that Justice
Frankfurter later cited in his opinions on standing. Compare F. FRANKFURTER &J. DAVIDSON,
supra, with Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-70 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), and
Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-57 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
In their 1935 review of the previous term, Professors Frankfurter and Hart discussed the
general "jurisdictional limitations," including "the threshhold requirement of the existence of
a 'case' or 'controversy'... " Frankfurter & Hart, supra, at 94. Their only reference to "stand-
ing" was the rejection of "any practice which would make of the Court a standing body of
expert expounders of the Constitution." Id See also Frankfurter & Fisher, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 623-32 (1938) (discussing
restrictions on constitutional claims in terms of equity and avoidance of constitutional issues).
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is unusual to say the least. One legitimately may wonder how a consti-
tutional doctrine now said to inhere in article III's "case or contro-
versy" language could be so late in making an appearance, do so with
so skimpy a pedigree, and take so long to be recognized even by the
primary academic expositors of the law of federal courts.
The traditional answer places heavy emphasis on the function of the
common law writ system to do the work now done by the concept of
standing.2 7 According to this analysis, the concept of standing could
only arise after the breakdown of the writ system and of common law
pleading. Standing then developed as an elaboration of the essence of
the private causes of action previously embodied in the writs.28 As
such, the modem concept of standing, with its focus on injury-in-fact, is
thought to be only the preservation of the private rights model
29 of
adjudication known to the Framers.
The traditional account is, however, inconsistent with the historical
data. It cannot account for the five taxpayer actions that preceded
Frothingham and Fairchild.30 Moreover, it ignores the established prac-
tice in state courts, throughout the nineteenth century, that provided
for public rights suits brought by plaintiffs who had no personal inter-
est or injury-in-fact. 31 Finally, it is disproved by the fact that the
Supreme Court, in 1875, specifically approved of this public rights
27. "Courts, whosejurisdiction was defined by the system of writs, did not need to speak
of standing. The question was whether a challenger was entitled to a writ, whether he had a
cause of action, whether the writ lay." J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 55 (1978). Thus, in his
concurring opinion in McGrath, Justice Frankfurter began his discussion of standing by ob-
serving that: "A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort
that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts." 341
U.S. at 152 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The earlier notion ofjusticiability referred to in United States v. Lee did not include a fixed
idea about the relationship between the party's status and a generalized conception of legal
process. Rather, the Court in Lee described justiciability in purely formalistic terms: "a plain-
tiff capable of suing, a defendant who has no personal exemption from suit, and a cause of
action cognizable in the court,-a case within the meaning of that term, as employed in the
Constitution and defined by the decisions of this court." Lee, 106 U.S. at 219; accord In re
Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241, 256 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
28. For a version of this traditional account, see, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-10 (1982).
29. The term "private rights model" is taken from Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68 (1973).
30. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 150-161 infra and accompanying text. Professors Jaffe and Berger reveal
the origins of these practices in English and pre-Revolutionary American law. Jaffe, supra note
5, at 1269-75;Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 255, 258-
61 (1961); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement, 78 YALE .J.
816, 818-27 (1969). ProfessorJaffe's canvass of the English mandamus cases led him to con-
clude that: "I have encountered no case before 1807 in which the standing of plaintiff is
mooted, though the lists of the cases in the digests strongly suggest the possibility that the
plaintiff in some of them was without a personal interest." Jaffe, supra note 5, at 1270. "It was
not, so far as I can find, until the end of the [nineteenth] century that our question was
mooted." Id. at 1271. Even then, the English cases reached opposing conclusions on the
necessity of a personal stake. Id. at 1271-73.
1377STANDINGJuly 1988]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
practice in a federal case without any constitutional objection.3 2 I ex-
pand and develop this history in Section III; I then chart and attempt to
explain its demise in Section IV.
2. The terminological conundrum.
The term "standing" does not appear either in Frothingham or in
Fairchild. Consistent with the traditional historical explanation of the
late arrival of standing doctrine, Professor Vining has suggested that
the American usage of the term developed haphazardly in this century
without specific introduction. 33 He has also hypothesized that it was
derived from the late nineteenth century English parliamentary term
locus standii.34 As I demonstrate below, however, each of these assump-
tions is incorrect. The term "standing" was in use early in the nine-
teenth century and did have two apparently accepted meanings
unrelated to the modem doctrine of standing.3 5 The explicit adoption
of the term to signal a new article III concept ofjusticiability occurs first
in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller.36
3. The Frothingham conundrum.
Frothingham is sometimes read as embodying only the prudential as-
32. Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875). See notes 135, 169-173 infra and accom-
panying text.
33. J. VINING, supra note 27.
The word standing is rather recent in the basic judicial vocabulary and does not ap-
pear to have been commonly used until the middle of our own century. No authority
that I have found introduces the term with proper explanations and apologies and
announces that henceforth standing should be used to describe who may be heard by
a judge. Nor was there any sudden adoption by tacit consent. The word appears
here and there, spreading very gradually with no discernible pattern. Judges and
lawyers found themselves using the term and did not ask why they did so or where it
came from.
Id. at 55. Vining traces its first American usage to the headnote in Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v.
Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903). Id.
Vining does note a canonic, medieval precedent for the term "standing" that is dearly
procedural: excommunicatus non habet personam standi in iudicio (one who has been excommuni-
cated has no standing in court). J. VINING, supra note 27, at 190 n.33.
34. "There seems little doubt that American usage is derived from the British." Id. at 55.
In this view, the term "standing" is derived from the English legal concept of locus standi-
literally, "a place to stand on." See 2 W. Jowrrr, THE DICMTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAw 1115 (2d
ed. 1977);J. VINING, supra note 27, at 55. The term locus standii has its origin in parliamentary
practice "with reference to the question whether a person who objects to a private Bill has the
right to appear by counsel and summon witnesses to support his objection before the select
committee." W. Jowrrr, supra, at 1115; EARL OF HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 749-50
(1912); accordJ. VINING, supra note 27, at 55. In modern English administrative law, however,
the term locus standii has taken on a meaning similar to that of standing in American adminis-
trative and constitutional law. S.A. DE SMrr, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
366-67, 407-09 (3d ed. 1973).
35. See text accompanying notes 251-260 infra. In the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, its primary usage was in equity to express the substantive limits of its jurisdic-
tion. This equity usage evolved in a manner that helped lay the groundwork for the
development of the modern constitutional doctrine of standing. See text accompanying notes
261-289 infra. I will describe these developments in some detail in Section IV, below.
36. 307 U.S. 433, 464-68 (1939).
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pects of standing,37 as constrasted with the core, article III criteria of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.3 8 Nevertheless, sixty years
later, "Frothingham's reasoning remains obscure." 39 As I indicated
above, Frothingham drew neither on the existing terminology of stand-
ing nor on the existing precedent of Fairchild. In light of the modem
doctrine of standing, this seems strange. But, viewed in its original his-
torical context, much of what is cryptic in Frothingham can be under-
stood in terms of traditional equity doctrines unrelated to standing, the
earlier prerogative writ practice, and older justiciability doctrine. I de-
velop this analysis in Section IV.
4. The causation conundrum.
In the 1970s, the Burger Court added causation as an element of
the threshold determination of standing.40 Professor Chayes has ob-
served that: "Any first year law student, at least after he has read the
Palsgraf case, could predict what would happen when the metaphysically
undisciplined concept of causation is introduced .... ,,41 From tort law,
we would have assumed that the necessary causal chains would vary as
different policies and purposes are implicated.42 Yet one of the oddi-
ties of standing law is that, in its treatment of the issue of causation, a
strange uniformity predominates instead. 43 I explain the conceptual
groundwork for this phenomenon in Section II and further explore the
connections in Section V.
5. The injury conundrum.
One of the constant analytic loops of standing law is the characteri-
zation of the injury that is sufficient to confer standing. Under the
older legal interest test, the relationship between standing and the mer-
37. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 n.6 (1968);Jaffe, supra note 31, at 302-03; Brown,
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 15 ("I do not
know whether Frothingham v. Mellon is a constitutional decision or a prudential one.").
38. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (majority opinion).
39. Id at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also note 37 supra.
40. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973).
41. Chayes, supra note 28, at 19 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928)).
42. See, e.g., Palsgraf 248 N.Y. at 352-53, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews,J., dissenting). Pro-
fessor Chayes suggested that "[O]ur mythical first-year law student knows that there are no
'direct' or 'indirect' injuries. There are only causal chains of different lengths. The question
is, 'how long is too long?' The answer can readily be made to vary, if not with the length of
the Chancellor's foot, then with the interests and sympathies of shifting configurations of five
Justices." Chayes, supra note 28, at 19.
43. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET (IST ED.), supra note 14, at 320 ("Why do tax law and
equal protection law embody identical injury-causation requirements?"). But compare Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding standing on
the basis of an attenuated line of causation between the Price-Anderson Act and a reduction
in property values of houses situated near nuclear power plants).
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its was "demonstrably circular,"' 44 because what conferred standing was
a legally protected interest, and you only had that if the court agreed with
you on the merits of your legal theory. The focus of modern standing
law on an objective injury-in-fact, which was designed to straighten this
out, has proved to be equally dependent on underlying legal assump-
tions.45 Thus, in Baker v. Carr,46 a voter's interest in the relative weight
of his or her vote-a matter that is a purely legal construct dependent
on one's conceptualization of a properly weighted vote47-may be suffi-
cient. Similarly, the Court has recognized Congress's power "to create
new interests the invasion of which will confer standing." 48 Thus, a
request for information under the Freedom of Information Act49 is a
justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person
has suffered any "palpable injury." 50
This conundrum is more intractable when one considers United
States v. Richardson.5 1 There, the Court rejected a parallel claim under
the statement and account clause 52 for information about government
expenditures because the plaintiff was not "in danger of suffering any
particular concrete injury. . . -53 In fact, the Court has treated these
kinds of constitutional claims as only generalized, political grievances
and not "injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer
standing."' 54 I will explore the inherent inconsistencies of these doc-
trines in Section V and will attempt to provide an explanation for and a
different means of reconstructing these issues in Section VI.
44. "[I]f the plaintiff is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is legally pro-
tected; if he is denied standing, his interest is not legally protected." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 65-66 (4th ed. 1983). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 22.04 (1958).
45. Chayes, supra note 28, at 15-16. In his latest article on standing, Professor Nichol
concludes that the injury prong of standing doctrine is actually two different requirements: a
requirement of injury-in-fact and a requirement of legally cognizable interest (or legal injury).
Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1915, 1918-19 (1986). As I
suggest below, particularly in Section V, this analysis misses the mark because it ignores the
cognitive processes implicated by terms such as "injury."
46. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47. "Talk of 'debasement' or 'dilution' is circular talk. One cannot speak of 'debase-
ment' or 'dilution' of the value of a vote until there is first defined a standard of reference as
to what a vote should be worth." Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
48. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41 n.22 (1976) (citing
Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3, and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972)).
49. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
50. Cf Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Simon, 426 U.S. 26, 40-41 & n.22
(1976).
51. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The inconsistency between the Freedom of Information Act
and the holding in Richardson was raised in Justice Stewart's dissent. Id. at 204-05.
52. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, which provides: "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time."
53. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177.
54. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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6. The particularization conundrum.
One of the primary thrusts of standing law has been the require-
ment of an injury particular to the individual invoking the court's
power.55 This particularization requirement is usually justified as serv-
ing the separation of powers policies often identified with standing law:
It "forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial
versions of college debating forums." 56 Yet the Court continues to re-
affirm the decision in United States v. SCRAP,5 7 where the injury that
supported standing was an injury to the environment shared by every-
one. Similarly, in the fair housing context, the Court continues to rec-
ognize interests in integrated living that can be asserted by citizens
living in relatively broad geographic areas, such as entire counties.58
This apparent inconsistency in the application of the particulariza-
tion requirement has led some commentators to ask whether there are
some constitutional rights that are "group rights" and others that are
"personal rights." 59 In Section VI, I suggest that this false dichotomy
is an artifact of standing law, that it is out of sync with social reality, and
that it is responsible for much of the perceived incoherence of standing
doctrine.
7. The democracy conundrum
The most appealing justification of standing law is that, in preserv-
ing the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political pro-
cess from undue intrusion by the unelectedjudiciary. But not all issues
are amenable to the political process. All too often, the inevitable con-
sequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and
widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody."' 60
In those cases, standing law undermines the notion of accountability
that supports a constitutional system premised on the rule of law. In
Sections VI C and D, I propose a means of recapturing these values.
There is a single thread that holds together the tapestry of this arti-
cle. What lies behind each of these conundra is our current over-glori-
fication of individualism. It was not always so. At the time of the
Framers and in succeeding generations, American law provided several
constitutionally acceptable models for the adjudication of group rights
at the behest of any member of the public, without regard to the neces-
55. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
56. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
57. 412 U.S. 669, 678 (1972).
58. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99.
59. See, e.g., Doemberg, "We the People" John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52 (1985); Schnurer, supra note 12, at
588-92 (concluding that the distinction between group and personal rights cannot reliably be
made).
60. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688.
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sity of personal interest, injury, or standing. In this article, I apply the
concepts of cognitive models and of metaphor to explain this history
and how these models were lost. I will also chart how doctrines unre-
lated to article III were successfully fashioned by liberal justices into an
individualist article III limitation on an activist conservative Court. I
will then dissect some of the more important modem standing cases to
show the disordering effects of standing on our legal analysis and of the
private rights model when applied to the public context.
In the final section, I will construct a framework for reconstituting
standing doctrine. The warp of that attempt is provided by those mod-
em justiciability cases which have already implicitly abandoned the
unidimensional, individualist model of standing. The woof is provided
by a theory of human cognition which demonstrates that multiple mod-
els and metaphors are necessary to meaningful interaction with the
world. Because the individualist weave of current doctrine interferes
with meaningful self-governance, I conclude with a discussion of the
role of litigation in a democratic society that would employ models of
"standing" better grounded in the nature of human cognition and
more reflective of human experience. The purpose of this endeavor is
to create new models, models that are reconstitutive rather than
alienating.
II. THE MEANING OF A METAPHOR
Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact
that many of our words were originally applicable only to physical
things; so that their use in connection with legal relations is, strictly
speaking, figurative or fictional. 61
A. Metaphors of Thought
The law is committed to the use of reason. New discoveries about
the nature of reason, therefore, have a natural and necessary place in
legal scholarship. To fail to recognize them ultimately would be to
deny the role of reason in law.
In ordinary legal discourse, we treat the term "standing" as a legal
term of art-a label for a concept or body of doctrine. But much of
what goes on in standing can be understood in terms of metaphors and
their relation to human cognition. The key to understanding-and to
61. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 24 (1913) (footnote ommitted).
The use of the term standing "is an excellent illustration of the extent to which uncritical
use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to
its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminately used
to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas." Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 318
U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to the use of the term "assumption
of risk"). Ironically, Justice Frankfurter capitalized on just this process with respect to the
term "standing." See text accompanying notes 246-288 & 393-468 infra.
1382 [Vol. 40:1371
July 1988] STANDING 1383
unlocking the barrier of standing law-lies in an appreciation that the
term "standing" is a metaphor. 62 Its origin no doubt comes from the
physical practices of the courtroom: A court will only hear a participant
if he or she is standing. "Standing" is therefore a natural metaphor for
when a court will consider a litigant's claim;63 the metaphor is motivated
by our experience. 64
The power of a metaphor is that it colors and controls our subse-
quent thinking about its subject. "This is so, in part, because the con-
cepts by which language expresses an otherwise unrepresentable...
reality are themselves generalizations importing preconceptions about
the reality to be expressed." 65 Recent scholarship on human cognition
suggests that metaphor is powerful because it is a fundamental compo-
nent of human reasoning.66 Metaphor enables us to see systems of
analogies not previously recognized. 67 It allows us to use a source do-
62. To prevent confusion, I use quotes---"standing"-when I refer to the metaphor and
do not do so when I refer to the legal doctrine.
63. See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 14 (1980): "[M]etaphorical
orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience." lId
"[1'je feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its
erpenential basis." Id at 19. (emphasis in original); cf C. LEvI-STRAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 93
(1962) ("The mythical system and the modes of representation it employs serve to establish
homologies between natural and social conditions .... ).
The term "standing" may also have antecedents in the practice and structure of the royal
ensemble or political court-one's status at court could be judged by how close one stood to
the king; one's status was evident in one's standing.
64. G. LAYOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT
THE MIND 113 (1987). Lakoff's use of the term "motivation" has nothing to do with conscious
intent. Rather, he uses the term to convey that, as products of human imagination, meta-
phors, models and concepts are neither arbitrary nor entirely predictable. The concept of
motivation addresses what "makes sense of" a system of thought; it does not provide "princi-
ples that generate, orpredict, the system." Id. at 96 (emphasis in original). See also text accompa-
nying notes 493-494 infra.
65. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
66. See, e.g., G. LAKOFF, supra note 64; M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY
BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); G. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, supra note 63.
The account of reasoning that follows diverges sharply from traditional objectivist accounts,
which view reasoning as propositional and knowledge as correspondence with an objective
reality. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at xi-xii. For a further discussion of the central role of
metaphor in thought see notes 676-730 infra and accompanying text. In a forthcoming piece,
I will discuss the relationship between the experientialist epistemology that follows and stan-
dard philosophical accounts of reasoning and knowledge. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law (manuscript in preparation on file with the
Stanford Law Review).
67. See M. BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGAUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY
(1962):
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive
and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for
seeing the other;, the implications, suggestions, and supporting values entwined with
the literal use of the metaphorical expression enable us to see a new subject matter in
a new way. The extended meanings that result, the relations between initially dispa-
rate realms created, can neither be antecedently predicted nor subsequently para-
phrased in prose. We can comment upon the metaphor, but the metaphor itself
neither needs nor invites explanation and paraphrase. Metaphorical thought is a dis-
tinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed as an ornamental substitute
for plain thought.
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main with an existing conceptual structure to understand and structure
another conceptual domain.68 That is, the structure or attributes of the
source domain are "carried over" 69 and applied to the target domain.
This process of metaphoric projection is essentially the same as the
way in which we use models. "[M]odels... too, bring about a wedding
of disparate subjects, by a distinctive operation of transfer of implications
of relatively well-organized cognitive fields." 70 A model, thus, is an-
other way of describing the source domain of a metaphor or an anal-
ogy. Recent scholarship indicates that these reasoning processes are
cognitively and epistemologically central.
There is a developing body of work on human cognition which sug-
gests that human thought is grounded in physical experience and ex-
tended by means of idealized cognitive models and metaphoric
projections. 71 According to this theory, basic preconceptual exper-
iences (or schema) provide the organizing principles for the construc-
tion of conceptual models. 72 Examples include link schema (such as the
umbilical cord, hand holding); container schema (we experience our
Id. at 236-37 (emphasis in original).
68. Max Black explained the function of metaphor by means of two metaphors: A meta-
phor is a filter and a metaphor is a lens. Id. at 39-41.
69. The word "metaphor"-itselfa metaphor from physical experience-is derived from
the Greek words pherein, "to carry," and meta, "over." T. HAWKES, METAPHOR 1 (1972).
70. M. BLACK, supra note 67, at 236-37 (emphasis in original).
71. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 64; M. JOHNSON, supra note 66. Lakoff's and Johnson's
works draw on an extensive body of empirical work in experimental psychology, linguistics,
and anthropology. See, e.g., G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 22-50, 58-64, 91-113, 119-30, 313-17,
330-34, 416-17. An important part of this work concerns the phenomenon of "prototype
effects" discussed in the text. See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra; see, e.g., Rosch, Natural
Categories, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 328 (1973); Rosch, Principles of Categorization in COGNITION
AND CATEGORIZATION 27-48 (1978); Rosch, Prototype Classification and Logical Classification: The
Two Systems, in NEW TRENDS IN CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION: CHALLENGES TO PIAGET'S THE-
ORY 73-86 (E. Scholnick ed. 1983).
Although the account of reasoning that follows may appear oversimplified, this appear-
ance is a necessary by-product of compression. In fact, Lakoff provides a sophisticated and
extensive account of the structure of cognitive processes. For example, I have highlighted
only the role of image-schemata and metaphor in the construction of cognitive models.
Lakoff, however, identifies other kinds of cognitive models structured by means of proposi-
tions, scenarios, and metonymies. G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 113-14. He also describes in
detail how it is that we construct and extend these cognitive models. ME at 281-92.
72. Like any theory, this theory has antecedents. The concept of schemata as mediations
between sense experience and conceptualization derives from Kant. See I. KANT, CRITIqUE OF
PURE REASON A138-41, B177-80 (N.K. Smith trans. 1963). For a discussion of how the theory
of schemata adumbrated in the text is culled from but is somewhat different than Kant's, see
M.JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 23-24, 152-57. The nonobjectivist approach to categorization,
in which members of the same category have some features in common but no essential crite-
ria, owes much to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance. See L. WrrrGENSTEiN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31-34 (G. Anscombe trans. 1953) (describing board games,
Olympic games, and gaming with dice as "games" that only bear a family resemblance to one
another). The concept of an idealized cognitive model as a basic structure of thought is influ-
enced by Hilary Putnam's concept of stereotypes. See Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning, "in 7
MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 131 (K. Gunderson ed. 1975). A survey
of the intellectual history of the movement from which experientialist cognitive theory has
developed is provided in H. GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNI-
TIVE REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1987).
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bodies as having an in-out orientation); part-whole schema (we experi-
ence directly the relationships between our hands and the rest of the
body);73 and source-path-goal schema (from earliest childhood, we move
from one place to another to obtain desired objects). 74 The human
capacity to conceptualize allows us to project these structures and to
use them to organize other aspects of our experience. To take a simple
example, we conceptualize purposes in terms of the source-path-goal
schema; this gives rise to systematic source-path-goal metaphors that we
use in our thinking about purposes. We can therefore perceive our
purposive efforts as going a long way toward our goal, conceptualize
something or somebody that interferes with our purposes as an obstacle
that gets in our way, and describe some of our failings in terms of being
sidetracked. 7 5
An important part of this theory is premised on the phenomenon of
prototype effects. In the classical theory of categorization, all objects hav-
ing the same relevant criteria are classed together. In this view, no cat-
egory member is any more "representative" of a category than another.
Empirical work in psychology, however, has shown that people within
cultures, and sometimes across cultures,76 pick out the same "proto-
types" or best examples of categories. Thus, robins and sparrows are
typically identified as prototypical birds; owls and eagles, although
birds, are not viewed as prototypical. 77
What explains this phenomenon is the notion that categories have
an internal structure which produces these perceptions of best exam-
ples. The claim is that categories are structured by means of idealized
cognitive models-culturally shared "theories" of how to organize some
portion of our experience. These models may be organized in terms of
image-schemata like the source-path-goal schema or in terms of a group
of related propositions grounded in a physical/cultural experience. An
example is the stereotypical conceptualization of "mother" by means of
an idealized cognitive model that assumes natural childbirth by a wo-
man who is married to the biological father, and who is also the primary
nurturer and full-time caretaker of the child. Women who fit this ideal-
ized cognitive model are prototypical "mothers" and are referred to as
such. But nonprototypical mothers are marked as such by the linguistic
conventions resulting from this model: They are stepmothers, surrogate
mothers, biological mothers, foster mothers, working mothers, or unwed
73. The part-whole schema gives rise to metonymy: The use of one entity or part to refer
to another, as when one refers to a class as a lot offaces. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 77-79;
G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 35-40; see also G. FAUCONNIER, MENTAL SPACES:
ASPECTS OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 3-5 (1985).
74. "Yes; it seems quite simple. But I doubt if we ever know why we do things. The only
really simple thing is to go straight for what you want and grab it." G.B. SHAW, MAN AND
SUPERMAN, Act IV (1903) (Ann Whitefield).
75. G. L4,KOFF, supra note 64, at 275-80.
76. See, e.g., zd. at 330-34.
77. Id. at 40-46.
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mothers. 78 Thus, the overall category of "mother" can be understood
as a radial category-that is, a category defined by a central model ex-
tended by certain "conventionalized variants."'79
Because "prototypes act as cognitive reference points of various sorts
and form the basis for inferences," 80 they tend to play an important
role in reasoning about categories. Sometimes, we may not distinguish
the variants from the prototype of the idealized cognitive model. An
extreme example is when a child thinks that the teacher or daycare
worker is the mother 'of the other children. In that case, we have a
radical prototype effect in which the prototype overshadows the rest of the
category. Other times, we simply fail to perceive the variants as exam-
ples of the same category; some might not see any of the nonprototypi-
cal mothers as real mothers. In that case, we have a reduction-to-prototype
effect in which the category is reduced to the central case of the model,
resulting in the exclusion of nonprototypical cases. One consequence
of these extreme prototype effects81 is that the variants may be left un-
expressed by the linguistic conventions of the culture. Because they
have no name, these variants become suppressed aspects of our social
consciousness. Examples would be women who supply an egg to be
planted in someone else's womb, legal guardians who do not provide
nurturance (Auntie Maine), or transsexuals who had a child before their
sex change operation.
B. "Standing" as Metaphor
To the reader unfamiliar with this new scholarship, this may seem
either strange or far afield for an article about the law of standing. But
by bringing to the surface the models and metaphors that animate stan-
dard legal thinking, we will be able to see and talk about both the his-
tory of standing and troublesome aspects of the doctrine in a new and
enlightening way.
Metaphor is successful in structuring understanding-that is, meta-
phor is interactive and has ontological effect-because in organizing our
78. Id. at 74, 79-84. The idealized cognitive model discussed in the text reflects the
traditional conception of "mother" in a patriarchal culture. This phenomenon illustrates the
role that language plays in encoding and preserving social practices. See note 96 infra. The
underlying cognitive model and the language will no doubt change as society moves towards
real sexual equality and the gender roles within and without the family change.
In the meantime, these assumptions exert a powerful influence on legal thinking. Re-
cently, Professor Minow discussed the effects such idealized cognitive models and unstated
social assumptions have on the many questions of difference that the courts regularly con-
front. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987); see id at 13-14, 44 (discussing Lakoff's description of "mother" as a radial category);
id. at 31-57 (discussing the underlying assumptions in the law that obliterate difference).
79. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 84-85. A radial category is itself structured in terms
of the preconceptual center-periphery schema. Id. at 287.
80. Id. at 45 (emphasis in original) (citing Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNrIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 532, 544-46 (1975)).
81. The terminology used in this paragraph was worked out in collaboration with
George Lakoff.
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view of the target domain it both highlights similarities with the source
domain and suppresses and hides dissimilarities, which become a spe-
cies of epistemic "noise."8 2 Metaphor can, thus, have as great a poten-
tial to mislead as to enlighten.
[W]hile metaphors can be abused in many different ways, the most seri-
ous and interesting danger is that a given metaphor or its allegorical
extension may be transformed into myth. ... [M]yth results when the
mask, lens filter, or construing subject is mistaken for or equated with
the subject construed. By suppressing those aspects of the principal
subject which are not amenable to the subsidiary subject, or by al-
lowing the subsidiary subject to exert an undetected influence on the
principal subject, the difference between the two referents of the meta-
phorical sign focus tends to be lost altogether. The metaphor is turned
into, not only a literal truth, but the literal truth about the principal
subject in question.83
The metaphor of "standing" is a myth that has become "the literal
truth" and shaped-or misshaped-our thinking about adjudication. It
has shaped our thinking about adjudication to conform to two separate
"truths" embedded in the metaphor, and to think about them as one.
The first is the "truth" of individualism: One stands alone; one stands
up; one stands apart; one stands out; one stands head and shoulders
above the crowd.
The metaphor of "standing" is thus the lens through which we view
the question of who has rights and who may assert them. Through this
lens we see only the disconnected individual in a fragmented society.
But this perspective obscures the fact that individuals exist only as part
of groups and larger communities of interest. And it obscures our abil-
ity to think about how best to protect and effectuate those interests in
an interdependent world. In the metaphorically structured reality of
82. See M. BLACK, supra note 65, at 39-41. Donald Davidson rejects Black's interactive
view of metaphor. "No doubt metaphors ... do provide a kind of lens or lattice, as Black says,
through which we view the relevant phenomena. The issue does not lie here but in the ques-
tion of how the metaphor is related to what it makes us see." Davidson, What Metaphors Mean,
5 CRITICAL INQUIRY 31, 45 (Autumn 1978). Assessing the operation of metaphor from the
standpoint of a more mainstream semantics, Davidson concludes that it must act outside the
domain of objectivity and truth and, instead, in the domain of art and subjectivity. In his view,
"there is no test for metaphor that does not call for taste." Id. at 31.
The work of Lakoff and Johnson, G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63; G. LAKOFF,
supra note 64; M.JOHNSON, supra note 66, is inconsistent with this approach. (For a discussion
of the relationship of Davidson's view to the work of Lakoff and Johnson, see M. JOHNsON,
supra note 66, at 71-72.)
Lakoff and Johnson view human understanding as largely imaginative and metaphoric.
The substantial explanatory power of their work is revealed, for example, in Black's use of the
filter and ens metaphors to explain the concept of metaphor. See M. BLACK, supra note 67, at
39-41. Another example is cited by Black: "[A]nalogical procedure seems characteristic of
much intellectual enterprise. There is a deal of wisdom in the popular locution for 'what is its
nature?' namely: 'What's it like?"' M. BLACK, supra note 67, at 240 (quoting M.H. ABRAMS,
THE MIRROR AND THE LArP 32 (1953) (emphasis in original)). See also notes 676-730 and
accompanying text.
83. Berggren, The Use and.Abuse of Metaphor, , 16 REv. METAPHYSICS: PHIL. Q. 236, 244-
45 (1962-63) (emphasis in original).
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the law of standing, there are no forests and no ecosystems. There are
only trees; and only the trees have "standing." '8 4
The second "truth" embodied in the metaphor is that the individual
must have a particular kind of relationship to the court whose power he
or she is seeking to invoke: A court will only consider what a party has
to say if he or she is standing (read: has "standing"). This view colors
our thinking because it focuses us on the relationship between a party's
status and a generalized conception of legal process.
Modem standing law defines this relationship between the individ-
ual and the process in terms of a particular cognitive model: the private
rights model. We structure this model by means of two metaphors pre-
mised on the source-path-goal schema: a causal source-path-goal metaphor
and a remedial source-path-goal metaphor. We identify the subject mat-
ter of a lawsuit through the elements of the causal schema.8 5 The de-
fendant's act is the source, the causal chain is the path, and the plaintiff's
injury is the goal. The remedial source-path-goal metaphor is virtually a
mirror image of the causal one: The individual's injury is the source of a
process that has as its goal an order from the court redressing that in-
jury; the path that connects them is the plaintiff's proof that the acts of
the defendant caused the injury.8 6 The mirror image quality of these
two source-path-goal metaphors gives rise to the conception of damages
and other forms of legal redress as designed "to put the plaintiff back in
the position he occupied"87 (or as near as possible) before occurrence of
the legal wrong.
The model just described is the idealized cognitive model of a pri-
84. Cf Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that inanimate objects should have standing, and citing Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972)).
85. We understand prototypical causation in terms of an agent that is the energy source,
a subject that is the goal, and a transfer of energy from agent to subject (usually by a set of
controlled physical actions) effecting a change. G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 54-55; G. LAKOFF
& M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 70-72. Causation is thus grounded in the same kind of
preconceptual source-path-goal experience as purposes.
Although typically absent from legal thinking, we frequently use metaphors of kinship to
express concepts of causation, as in the adage: "Necessity is the mother of invention." For a
discussion of the prevalence of kinship metaphors in literature, see M. TURNER, DEATH IS THE
MOTHER OF BEAUTY: MIND, METAPHOR, CRITICISM (1987).
86. The source of the term "cause of action" lies in these source-path-goal metaphors.
The plaintiff's proof of the causal source-path-goal metaphor is the cause of the court's action:
the remedial order. Cf J. VINING, supra note 27, at 15. The use of the source-path-goal meta-
phor is also reflected in our description of the judicial event as a proceeding. The "stuff" of
such proceedings are legal rights: a word that derives from the Latin rectus or "straight." For
more on the metaphoric implications of the notion of rights, see Winter, supra note 66.
87. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583, 296 N.E.2d 183, 187 (1973) (Kaplan,J.)
(emphasis added); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 537
(7th ed. 1982) (Compensatory damages are intended to "restore [the plaintiff] to the position
he occupied before the tort."); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 560
(1935) ("damages for a tort should place the injured person as nearly as possible in the condi-
tion he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred, and ... damages for breach of
contract should place the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been
fulfilled.").
[Vol. 40:13711388
July 1988] STANDING 1389
vate cause of action.8 8 The tripartite test of standing which focuses on
injury, causation, and redressability is thus an extrapolation from the
essential elements of the source-path-goal schema of the private rights
model. This reductive legal test is a natural byproduct of the "stand-
ing" metaphor's ontological effect.
This analysis may seem reminiscent of the traditional view of the
origins and functions of the law of standing that I referred to above.89
What differentiates these perspectives is that the traditional view sees
standing law as a rational deduction from objective historical practice.
In contrast, I am suggesting that it is historically incorrect and, thus,
can only be explained as a function of particular cognitive processes.
My view is premised on the recognition that the use of a particular cog-
nitive model has ontological effects in the real world. For example, the
primacy of purpose or intent in the definition of widely disparate causes of
action90 is the result of a coherence prototype effect9 ' arising from the
88. I part company from Albert, supra note 12, and Currie, supra note 12, because their
focus and reliance on the concept of "cause of action" merely recreates the private rights
model. Albert, for example, notes that:
This doctrine of official accountability under the private law ... worked well enough
in the nineteenth century when litigation often involved resisting official impositions
on one's person or property .... It worked less well in maintaining official accounta-
bility where claims to bonuses, pensions, and public lands were involved. And it
worked very badly in accommodating nonstatutory review under the proliferation of
spending and regulatory programs in the twentieth century.
Albert, supra note 12, at 434 (footnotes omitted). But when Professor Albert applies his
"claim for relief" analysis to the problems of standing, he concludes that "[p]ubic... inter-
ests and claims are similar to private ones long vindicated in judicial proceedings .... " Id. at
474-75. Having recreated the private rights model, he cannot explain why, as a practical mat-
ter, it has failed to accommodate these public claims. The answer is, in my view, that to stay
within the private rights model of standing makes it difficult to escape the individualist prem-
ise of the metaphor. Thus, Professor Albert would treat most third-party standing cases as
cases of derivative personal right. Id. at 465-68.
In contrast, Professors Chayes and Stewart recognize the public dimensions of the adju-
dicatory process that call for representational, Chayes, supra note 28, at 24-26, or surrogate,
Stewart, supra note 5, at 1742-44, standing. Once we have freed standing doctrine from its
mistaken historical and individualistic premises, as I do in the sections below, we will be able
more fully to appreciate the value and necessity of the public dimensions of adjudication. See
notes 590-784 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1285
(1976) ("The basic conceptions governing legal liability [in the late nineteenth century] were
'intention' and 'fault.' "). See, e.g., Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979) (equal protection claim by women must show that "the decisionmaker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects"); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (employee
who claims that he was dismissed because of his exercise of first amendment rights must show
"that this conduct was a 'substantial factor'--or to put it in other words, a 'motivating factor'
in the Board's decision not to rehire him") (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring proof of scienter for claim of securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (proof of intent necessary for claim of racial dis-
crimination under the equal protection clause); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S.
26, 33 (1967) ("the finding of a violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory con-
duct was motivated by an anti union purpose."). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033 (1987) (plurality opinion) (jurisdiction based on
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overlap of related cognitive models. Our use of the causal source-path-
goal metaphor to conceptualize the subject matter of a lawsuit overlaps
with our use of source-path-goal metaphors to structure our view of both
purposes and causation. A cause of action is defined in terms of the con-
fluence or intersection of these source-path-goal metaphors. In defining
causes of action, we unconsciously experience purpose as prototypical
because it is coherent-that is, it fits the entailments of all three uses of
the schema.
Thus, we do not ordinarily define a cause of action in terms of the
experience of the plaintiff (the source of the remedial source-path-goal
metaphor).92 Rather, we define it in terms of the purposive, causal as-
pects of defendant's behavior. This explains the Court's otherwise bi-
zarre statement in Daniels v. Williams that "the word 'deprive' in the Due
Process Clause connote[s] more than a negligent act. . .. -"3 The vic-
tim, of course, experiences precisely the same physical deprivation
whatever the defendant's mental state. Similarly, a bystander who sim-
ply observes the events would see exactly the same physical actions with
exactly the same consequences for the victim regardless of the defend-
ant's state of mind. But the Court, whose view of the scenario is neces-
sarily mediated by cognitive processes, perceives a different and
narrower reality. The Court then asserts that its perception is the prod-
uct of a conventional linguistic expression (that is, "the word .. .
minimum contacts requires "an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. ')
(emphasis in original)).
91. G. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 41-45, demonstrate how even inconsis-
tent metaphors may be coherent because they share mutual entailments. (An entailment is an
intuitive relationship such that, because A and B are connected, whenever we take A to be the
case we also take B to be the case.) Mixed metaphors can be coherent when for metaphors A
and C, A entails B and C also entails B. Id. at 87-96. For Lakoff's discussion of motivation on
which my analysis of the coherence effect is based, see G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 346 ("Mo-
tivation is a central phenomenon in cognition. The reason is this: It is easier to learn something
that is motivated than something that is arbitrary. It is also easier to remember and use motivated
knowledge than arbitrary knowledge." (emphasis in original)).
In one sense, all prototype effects are coherence effects. A prototype is chosen as a best
example of a category precisely because it fits (i.e., is coherent with) the particular idealized
cognitive model. I use the term coherence effect, however, to highlight the ontological ver-
sion of this cognitive phenomenon that can be observed in more complex conceptual settings,
as in the case of converging cognitive models and radial categories involving diverse and
inconsistent schemata. See notes 205-245 infra and accompanying text.
92. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245 ("we have difficulty understanding how a
law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially dis-
criminatory and denies 'any person... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater
proportion of Negroes fail .. "). But cf. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868, L.R., 3 H.L. 330, 338; D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 610 (5th ed. 1984) (discuss-
ing strict liability in tort).
93. 474 U.S. 327, 330, (1986). A recent dissent by Justice O'Connor provides an inter-
esting example of the cognitive overlap of the source-path-goal metaphors for intent and causa-
tion. In City of Springfield v. Kibbe, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987), Justice O'Connor
invoked this coherence effect in arguing that "the law has been willing to trace more distant
causation when there is a cognitive component to the defendant's fault ..... Id at 1121
(O'Connor, White, Powell, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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connote[s]") .
There are analogous narrowing effects in the context of standing.
When the metaphor of "standing" becomes the conduit of certain
"truths," it structures our perception of the boundaries of the legal
world in a way that is distorting.95 The "standing" metaphor affects
both how we perceive our past and what we receive from it in terms of
available legal tools.9 6 Viewed through the lens of "standing," adjudi-
cation was always about the settlement of private disputes; questions of
public values are implicated only incidentally. But this was not always
the case. At the time of the Framers, non-individualistic, group models
of adjudication, like mandamus and informers' actions, had been
designed to deal with public issues. 97 These public rights models were
structured in terms of other schemata very much at odds with the mod-
em conceptualization of standing. The "standing" metaphor, there-
fore, deprives us of a knowledge of our own history. As a result, we
lose an understanding of what that history could say to us about our
possibilities.
The "standing" metaphor also interferes with our practical ability to
face the underlying substantive issues that confront us. When we focus
in standing cases on what the metaphor makes us see, we miss some of
the suppressed aspects of our reality. The law of standing is, thus, an
example of the obfuscatory power of metaphor.98 We focus on issues
such as the role of prudence in standing law or the relationship be-
tween standing and the separation of powers, while other real and im-
portant issues in the cases remain hidden and largely unexamined. 99 In
94. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
95. In focusing on the "standing" metaphor, we see only what the metaphor brings us to
see. "[I]t is so hard to decide, even in the case of the simplest metaphors, exactly what the
content is supposed to be. The reason is... that we imagine there is a content to be captured
when all the while we are in fact focusing on what the metaphor makes us notice." Davidson,
supra, note 82, at 46.
96. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY (1967):
[T]he sum of linguistic objectifications pertaining to my occupation constitutes [a]
... semantic field, which meaningfully orders ... the routine events I encounter in
my daily work. Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for.., historical
experience to be objectified, retained and accumulated. The accumulation, of
course, is selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and
what "forgotten" of the total experience of... the society.
hit at 41.
97. See text accompanying notes 121-172, 184-198 & 218-245 infra.
98. Cf Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J. dissenting) ("[Tlhis accounts for the phe-
nomenon of opinions, such as the one today, that tend merely to obfuscate, rather than in-
form, our understanding of the meaning of rights under the law."); Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (referring to "[t]he Court's further obfuscation of the law of standing").
99. Professor Stewart, for example, provides a good explanation of how the zone of
interest analysis in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 190 (1970),
distorted the Court's analysis of the merits. Stewart, supra note 5, at 1732-33. In Section V, I
dissect several major standing cases to demonstrate that this suppression of the merits entail-
ments of standing determinations is an inevitable consequence of standing doctrine.
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a case like Lyons, the substantive issue left unexamined may be a matter
of life or death.
In every standing case, the unexamined issues concern the nature of
the right that society is being asked to recognize and the shape of the
correlative remedy that it is willing to bestow. They concern the role of
law in shaping a self-governing society. Viewed from this perspective,
the question "who may sue?" is really a question of "what are rights
and how may they best be effectuated?" 00 a question at the heart of
law. Standing obscures consideration and analysis of the underlying
questions of rights and remedies, of policies and values, by imposing a
single, unidimensional conceptual ordering of the process of adjudica-
tion. But, these questions in fact present disparate policy choices that a
democratic society must make across an entire spectrum of vastly differ-
ent problems of social organization.
Analytically, then, standing doctrine is neither a series of rules
about when a court will reach the merits nor a shill for a decision on the
merits. It is a determination that, regardless of the blinders we employ,
necessarily entails considerations that go to the merits. It is not so
much a question of the who or the when, 10 1 as it is inevitably a question
of the what. Standing is a decision about the scope of and the policies
governing rights and remedies in the underlying subject matter area.
Its shape can therefore change from area to area: The question "who
may sue?" will be answered differently depending on what they wish to
sue about. It may be answered differently in a first amendment case
than in an antitrust or tax case. In each, it is a question about how far
the benefits of the particular law at issue extend, about the ability of
those affected to assert their interests, and about what we gain and what
100. This insight was prompted by two observations of Professor Wechsler's.
More precisely stated, the question of standing ... is the question whether the
litigant has a sufficient personal interest in getting the relief he seeks, or is a suffi-
ciently appropriate representative of other interested persons, to warrant giving him
the relief, if he establishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same token, to warrant
recognizing him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of illegality. So
viewed, the question becomes inextricably bound up with the whole law of rights and remedies, does
it not?
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 156 (emphasis added).
(This paragraph also appears in essentially the same form in the original edition, H. HART &
H. WEcHsLER, supra note 21, at 174 (1953)). Subsequently, Professor Wechsler observed that:
Only when the standing law, decisional or statutory, provides a remedy to vindicate
the interest that demands protection against infringement of the kind that is alleged,
a law of remedies that ordinarily at least is framed in reference to rights and wrongs
in general, do the courts have any business asking what the Constitution may require
or forbid ....
Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1959). Profes-
sor Wechsler makes certain assumptions that, despite my deep personal respect for him, I
cannot share. He assumes a set of principles governing standing--'a law of remedies that
ordinarily at least is framed in reference to rights and wrongs in general"--generalizable
across subject matter areas in a "neutral" way. Id.
101. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363
(1973).
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we lose when we encourage perception of and action upon shared in-
terests. It is these important questions of policies and values that are
obscured by the metaphoric individualist and process oriented ap-
proach to standing.
A determination of who has standing, moreover, is a determination
about the way society is shaped and structured. In structuring and or-
dering the universe of legal relationships, standing law inevitably or-
ders the way rights and other legal interests may be distributed. When
we persist in seeing only the individual as a cognizable social unit, we
limit also the recognizable interests that are available for our considera-
tion either in adjudication or legislation. Thus, for example, there is no
meaningful legal interest in a public report of Central Intelligence
Agency appropriations because no individual can document a concrete
injury as a result of the lack of knowledge about these appropria-
tions.102 But once a court has said that the citizen has suffered no in-
jury, it will be difficult for the rest of society to see why it should be
concerned about the issue at all. If no one is harmed, there seems little
reason to devote time and energy in the legislative process to deal with
what appears to be a nonproblem. Standing law thus becomes a sort of
"harmless error" doctrine for the political process. In this way too, our
perception of the who affects our understanding of the what. 10 3
The question of standing, thus, is also a question about the nature
of our relationships in society and our ability to sustain our community.
It divides us from one another by reinforcing our individual and con-
flicting self-interests and by submerging our common stake in the com-
munity. It alienates us so that we do not control our government or,
ultimately, our fate.
I have stated my thesis. But the test of a theory is in its application.
I will develop these ideas in the nitty-gritty of legal doctrine and real
cases. We begin with our history.
102. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Cf Kelman, Taking Takings Seri-
ously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1847-48 (1986) (reviewing R. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)) ("We recognize what
rights we have simply by seeing what remedies we are entitled to. Legal thought distorts our
perception because we... come to believe there can be no problem, no significant interest to
vindicate unless we can imagine how a legal right might vindicate it.").
103. Professor Vining argues that our shared understanding of the relevant social inter-
ests affects our ability to recognize the legal identity of the individual as a proper claimant in
court-that is, that the what motivates the who. He gives as an example a litigant who favors
an entirely blue landscape suing to prevent the construction of a nearby red house. In Vin-
ing's view the court would not reach the merits because of
the absence, to the court's eyes, of a "you" to be harmed; and what prevents the
court from seeing a "you," a person, is the absence of any public value to define a
class for which the individual voice might speak. To say "I am an all-blue lover..."
does not have meaning until the love of blue... becomes ... widely enough shared
to permit us to recognize it as a social role.
J. VINING, supra note 27, at 61. It is unclear, however, why Vining thinks a court would dismiss
for lack of standing and not on the merits for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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III. THE ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS MODEL
These... are my tools of trade. A lawyer without history or literature
is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge
of these he may venture to call himself an architect.104
A. Of Framers and Relators, Informers and the Forms of Action
A famous Holmesian dictum has it that "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic."105 The history of standing suggests, however, that
history without logic can be easily mislaid. In this section, we will redis-
cover that history and reconstruct its logic.
The modem doctrine of standing often is justified as grounded in a
historical understanding of the language of article III respecting
"case[s] or controvers[ies]" or "the judicial Power of the United States
.... t1106 Justice Frankfurter argued that the provisions of article III:
mean that a court will not decide a question unless the nature of the
action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship be-
tween the parties are such that judicial determination is consonant with
what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and
the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed. 10 7
Recent decisions continue to reflect this syllogism.108 Yet, the English,
colonial, and post-constitutional practices suggest that the contempora-
neous understanding of the "case or controversy" clause considered as
104. SIR WALTER Scoi-r, Guy MANNERING 249 (1815).
105. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
106. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. III).
107. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150.
108. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 563
(1962) (plurality opinion) (quoting United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 44, 60
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-97 (1968) ("Fed-
eraljudicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent
with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolu-
tion through the judicial process."); cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Congress may not assign to non-
article IIIjudges state law actions for "damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and
other counts which are the stuff ofthe traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at
Westminster in 1789."). But see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("The requirements of Art. III are not
satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights,
and has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in
terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process."). Note, however, that the
Court's statement in Valley Forge reflects the degree to which current standing law is defined in
opposition to the traditional syllogism.
In Glidden, Justice Harlan noted that suits against the government fell within that
tradition:
Suits against the English sovereign by petition of liberate, monstrans de droit, and other
forms of action designed to gain redress against unlawful action of the Crown had
been developed over several centuries and were well-established before the Revolu-
tion .... Similar provisions for judicial remedies against themselves were made by
the American States immediately after the Revolution.
Glidden, 370 U.S. at 563.
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justiciable actions concerning general governmental unlawfulness, even
in the absence of injury to any specific person, and even when prose-
cuted by any common citizen with information about the alleged illegal-
ity. In other words, there was a public rights model structured in terms
of alternative schemata.
At the time of the Framers, the concept ofjusticiability did not em-
brace notions of standing as we think about them today. It was neces-
sary that a legal question "assume such a form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on it."1° 9 But the Court did not express that concept
in terms of "standing" or the essentials of a private cause of action.
Rather, it expressed it in formalistic terms, in what I shall call the syllo-
gism of the forms: "UJudicial] power is capable of acting only when the
subject is submitted to it, by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case ... ." 110 This understanding
ofjusticiability predominated until the middle of the twentieth century,
from Marshall'' to Story1 12 to Field" l 3 to Day' 14 to Tafti" 5 to Bran-
deis.116 What a court looked for was whether the matter before it fit
one of the recognized forms of action.
This justiciability standard reflected the mediating influence of the
common law forms of actions on the procedure and substance of pri-
vate rights. Law was that body of rules that defined the rights of citi-
zens and, concurrently and coextensively, provided a remedy to the
injured party. The forms of action stood as the gatekeepers of this sys-
tem. Thus Blackstone could speak simultaneously of "the several inju-
109. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (Marshall,
CJ.); accord Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that
appeal from denial of writ of prohibition to restrain an allegedly unconstitutional tax was a
,case" or "suit" and therefore within the Court's jurisdiction).
110. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819.
111. Id,
112. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrLrrION OF THE UNITED STATES 1640
(1833).
113. In In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887),Justice Field summa-
rized the law ofjusticiability-that is, the meaning of "cases or controversies"--in precisely
these terms, quoting from the extrajudicial writings of Marshall and Story as well as from the
cases. Id at 255-56.
114. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-58 (1911). Justice Day's opinion for
the Court relied on Pacific Ry. Comm'n, and on Marshall's opinions in Osborn and Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
115. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923) ("[Ihe jurisdiction of this
Court and of the inferior courts of the United States ordained and established by Congress
under and by virtue of the third article of the Constitution is limited to cases and controver-
sies in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them .... ).
116. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926) (naturalization petition). Justice Bran-
deis emphasized that it is theform, and not the substance, that determines
[w]hether a proceeding which results in a grant is a judicial one. [It] does not de-
pend on the nature of the thing granted, but upon the nature of the proceeding
which Congress has provided for securing the grant.... Whenever the law provides
a remedy enforceable in the courts according to the regular course of legal proce-
dure, and that remedy is pursued, there arises a case within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, whether the subject of the litigation be property or status.
Id at 576-77.
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ries cognizable by the courts of common law, with the respective
remedies applicable to each particular injury,"' "1 7 and of the principle
"that where there is a legal right there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded." 118 Based upon these principles,
Chief Justice Marshall could draw the more extensive conclusion that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury." ' 19 Under the eighteenth century common law, rights were sy-
nonymous with remedies, 120 remedies were synonymous with the forms
of action, and, by algebraic logic, the forms of action were synonymous
with the concept of redressable (that is, cognizable) injuries. In this
traditional doctrine, one can see reflected the mirror image quality of
the remedial and causal metaphors of the private rights model.
One might infer from this that the practice at the time of the Fram-
ers was consistent with the private rights model of the "case and con-
troversy" requirement and modem standing law's focus on "injury-in-
fact." Although the common law forms of action dominated the legal
process and jurisprudential thought of the time, they did not exhaust
it. 1 2 ' There were other matters of "such a form that the judicial power
is capable of acting on" them.' 22 Characterized neither by the private
rights model of the seven common law forms of action nor by the "in-
jury-in-fact" paradigm of modem standing doctrine, these matters took
forms astonishingly similar to the "standingless" public action or "pri-
vate attorney general" model that modem standing law is designed to
thwart.
Prior to the Revolution, other writs as well as equity practices
brought before the courts cases in which the plaintiff had no personal
interest or "injury-in-fact." Under the English practice, "standingless"
suits against illegal governmental action could be brought via the pre-
rogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari issued by the
King's Bench. 123 Thejurisdiction of King's Bench to superintend local
governmental authorities by means of these writs developed at the
117. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *115. See also id at *109 ("For it is the settled
and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld must have a
remedy and, every injury its proper redress.").
118. Id. at *23 (emphasis in original).
119. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 102 (1803). Marshall drew this dictum
directly from the passages in Blackstone quoted in the text.
120. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 400 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (citing Marbury and referring to the Framers' "contemporary modes ofjurispruden-
tial thought which appeared to link 'rights' and 'remedies' in a 1:1 correlation .... ").
121. This dominance was so marked that Blackstone referred to "such injuries or en-
croachments as may occur between the crown and the subject" as cases in which the remedy
"is generally of a peculiar and eccentrical nature." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 115-
16.
122. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824).
123. Also in this category was the writ ofquo warranto. See Berger, supra note 31, at 823.
On the "justiciability" in early American law of writs of prohibition, see Weston v. Charleston,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829), discussed in note 109 supra.
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close of the seventeenth century. 124
The very availability of these writs as means to control governmen-
tal action belies the private rights model; these procedural devices were
designed to restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or pub-
lic agencies, especially actions that were beyond their jurisdiction. 25
These writs fit easily within the jurisprudential thought of the time.126
As Blackstone explained it, mandamus and prohibition redressed the
legal injuries of "refusal or neglect ofjustice"127 and "encroachment of
jurisdiction,"'' 28 respectively. Neither of these concepts entails a view
in which only individuals can be rights-holders. To the contrary, "ne-
glect of justice" and "encroachment of jurisdiction" are essentially
communal concerns. 129 And, if Blackstone's definitions of these "inju-
ries" sound strange to modem ears, it is because today's jurisprudence
treats "injury-in-fact" in literalist terms. But the common law usage of
the term "injury" was plainly metaphoric. 130 The term "injury" re-
ferred to "any infringement of the rights of another.., for which an
action lies at law."'' Legal injuries were conceptualized in terms of
the experience of physical injury, but the former was not confused with
the latter. It is only in this sense that there could be a notion of damnum
absque injuria-that is, damage without cognizable legal injury.
Unlike the common law writs, the prerogative writs were not struc-
tured in terms of the source-path-goal schema. Rather, the subject matter
of the prerogative writs was understood in terms of the part-whole
schema: The King's Bench acted on behalf of the King himself (the
124. S.A. DE SMrIH, supra note 34, at 337-38; Rex v. Glamorganshire Inhabitants, I
Ld.Raym. 580 (1700) (The Cardiff Bridge case). "Local government bore a judicial aspect
.... It was assumed that the writs of certiorari and prohibition, by which [local governments]
were controlled in their capacity as courts of summary jurisdiction, were equally appropriate
devices for superintending the exercise of their multifarious governmental functions." S.A.
DE SIrrn, supra note 34, at 337-38.
125. By contrast, the classic rhetoric of standing doctrine denies access to plaintiffs who
claim a "right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered
according to law .... " Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). Cf Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (not sufficient that plaintiff "suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 286-87 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("the policies underlying the requirement of 'standing' [are] that the litigant
who would challenge official action must claim infringement of an interest particular and per-
sonal to himself, as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with the general frame and
functioning of government-a complaint that the political institutions are awry."); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("[T]he absence of any particular individual or
class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is commit-
ted to the surveillance of... the political process.").
126. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 109.
127. Id The original writ of mandamus was a means by which the King regulated or
recovered certain of his tenancies. See T. BLOuNT, NOMo-LXICON: A LAw-DICTIONARY (1670)
(facsimile ed. 1970).
128. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 111.
129. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ix reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 620 (1838)
("mandamus... is a prerogative writ, and [is] grantable when the public justice of the state is
concerned").
130. See notes 499-589 infra and accompanying text.
131. Cf I W.Jowrrr, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 977 (2d ed. 1977).
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whole of the government) to superintend lower organs (the parts) rather
as the head rules the body. 132 Indeed, exactly this metaphor was used
by the courts, which described mandamus as "one of the flowers of the
crown . . ... "133
The private rights model entails two source-path-goal schemata, one
to structure the subject matter of and another to structure the adjudica-
tive process invoked by the model. Similarly, the public rights model
embodied in the prerogative writs entailed a second use of the part-
whole schema to structure the adjudicative process. Any part (that is,
citizen) could invoke the power of the whole to secure observance of the
law; any part could stand for the whole, a legal metonymy. This model
therefore required neither injury nor "standing." At common law,
these writs were available by suit of a stranger. 134 The citizen-plain-
tiff's lack of a direct, personal interest did not require that the court
ignore the plaintiff's petition. Rather, because these writs invoked the
discretionary authority of the royal prerogative, the court retained the
power to adjust or withhold the remedy. 135
The English relator practice, which applied also in equity, provided
a formalized procedure for this part-whole metonymy. On issues of pub-
lic rights or public duties, where the English attorney general could sue
on behalf of the Crown, any person might seek one of the prerogative
writs or bring a suit for an injunction in the name of the attorney gen-
eral. The litigant, or relator, needed only to obtain thefiat or permis-
sion of the attorney general to use his name; such permission was
132. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 273-74 (discussing the caste system in India)
("Families (and other social organizations) are understood as wholes with parts.... [S]ociety
is conceived of as a body (the whole) with... parts ... structured metaphorically according to
the configuration of the body .... The general concept of structure itself is a metaphorical
projection of the CONFIGURATION aspect of PART-WHOLE structure.") A common ex-
ample of a metaphor motivated by the use of this cognitive model for society is the body politic.
See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877) (" 'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the pream-
ble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people cove-
nants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good.' ").
133. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 620.
134. "Stranger" is a term of art: "[I]n Law it hath a special signification for him that is
not privy, or party to an Act .... " See T. BLOUNT, supra note 127. In contrast, neither the
terms "standing" nor "locus standii" appear in Blount's seventeenth century legal dictionary.
135. S.A. rE SMrrl, supra note 34, at 367-70. According to de Smith, the nineteenth
century English practice varied with the nature of the stranger's claim. Some claims brought
by strangers "obliged [the court] to allow the application," id. at 367 (citing Buggin v. Bennett
(1767) 4 Burr. 2037), others were refused "unless he [the stranger] makes out a strong case,"
id (citing Foster v. Foster & Berridge (1863) 32 L.J.Q.B. 312, 314). On this point, de Smith
characterizes the nineteenth century English cases as "a fog that is not easily penetrated." Id
Some of this confusion may be explained by the intermediate nature of the public rights
model embodied in these prerogative writs. See notes 205-245 infra and accompanying text.
In any event, it is clear that, in the United States, these writs were treated as quasi-equitable
and therefore involving discretion. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 356 (1875);
United States ex reL Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1933). In Hall, the Supreme
Court allowed a mandamus petition despite the argument that the petitioners had failed to
show any personal interest. See notes 168-172 infra and accompanying text.
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granted as a matter of course. Once permission was obtained, the rela-
tor prosecuted the action at his or her own expense and without direc-
tion from the attorney general.' 3 6 The attorney general, however, was
not a necessary party-that is, hisfiat was not needed--"where the in-
terference with the public right is at the same time an interference with
some private right or is a breach of some statutory provision for the
protection of the plaintiff."' 137 This latter rule demonstrates that the
relator practice clearly contemplated actions by those without a direct
stake in the controversy. Thus, as a practical and historical matter, the
relator's action extended the availability ofjudicial remedies to persons
not immediately affected by the challenged action by allowing any part
to invoke the name and the power of the whole and represent its inter-
ests before the courts.
These English versions of the public rights model were familiar to
the Framers as "the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of
Westminster .. ".. ,138 Hayburn's Case139 illustrates that, although the
specific procedural form of the relators' practice did not survive in
America, the acceptability of the part-whole schema of the public rights
model did survive.
In Hayburn's Case, Attorney General Randolph filed in the Supreme
Court a petition for a writ of mandamus to the federal circuit court for
Pennsylvania to enforce a congressional statute providing disability
pensions to Revolutionary War veterans.1 40 The statute empowered
the federal circuit courts (which were the superior trial courts) to serve
as commissions, determining the amount of the pensions and certifying
those determinations to the secretary of war. The secretary of war,
however, could disallow a pension and refer the case to Congress. The
circuit courts refused to accept these cases.
The Attorney General first sought mandamus in his own behalf, 6x
officio, to enforce the statutory scheme. He argued that section 35 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789141 authorized the attorney general to act in this
manner. 142 But, only a few months before the argument in Hayburn's
Case, Congress had rejected an amendment to the Process Act of
1792,143 proposed by Randolph, that would have explicitly authorized
such actions. 144 A divided Court denied the ex officio motion. 145 Ray-
136. 37 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 230-231 (4th ed. 1982).
137. Id at 231 (footnotes omitted).
138. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
139. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
140. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243 (repealed 1793).
141. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
142. Randolph premised his argument on the English practice, which had also charac-
terized procedure in Virginia where he had also served as attorney general. J. GOEBEL, JR., I
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 563-64 (1971).
143. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275.
144. J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 142, at 563 & n.49.
145. Hayburn 's Case, 2 U.S. at 409.
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burn's response was to seek mandamus on behalf of Haybum, an inter-
ested party. 146
A majority of the members of the Court, while sitting in the circuit
courts, had expressed the view that the exercise of "judicial power"
contemplated by article III was inconsistent with a power to revise the
judgment reserved to either the legislature or an executive officer. 147
Hayburn's Case was rendered moot by an amendment to the pension
statute; today it stands for the principle expressed by the Justices while
sitting in the circuit courts below. But the only issue the Court actually
considered in Hayburn's Case was whether the attorney general had the
power to sue ex officio. The Court's deadlock on this issue eliminated
the availability of the English relator action: The relator could hardly
invoke the "standing" of the attorney general if the attorney general
had none.
But Hayburn's Case did not affect the viability of adjudicatory models
premised on the part-whole schema-that is, it did not reflect a rejection
of the English practice treating such cases as justiciable. Rather, the
concern in Hayburn's Case was with the proper definition of the whole in a
constitutional system of separated powers. The English practice upon
which Randolph relied presupposed a sovereign with plenary power to
enforce its laws through its attorney general and its courts. It was this
premise that the Court did not accept. The executive was no longer the
"head" of the body politic, and the federal courts, unlike the King's
Bench, could no longer assume that they were free to speak for the
whole. Rather, both organs were limited to the exercise of powers given
either by the Constitution or, within constitutional limits, by the Con-
gress. 148 Congress was the branch most representative of the Ameri-
can sovereign-the people. It was, therefore, the closest American
equivalent to society's "head."
Different institutional premises, rather than doubts about jus-
ticiability, led to the demise of the relator form of action in the federal
courts. Indeed, Hayburn's Case affirmed another adjudicatory model
premised on the part-whole schema. That is, if the Court had intended
to require that plaintiffs must have personal injuries in order to estab-
146. Id. The action became moot after Congress passed a new pension bill taking the
circuit court out of the process. Id at 409-10. Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324.
147. Hayburn's Case 2 U.S. at 410 n.a. This view was expressed in an opinion and two
letters written by theJustices. These documents are described in a footnote to Hayburn 's Case.
Haybum's Case is further discussed in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 39, 49-50
(1851).
148. Today, the "standing" of the attorney general to enforce the law is recognized
when conferred by statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1997, 2000(1-5) (1982). Cf. United
States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1980) (absent statutory authorization, attorney
general has no authority to bring suit to prevent pattern and practice of constitutional viola-
tions by police). At the turn of the century, however, the Court recognized the attorney gen-
eral's "standing." See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) (Holmes, J.). Debs is discussed below in text accompany-
ing notes 270-273 infra.
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lish a "case or controversy," then it would have dismissed Randolph's
ex officio action at the outset for want ofjusticiability. Similarly, it would
have held the case unjusticiable even after Randolph declared that he
was suing on behalf of another.
The Court did not dismiss Randolph's actions for lack of jus-
ticiability because it did not repudiate the essence of the public rights
model. Today we would see Randolph's actions as an instance ofjus
tertii-raising the rights of third parties-or what I will call a representa-
tional model. The Hayburn Court accepted Randolph's invocation of a
representational model, premised on a part-whole structure, that did not
require allegation of specific, personal injury: Randolph, a representa-
tive of the whole, was allowed to proceed with the mandamus petition on
behalf of Hayburn, a part. 149
Although Hayburn's Case undermined the institutional premises of
the relator action, American courts continued to entertain similar suits
premised on a part-whole schema. Those courts familiar with the Eng-
lish precedents invoked them to allow citizens without particularized
injury or interest to question governmental authority. In State v. Justices
of Middlesex,150 the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked the theory that
jurisdiction lay to redress what Blackstone called "neglect ofjustice"'' 1
to hold that certiorari was available to challenge the conduct of an elec-
tion. The court found support for its conclusion in the writings of the
English jurists, including Coke1 52 and Hawkins, who observed that
"whatever crime is manifestly against the publick good, it comes within
the conusance of this court [the King's Bench], though it do not directly
injure any particular person . ... ,153 The New Jersey court indicated that
its discretionary power of certiorari "is sometimes exercised before an
injury actually accrues to any one, by issuing a mandamus ... -"154 The
Court justified this power in communitarian terms:
Where the injury is extensive, and involves any considerable portion of
the community, it is better to take up the business in gross .... The
reason is [that] the power is necessary for the preservation of the peace
of the community;-and with what colour can it be pretended that this
court, whose duty it emphatically is to take care that justice is done to
149. Compare the characterization in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, supra note 21, at 90: "[T]he Attorney General reached in his pocket and pulled out Mr.
Hayburn as a client.... Who did the Attorney General think were the parties before then?" Id.
(emphasis added).
150. 1 N.J.L. (I Coke) 244 (1794). The suitors were "some of the Inhabitants of-
Ie.t at 245 (blank in original). See also Jaffe, supra note 5, at 1275-76.
151. See note 127 supra.
152. According to Coke, the jurisdiction of the King's Bench extended to "errors and
misdemeanors extrajudicial, tending to the breach of the peace or oppression of the subjects,
or raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any other manner of misgovernment . M..." id-
dlesix 1 N.J.L. at 249 (quoting 4 COKE'S INsTrrtrrEs *71).
153. Id at 250 (quoting 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 7 (I.
Curwood 8th ed. 1824)) (emphasis added).
154. Id.
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every one, has no power to protect the interests, and redress the
wrongs of an entire county. 155
Although Middlesex was apparently reversed on appeal "before gover-
nor and council,"'156 its statement of the received common law concern-
ing the prerogative writs nevertheless reflected a great number of the
American mandamus decisions. In County Commissioners v. People ex rel.
Metz, 157 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected, in language similar to, but
directly contradicting, modem standing doctrine, 15 8 the argument that
the plaintiff had not shown sufficient interest to maintain the suit.
The question, who shall be the relator.., depends upon the object to
be attained by the writ. Where the remedy is resorted to for the pur-
pose of enforcing a private right, the person interested in having the
right enforced, must become the relator .... A stranger is not permit-
ted officiously to interfere, and sue out a mandamus in a matter of pri-
vate concern. But where the object is the enforcement of a public right, the
People are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show that he has
any legal interest in the result. It is enough that he is interested, as a citizen, in
having the laws executed, and the right in question enforced. . . . No doubt is
entertained of the right of Metz to become the relator, and pursue this
remedy,[sic] The object of the suit is not a matter of individual inter-
est, but of public concern. Any citizen of the county, especially of the
locality interested in having the improvement prosecuted, could be-
come the relator, and obtain the mandamus. 159
Other courts emphasized that citizens have a duty, as well as a right, to
take legal action when a public right is violated or a public grievance
committed. 160
Even without the formal procedural structure of the English relator
practice, these American decisions continued to employ the part-whole
structure of the common law mandamus action. Metz thus justified the
invocation of the court's jurisdiction by a citizen interested in having
the laws executed on the ground that there is a live controversy with the
155. Id. at 252.
156. Id. at 255 (reporter's note).
157. 11 111. 202 (1849). This case involved state appropriations to a county to pay for
improvements in a navigable creek. Mr. Metz was appointed commissioner to oversee the
work. He drew three of four installments from the appropriated funds. The county commis-
sioners refused to authorize the final payment, deciding to use that money for other purposes
pursuant to a later statute. Mr. Metz sued to require payment of the fourth installment to him
for disbursement. In the terms of the modern standing doctrine, Mr. Metz's standing is that
of a governmental officer attempting to execute the duties of his or her office. See, e.g., Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968) (dictum) (standing not challenged by appel-
lees). For criticism of the Court's recognition of standing in Allen, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 182-83.
158. See note 125 supra for the contrasting rhetoric of modern standing doctrine.
159. Metz, 11 111. at 207-08 (emphasis added). Accord Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S.
343, 355 (1875). The common law practice continued in the state courts for some time. See,
e.g., Bancroft v. Building Comm'r, 257 Mass. 82, 84-85, 153 N.E. 319 (1926).
160. See, e.g., People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (man-
damus); People ex reL Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 Denio. 617, 618 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (general
rule unless statute provides otherwise).
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people who are regarded as the realparty. 161 There was no requirement
of injury-in-fact or typicality as with the representation of the interests
of a class in the modem class action. Given the part-whole structure of
the relationship between the parties, I will refer to this original "stand-
ingless" model as a constituent model. 162
State practice was far from uniform. By the middle of the nine-
teenth century, many courts read the English cases as requiring the re-
lator to allege a private right.163 These courts concluded that, in cases
involving public rights, only state officers such as the attorney general
or district attorney could sue.164 Elsewhere, courts and litigants bor-
rowed the form of the relator action, 16 5 but altered the substance.'
66
These cases reflect certain legal and historical misconceptions,' 67 and,
161. Metz, I1 Ill. at 162.
162. The difference between the representational and constituent models is in the rela-
tionship between the litigant and the affected parties. In the representational model, the liti-
gant sues directly on behalf of an affected party. In the constituent model, the litigant is, as a
citizen, an affected party. In this latter context "affected" does not connote concrete injury or
injury-in-fact as it does in modem standing doctrine.
163. In People cc reL Drake v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 4 Mich. 98 (1856), the
Michigan Supreme Court declined to follow the New York and Illinois mandamus practice. In
the view of the Michigan court, these state courts had deviated from the practice of the Eng-
lish courts, which "molded," "formed," and "transmitted" the common law. Id at 103. See
also Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1863) (injunctive action "to
abate a public nuisance" described as similar to the former English action "information in
Chancery," in which a "private party sues rather as a public prosecutor than on his own ac-
count; and unless he shows that he has sustained, and is still sustaining, individual damage, he
cannot be heard"). But cf. notes 134-137 supra and accompanying text. The account of Eng-
lish law given in the Ward case was directly contradicted by the Supreme Court in Union
Pacific R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875) (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) (The Wheeling Bridge Case 11)).
164. Heffner v. Commonwealth ev reL Kline, 28 Pa. 108, 112 (1857); People ex reL Drake
v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 4 Mich. at 103 ("this is a case in which the action of the
attorney-general would have been proper and necessary"); Sanger v. Commissioners of Ken-
nebec, 25 Me. 291, 296 (1845); In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 105 (1834) (stating
general rule); Cleary v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 35 (1821); see also State v. Deliesse-
line, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52 (1821) (observing that cases brought by the attorney general on
information are of two kinds: ex-offieo and those filed at the request of an individual).
165. In mandamus cases, private parties asserting their own rights continued the English
form, bringing suit in the name of the United States, presumedly on the theory that the indi-
vidual beneficiary was also vindicating the public's right to lawful governmental action. See,
e.g., Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); United States ex rel
McBride v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 30 U.S. 95 (1938)
(mandamus in state courts). A similar practice developed in habeas corpus. See, e.g., Louisi-
ana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (habeas by state prisoner); United States
cc rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (habeas by excluded alien).
166. Sometimes, the party brought suit on behalf of a relator who was the real party in
interest, such as the attorney general seeking quo warranto or mandamus at the instigation of
a citizen. See, e.g., State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52 (1821); State ex inf. Barker v.
Duncan, 265 Mo. 26, 34-36, 175 S.W. 940, 942 (1915).
167. The most likely source of these misconceptions is Blackstone, who discussed man-
damus only in the context of private, injured parties. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 110-
11. Dean Thomas Cooley, who annotated Blackstone's discussion of mandamus, exacerbated
the problem by citing only the minority view cases. 2 CooIY's BLACKSTONE 935 n. 1. Cooley
and several state courts, see notes 163-164 supra, relied on Wellington, 33 Mass. 87, for their
understanding of the appropriate relators in public rights mandamus petitions.
In IWellington, however, the court actually adjudicated a public rights mandamus premised
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in their period, were perceived by the United States Supreme Court as
minority views.
Professor Jaffe documented the development of mandamus in the
state courts.1 68 Yet the approval of the constituent model in the federal
courts has gone virtually unnoticed. In 1875, in Union Pacific Railroad v.
Hall,169 the United States Supreme Court explicitly endorsed Metz and
declared: "There is. '.. a decided preponderance of American author-
ity in favor of the doctrine, that private persons may move for a manda-
mus to enforce a public duty, not due to the government as such
"9170
In Hall, the Supreme Court considered a petition for mandamus
against the federally chartered railroad brought by merchants seeking
to require the railroad to maintain a line over the Missouri River that
ran from Iowa to Nebraska. As the Court characterized it, these
merchants "had no interest other than such as belonged to others" and
sought only to enforce "a duty to the public generally."' 17 1 The rele-
vant statute provided only that the circuit courts "shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine all cases of mandamus to compel said Union
Pacific Railroad Company to operate its road as required by law.' 1 72
Union Pacific challenged the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' interest to
maintain the petition. The Court did not discuss this challenge in jus-
ticiability or constitutional terms. Rather, it first upheld Mr. Hall's
claim on the merits and then, at the close of the opinion, upheld his
right as a member of the public to petition for mandamus on a matter
of public right. Basing its judgment on English 173 and American prece-
solely on third-party rights. Id. at 97-105. It questioned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' inter-
est only at the close of the opinion. It indicated substantial confusion on this point:
"[A]lthough the proceedings ... are in some measure public proceedings, inasmuch as the
ultimate object is to acquire an easement for the public, yet by the course of the proceeding as
presented and regulated by statute, it assumes in some degree the form of a private adversary suit." Id. at
105 (emphasis added). In the end, the court did not resolve the personal interest question; it
considered instead the risks to third party interests. Id. at 105-06. Although Wellington did
state the general rule in terms of the minority rule, id. at 105, its action was inconsistent with
this statement. Id. at 105-06. Thus, Wellington provides weak evidence of early nineteenth
century practice in public rights cases, and is not an antecedent of modem justiciability doc-
trine. See also text accompanying notes 307-317 infra.
Subsequent Massachusetts cases treated as open the question whether a mandamus peti-
tioner had to show a personal interest. E.g., Attorney General v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 479
(1877). Ultimately, the Massachusetts courts held that no such showing was necessary. Cox v.
Segee, 206 Mass. 380, 381, 92 N.E. 620 (1910); Bancroft v. Building Comm'r, 257 Mass. 82,
85-86, 153 N.E. 319 (1926).
168. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 1275-82.
169. 91 U.S. 343 (1875). The only reference to Hall in the literature is in L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 468 n.44 (1965). It appears as part of a string
cite of cases supporting the public mandamus action.
170. Id at 355.
171. Id. at 354.
172. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509.
173. Hall, 91 U.S. at 354 (citing The King v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co., 2 Barn. & Ad. 646,
in which "a private individual, without any allegation of special injury to himself, obtained a
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dent, the Court concluded that the petition was proper and affirmed
the decision below granting the writ.
With the exception of cases like Hall, the federal mandamus practice
remained underdeveloped. The reason is that the Court had systemati-
cally rejected general jurisdiction over mandamus actions in the federal
courts in a series of three early nineteenth century cases. In Marbury v.
Madison, 174 the Court held that Congress could not vest mandamus ju-
risdiction in the Supreme Court because it was an original action not
provided for in article III. Ten years later, in McIntire v. Wood, 175 the
Court held that the All Writs Act 176 was not intended to confer general
mandamus powers on the federal courts, but only to authorize manda-
mus in support of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.
These decisions were reaffirmed in Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes. 177 There, the Court explained that the federal courts had
neither residual common law authority to issue the writ nor sovereign
prerogative as in England.17 8 The federal courts, therefore, could only
issue the writ when Congress provided mandamus jurisdiction. But the
Court did not question that jurisdiction when Congress provided it; the
Court merely invoked the syllogism of the forms. "That the proceed-
ing on a mandamus is a case within the meaning of the act of congress,
has been too often recognised in this court to require any particular
notice. It is an action or suit brought in a court ofjustice, asserting a
right; and is prosecuted according to the forms of judicial proceed-
ings."' 179 The Court recognized jurisdiction over mandamus only in
the District of Columbia Circuit Court on the ground that the congres-
sional statute organizing the District adopted the common law of Mary-
land and, therefore, adopted as well its common law jurisdiction over
mandamus.' 8 0
One might conclude that the Court engaged in this extended gue-
rilla warfare against mandamus jurisdiction precisely because it feared a
general judicial power to superintend government. But this argument
undermines the historical basis of modern standing doctrine. Had it
been available, the standing concept would have solved the Court's
fears. It certainly would have made Kendall an easy case. Kendall was a
rule upon the company to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding them to
lay down again and maintain part of a railway which they had taken up").
174. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 87 (1803).
175. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 317 (1813).
176. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1982)).
177. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 364, 431-32 (1838).
178. The power to issue a writ of mandamus in the courts of the United States "is not
exercised, as in England, by the king's bench, as having a general supervising power over
inferior courts ... [but rather] it is in a special, modified manner, in which the writ of manda-
mus is to be used in this court, and in the circuit courts ...." Kendall, 37 U.S. at 434 (discuss-
ing the notion that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction).
179. Id. at 429.
180. Id. at 432-33.
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case of private right brought by four postmasters to compel the post-
master-general to pay their salaries. 181 Instead of justifying the exer-
cise of judicial power on the theory that Kendall was a case of private
rights, the Court engaged in a lengthy discourse on mandamus under
the new constitutional system and justified the specific invocation of the
judicial power in this mandamus case in a roundabout way.' 82 In Hall,
on the other hand, the Court accepted jurisdiction even though the
plaintiff lacked a personal, private interest.183 The Court adjudicated
the mandamus petition even though it was premised on the part-whole
schema of the constituent model; it did so without question because
Congress had explicitly conferred the jurisdiction.
Yet another form of public action thrived in America under the
Constitution. "Statutes providing for actions by a common informer,
who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that
given by statute, had been in existence for hundreds of years in Eng-
land, and in this country ever since the foundation of our Govern-
ment."' 84 These were called "popular actions because they were given
to the people in general."'185
An English statute of 1424, for example, imposed a penalty on cus-
tomshouse officials who embezzled duties paid by merchants. 186 Any
informer, unrelated to the transaction, could sue to collect the trebled
penalties provided by the statute; the informer sued in his own behalf
and on behalf of the King. If successful, the informer kept a third of the
judgment. This device was used in the context of regulatory or crimi-
nal enforcement and was also employed to enforce legal obligations on
governmental officers that did not otherwise give rise to private rights.
In a later statute, Parliament provided that an informer could collect a
penalty of 500 pounds from an officer who neglected to take the re-
quired oath of allegiance to the government.' 87
The full extent of the popularity and use of informers' statutes in
America has not been documented previously.' 88 The colonies and the
states employed informers' statutes in a wide variety of cases, including
the enforcement of regulatory statutes and morals legislation.189
181. Id. at 367-68.
182. The statute that the Court read as adopting the common law of Maryland was, at
best, ambiguous on that point. See id. at 432; text accompanying note 180 supra.
183. Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875).
184. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905). See W. HOLDSWORTH, 4 A HISrORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 356-57 (1925); Berger, supra note 31, at 825-26.
185. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 161 (emphasis in original).
186. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 240 (1926) (citing 3 Henry VI c. 3).
187. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *437.
188. Professor Berger devoted only one and one half pages to the subject, noting Marvin
v. Trout and the 1692 New York statute mentioned in the text accompanying note 190 infra.
Berger, supra note 31, at 826 & n.55.
189. See, e.g., Beadleston v. Sprague, 6 Johns. 101, 102-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (in-
former's suit to enforce statute prohibiting sale of liquor without a license); Rowe v. State, 2
S.C.L. (2 Bay) 565 (1804) (suit by informer to recover his moiety, that is, his portion of fine to
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These statutes provided a common mechanism to regulate, by judicial
sanction, governmental officials where there was likely to be no ag-
grieved party with a private cause of action. One of the earliest statutes
was adopted in New York in 1692. Under a statute "for the restraining
and punishing of Privateers and Pirates," all commissioned officers
within the colony were required to arrest or kill any pirates within their
jurisdiction. Any informer could enforce this duty by suit to collect a
statutory penalty.' 90 An early New Hampshire statute required the offi-
cials in each town to erect and maintain a pound for cattle; and it made
the obligation enforceable by the public at large through the medium
of the informer's suit. 19 1
The Framers, in their roles as members of the first Congress, passed
legislation both creating and facilitating informers' suits. The first
Congress was in session only two months when it passed a customs-
house informer statute; it subsequently provided federal jurisdiction
over informer suits in the Judiciary Act of 1789.192 These actions sug-
gest that the Framers did not view the "case or controversy" require-
ment of article III as limiting such "popular actions" as informers'
be collected by sheriff where the original informer's action was brought for "killing a negro by
undue correction.").
190. 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw YORK 279, 281 (1894) (statute passed September 10,
1692).
191. See Fairbanks v. Town of Antrium, 2 N.H. 105, 106 (1819) (statute of Feb. 9, 1791,
authorizing a 10-pound penalty "to any person who may sue for same"); see also Pike v.
Madbury, 12 N.H. 262 (1841) (penalty must be paid in United States currency).
The earliest "taxpayer's action" appears to be an 1807 New York statute creating an
informer's suit to compel town supervisors to fulfill their obligation "to raise such sums of
money as they are directed to raise and levy by acts of the legislature." 1807 N.Y. Laws 43.
This was the statute at issue in Caswell, qui tam v. Allen, 10 Johns. 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
"[P]laintiff, who sued as well for himself as for the people," sought a $250 penalty from the
supervisor of the Town of Scipio. Id
In Dozier v. Williams, 47 Miss. 605 (1873), Dozier sued the clerk of the probate court
who, without the father's consent, had illegally performed the marriage ceremony for Dozier's
minor son. The suit was brought pursuant to a Mississippi informers' statute that provided
for a penalty of $1000.
Beadelston, supra note 189, and Dozier suggest a possible source of another justiciability
doctrine: the prohibition of friendly suits. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHIAPO & H. WECHS-
LER, supra note 21, at 102-07; United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943). Multiplicity
of litigation was a problem inherent in informers' suits. At common law, the statutory right to
recovery attached to the first plaintiff to file such a suit. All suits filed thereafter were subject
to dismissal. This rule gave rise to collusion between defendants and friendly plaintiffs. Po-
tential defendants sometimes obtained their own informers to bring suit, who could discharge
or remit the statutory penalty and whose judgment could be used to bar all subsequent suits.
Several doctrines developed to prevent such collusion. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *437 (first informer loses priority if collusion revealed); Dozier, 47 Miss. at 606 (subse-
quent plaintiffs can plead fraud or coveture); Caswell, 10 Johns. at 118 (informer can only
recover judgment, cannot discharge debt).
192. This informer's suit was directed against custom collectors who failed to post fee
and duty schedules or who overcharged individuals. Act ofJuly 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Star.
29, 45. Federal jurisdiction over these suits was conferred in the firstJudiciary Act. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (authorizing federal district court jurisdiction "of all
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States"). 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 161.
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suits. 193 The second Congress implicitly approved the practice of in-
formers' suits, providing rules for the award of costs in cases brought
by "any informer or plaintiff on a penal statute to whose benefit the
penalty or any part thereof if recovered is directed by law ....
And, in 1794, the third Congress created informers' suits to enforce its
prohibitions against the slave trade. 195 Subsequent Congresses, from
1834196 to 1986197 continued to use informers' suits for the enforce-
ment of rights accruing to the public at large.' 98
The informer's suit employed multiple cognitive models. Inform-
ers' suits like those provided for in New York and New Hampshire used
the constituent model with a simple part-whole structure as in manda-
mus: Any member of the body politic with the relevant information was
empowered to sue to vindicate the policy choice made by the whole in
passing the underlying regulatory law. Any member of the community
could enforce the collection of taxes, the provision of police protection,
or the maintenance of an animal pound once the community had so
determined.
Other informers' suits like those federal actions regulating customs
practices, applied more complex models. These statutes presupposed
an injury to someone, who would also have a private cause of action
modelled on the remedial source-path-goal schema. These statutes nev-
ertheless authorized suit by a stranger with information, allowing the
informer to act in a representational capacity. Thus, these informers'
actions were examples of a representational model-they were struc-
193. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161-62.
194. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 5, 1 Stat. 275, 277 (an act for regulating processes in
the courts of the United States). This provision was subsequently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 823,
but was deleted as obsolete in the revision of 1948. In fact, this deletion was erroneous be-
cause there are still informer statutes on the books. See, e.g., notes 197-198 infra.
195. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (an act to prohibit the carry-
ing on of the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country).
196. See Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 27, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 201 (1982)) (an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to
preserve peace on the frontiers); see also United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857 (D. Mont. 1898)
(dealing with the Act ofJune 30, 1834).
197. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, 3155-
57; Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-258, §§ 3729-3730, 96 Stat. 877, 978 (1982) (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (providing for cause of
action brought by "a person" in the "name of the Government" against those committing
frauds or making false claims against the government). This statute was first passed during
the Civil War to control false claims by military personnel. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 4,
6, 12 Stat. 696, 698 ("An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Government of the
United States"). It was amended in 1943, Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608-09, and
more recently in 1982 and 1986.
198. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 9, 1909, ch. 100, § 7, 35 Stat. 614 as amended by Act ofJan. 17,
1914, ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275, 277, repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1291
(1970) (informers' suits relating to importation of certain drugs); Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch.
1210, § 1, 25 Stat. 566, Act of Apr. 28, 1904, No. 34, 33 Stat. 591, Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch.
141, § 3, 37 Stat. 737, all repealed by Act ofJune 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403, 66 Stat. 163, 279
(informers' suits to enforce prohibitions on importation of certain aliens); Act ofJuly 4, 1864,
ch. 249, § 9, 13 Stat. 390, 392, and Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, § 48, 16 Stat. 440, 454
(informers' suits to regulate passenger travel on steamships and other vessels).
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tured in terms of the source-path-goal schema of an ordinary private
cause of action' 99 and a link schema. One link was the informer's infor-
mation about the injury to the actual victim. 20 0 The other link was pro-
vided by thepart-whole schema: Onepart could speak for the other since
each was a constituent of one whole.
Suits by those without personal injury who were acting as represent-
atives of others were not viewed as raising constitutional problems
under article III. In Adams, qui tam, v. oods,201 ChiefJustice Marshall
expressed the view that informers' suits were common and ordinary:
"Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recov-
ered by an action of debt, as well as by information .... ,,202 The Court
never questioned the plaintiffs' "standing" in three subsequent inform-
ers' actions that it decided in 1885, 1905, and 1943.203 On the basis of
these cases, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Flast v. Cohen, conceded that
suits brought by nontraditional plaintiffs-that is, plaintiffs without in-
jury-in-fact-were not barred by article 111.204
B. Cognitive Structure, Prototype Effects, and the Public Rights Model
The public rights model coexisted comfortably with the conceptual
system of nineteenth century legal thought. It was in many ways tradi-
tional in its structure, even though premised on alternative schemata.
Because the public rights model overlapped structurally with the pri-
vate rights model, however, it seemed like a variant of the latter model.
As such, it was vulnerable to the extreme prototype effects discussed in
Section II above.
In his classic article on modern public law litigation,20 5 Professor
Chayes described the traditional, private rights model in terms of five
"defining features." He described traditional litigation as bipolar, ret-
rospective, self-contained, party-initiated and controlled, and charac-
terized by an approach that treats right and remedy as
interdependent. 20 6 In contrast, Chayes described the emerging public
199. See Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
200. Authorization of informers' suits made sense when the victim was unaware of the
overcharge or the failure to post the schedule. No doubt the victim could also sue if he or she
were aware of the illegality. Yet, the lack of awareness by the victim was not a precondition to
the informer's suit. For a discussion of the metaphors that make information a particularly
good candidate as a link schema, see text accompanying notes 699-700 infra.
201. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) (concerning a suit brought under the Act of Mar. 22,
1794, ch. 11, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 347, regulating the slave trade).
202. Id at 341.
203. The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885); Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905); United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
204. Flast, 92 U.S. 83, 121 (1968).
205. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
206. Thus, the traditional model has two opposing parties or interests, it is focused on a
limited set of completed events, the court's involvement ends with a decree whose direct im-
pact is limited to the parties, the parties shape the issues and marshall proof while the judge
serves as the neutral arbiter of the law, and the scope of the relief is logically deduced from
the substantive violation. Id at 1282-83.
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law model as flexible and sprawling in shape, predictive in its fact-find-
ing and prospective in its approach to remedy, judicially managed and
activist rather than party controlled, and characterized by a dispute
over the operation of public policy rather than over private right.20 7
In these aspects, at least, the public rights models of mandamus and
of the informer's action that we have considered had more in common
with the traditional version of the private rights model than with the
emerging public law model described by Chayes. These nineteenth
century public rights models were bipolar, initiated by a single citizen
against an officer of the government. The litigation was often retro-
spective; in any event, it was well-bounded by a specific duty or omis-
sion and its subject matter concerned quite precise "consequences for
the legal relations of the parties. ' 208 The suit was entirely party-initi-
ated and controlled. Right and remedy were interdependent, con-
trolled no less by the writ system than were the common law forms of
action. 20 9 The lawsuit was only partially self-contained in the sense em-
ployed by Chayes: The entry of judgment ended the court's involve-
ment, but its impact was not confined to the particular litigant who
prosecuted the action. Rather, it affected the "real party in interest":
the entire community. 2 10
These similarities between the original public and private rights
models reflect a common experiential grounding by means of the con-
ventional metaphor rational argument is war.211 In our culture, we con-
ceptualize rational arguments in terms of basic physical combat:
"There is still a position to be established and defended, you can win or
lose, you have an opponent whose position you attack and try to de-
stroy and whose argument you try to shoot down. If you are com-
pletely successful, you can wipe him out."' 2 12 This same set of
207. Id. at 1302-03.
208. Id. at 1282.
209. As discussed in Section II, the private rights model consists of two mirror image
source-path-goal metaphors: One structures our understanding of the causal behavior of the
defendant that is the subject of the suit; the other structures the remedial or adjudicative
process. The public rights models, too, used a mirror image structure. In the constituent
model, like mandamus, the remedial part-whole schema mirrored its substantive part-whole schema.
Thus, any citizen, or part, could sue and ask the court, acting for the whole, to order the gov-
ermental agent, another part, to comply with the law, as decided by the whole. The represen-
tational models were more complex. Sometimes, as in Hayburn's Case, the remedy mirrored
the causal source-path-goal schema of the subject's private cause of action. Other times, as in
the informers' actions, it was specified by the statute that also specified the right and author-
ized the link.
210. Compare Chayes, supra note 205, at 1283.
211. See G. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 61-62.
212. Id. at 63.
This metaphor allows us to conceptualize what a rational argument is in terms of
something that we understand more readily, namely, physical conflict. Fighting is
found everywhere in the animal kingdom and nowhere so much as among human
animals. Animals fight to get what they want-food, sex, territory, control, etc....
The same is true of human animals.... Part of being a rational animal.., involves
getting what you want without subjecting yourself to the dangers of actual physical
[Vol. 40:13711410
conceptualizations governs in legal matters. 213 Thus, Professor Chayes
described traditional litigation as "a contest between two individuals or
at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a
winner-take-all-basis." 214 Here we have a reference to the array of op-
posing forces in battle and the principle of "to the victor belong the
spoils" that have characterized warfare throughout much of human
history.
Our use of the rational argument is war metaphor to organize our
models of litigation is not arbitrary or accidental, but rather is moti-
vated by human experience. Physical combat and rational argument
are both means of obtaining desired ends such as food, property, sta-
tus, and control. Until the development of sophisticated weaponry in
modem times, even organized combat was inherently hand-to-hand
and one-on-one. The bipolar, individualized nature of the private
rights model thus reflects directly the historical experience of combat.
The public rights models of the nineteenth century retained this bi-
polar structure by employing a representational model, a metonymy
premised on the part-whole schema and motivated by the battle meta-
phor. Opposing forces sometimes settle their differences through the
combat of champions subject to a "winner-take-all" agreement. 215
Representation of the whole (the army) by the part (the champion)
avoided greater bloodshed. In an even more civilized version, the op-
posing forces sent emissaries to avoid fighting via a diplomacy in which
reason replaced physical combat. The constituent model of mandamus
mimicked this model in the legal sphere. In cases like Hall or Metz, a
single member of the public adjudicated the concerns of many. This
model was an advance over the inefficient and disruptive effects of a
multiplicity of private suits. The role of the courts was to coordinate
and vindicate the greater interests of the whole,216 by employing the
conflict. As a result, we humans evolved the social institution of verbal argument.
We have arguments all the time in order to get what we want, and sometimes these
"degenerate" into physical violence.
Id. at 61-62. For a poetic variant of this conventional metaphor, see E. Costello, You'll Never
Be a Man, in TRUST (Columbia Records 1981) ("You need protection from the physical part of
conversation/though the fist is mightier than the lip it adds the aggravation").
213. G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 65. ("Whether we are in a scientific,
academic, or legal setting, aspiring to the ideal of rational argument, or whether we are just
trying to get our way in our own household by haggling, the way we conceive of, carry out,
and describe our arguments is grounded in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor.") (capitaliza-
tion in original).
214. Chayes, supra note 205, at 1282.
215. See, for example, the biblical report of the fight between David and Goliath, an
ancient instance of this practice. 1 Samuel 17:1-9.
216. SeeJ. VINING, supra note 27, at 52-53.
By experience and attitude, as well as by virtue of their special procedures, courts
have always been in a position to look continuously at the whole. As other institu-
tions that also shared the priestly tradition have disappeared, the importance of this
aspect of the notion of what it is to be a judge has grown. No society pursuing a
multitude of public values of different weight through a multitude of largely in-
dependent agencies has ever tried to do without such central coordination.... The
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part-whole schema of mandamus.
The rational argument is war metaphor also accounts for the radical
prototype effect in our thinking about justiciability. Warfare is a natu-
ral source domain for the source-path-goal metaphor. Whatever the pur-
pose of the fight, it involves advancing on the enemy's position and
trying to take it. Structuring rational argument metaphorically as we
understand battle, we employ a source-path-goal schema in our conceptu-
alization of argument. Adjudication involves rational argument and is
one kind of human purposive endeavors. It is, therefore, naturally con-
ceptualized in terms of a source-path-goal schema. Adjudicatory models
premised on a part-whole schema, like mandamus, are ultimately
crowded out of our concept of justiciable controversies.
As such, adjudication is a radial concept. All of its submodels share
the core source-path-goal schemata of arguments and purposes. The
causal and remedial source-path-goal metaphors of the private rights
model and the part-whole and link metaphors of the public rights models
radiate from this core. The private rights model seems, therefore, to be
more central to the concept of adjudication-a coherence prototype ef-
fect. Thus, the remedial source-path-goal metaphor of the private rights
model is seen as the primary case, or prototype, of adjudication. In
comparison, the public rights model doesn't quite seem to fit; it seems
"of a peculiar and eccentrical nature. ' 217
As a variant of this prototypical structure, public rights litigation
was an intermediate category between private law disputes, on the one
hand, and politics, on the other. This was reflected in the substantive,
procedural, and jurisdictional aspects of public rights law. Substan-
tively, the public rights law occupied an intermediate status between
the realm of inviolable vested rights and political discretion. It con-
cerned affairs of the whole2 18 such as public roads, 2 19 navigable riv-
process of perceiving, announcing, reconciling, and choosing between the values at
stake in particular situations-the judicial process- . . . is an integral part of the
government. And there is nothing mystical about the function. It consists simply in
seeing all the considerations, the implicit as well as the fully articulated .... and in
seeing all decision makers making use of public force as subject to constraints
originating outside as well as within themselves.
Id. at 52-53 (emphasis and footnotes deleted).
217. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *115-16.
218. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (grain warehouse is subject to regula-
tion because "[p]roperty does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner
to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large"). In colonial times,
judicial regulation of public rights matters was much more extensive than has been supposed.
For example, the colonial courts of Virginia not only licensed all innkeepers, but also set all
prices. H. WILLIAMS, LEGENDS OF LoUDOUN: AN ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY AND HOMES OF A
BORDER COUNTY OF VIRGINIA'S NORTHERN NECK 104-06 (1938). Massachusetts courts also
licensed all innkeepers until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hartog, The Public Law
of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIT.
282, 288-91 (1976). Despite this accepted colonial practice, the twentieth century Supreme
Court held that rate setting was not a "case or controversy" within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923).
219. See, e.g., In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834).
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ers, 220 railroads, 2 2 ' morals legislation, 22 2 and the performance of
public officers. 22 3 But it included only those matters that could be gov-
erned by legal reason and the constraints of the "right and remedy"
formulation. Mandamus thus excluded from its purview public matters
that involved discretion, 22 4 leaving such matters to the political pro-
cess. 22 5 Moreover, public rights matters were more vulnerable than
were private suits to the intervention of politics: Legitimate concerted
actions of the whole (subsequent legislation, for example) could defease
the public right asserted by the litigant, even during the course of the
lawsuit.2 26
Procedurally, the models of access for raising claims of public right
allowed individuals to command the attention of the law, as in the pri-
vate rights model. But, as in the political sphere, these models re-
quired no personalized injury peculiar to the plaintiff. Jurisdictionally,
the authority to consider matters of public right was understood
neither as inherently judicial nor as nonjusticiable. Rather, the ques-
tion ofjusticiability was left to the discretion of Congress, as in manda-
mus cases like Kendall and Hall.22 7
The public rights concept filled an important social and legal need
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During this period,
the Anglo-American governmental structures had yet to develop the
large scale, bureaucratic organizations that characterize our modem
governments. Thus, in England, most criminal prosecutions were
brought by the victims themselves, in their own name and in the name
220. See, e.g., County Commr's v. People ex reL Metz, I 1111. 202 (1849); Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851).
221. Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875).
222. See, e.g., Beadleston v. Sprague, 6Johns. 101 (N.Y. 1810) (informer's suit).
223. See, e.g., Act ofJuly 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 45 (informer's statute).
224. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 105, 107 (1803) ("The province of
the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature
political... can never be made in this court."); Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347,
352 (1868) ("there exists no power in the courts, by any of its processes, to act upon the
officer ... [where] the law reposes this discretion in him for that occasion, and not in the
courts.").
225. The dictum in Marbury, referring to this limit on the reach of mandamus to compel
discretionary public acts, formed the basis of the later political question doctrine.
226. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421,431-32
(1855) (public nuisance suit failed because of Act of Congress) (The Wheeling Case III; Hodges
v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1923) (taxpayer suit against consolidation of school districts
failed because of subsequent legislation); cf United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 64, 68-69 (1801) (public nature of suit invoked to justify application of subsequent
treaty to reverse judgment that was correct when rendered).
This intermediate legal status was also reflected in informer actions: The executive often
had the power to remit the statutory penalty claimed by the informer at any time prior to
judgment in the informer's suit. See The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1885).
227. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
284 (1855). Murray's Lessee is discussed at length below. See notes 233-236 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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of the Crown. 228 Similarly, local governmental action was often the
bailiwick of a quasi-judicial board of commissioners, as in England,229
or the local circuit court, as in the Colonies. 230 The public rights
model provided a vehicle for direct participation by the citizenry that
was not available in any other manner.
Part of the explanation of the demise of the public rights model lies
in its declining social and political utility in the mid-nineteenth century.
As public agencies such as district and county attorneys were estab-
lished, the need decreased for private attorneys general. This was re-
flected in the 1840s and '50s by those courts which held that only the
public officers could bring public rights suits. 23 1 The increased desue-
tude of the public rights model resulting from the gradual expansion of
these public agencies, coupled with the cognitive eclipse of the model
as a result of the extreme prototype effects described above, led to the
almost total loss of the public rights model from modem legal
awareness.
The intermediate legal status of the public rights model explains
three common anachronisms in current legal scholarship that are a
function both of our reading of nineteenth century material through
the lens of twentieth century concepts 23 2 and of the phenomenon of
prototype effects. The first anachronism is the now conventional read-
ing of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co. 233 as a discussion
of the power of Congress to assign certain matters-designated "public
rights"-to article I tribunals.234
228. 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 419, 493-94 (1883); 3
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621 (5th ed. 1942); 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 160 (1965) (private enforcement of criminal law until 1859); Hay,
Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON, & C.
WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 40-41
(1975).
229. See De Smith, supra note 34, at 337-38; note 124 supra.
230. See note 218 supra.
231. See cases cited in note 164 supra.
232. "Real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to
the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the
eyes of another century than our own." H. BUTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HIS-
TORY 16 (1963). See also Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, YALE LJ. 1017, 1021, 1045-50
(1981).
233. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). [W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial
power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that thejudicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible ofjudicial determination, but which
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it
may deem proper. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). In light of the preceding historical material,
the reader will note that this famous passage is not a reference to article I Tribunals, but rather
an invocation of the syllogism of the forms to assert that public rights matters are justiciable at
Congress' discretion.
234. This reading is common to the modem Supreme Court opinions in this area, such
as Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986),
Northern Pipeline Construction Corp. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plural-
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When viewed in light of the new historical evidence presented
above, however, it becomes clear that Murray's Lessee explicates instead
the intermediate status of the public rights model. On the page before
the passage that is cited as referring to article I Tribunals, Justice Curtis
explained that:
[t]hough, generally, both public and private wrongs are redressed
through judicial action, there are more summary extrajudicial remedies
for both. An instance of extrajudicial redress of a private wrong is, the
recapture of goods by their lawful owner; of a public wrong, by a pri-
vate person, is the abatement of a public nuisance; and the recovery of
public dues by a summary process of distress, issued by some public
officer authorized by law, is an instance of redress of a particular kind
of public wrong, by the act of the public through its authorized
agents.23 5
Murray's Lessee distinguishes between personalized private injuries and
matters affecting the whole (such as public nuisance and public dues).
The passage in Murray's Lessee concerning Congress' discretionary
power to assign matters affecting the whole to the courts is in its histori-
cal context an expression, congruent with the Court's acceptance of
congressionally authorized mandamus actions in Kendall and Hall, of
the intermediate jurisdictional status of the public rights model. 23 6
ity opinion), Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48-50 (1932), and Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S.
438, 451 (1929). Examples of recent scholarship that perpetuate this misreading include Fal-
ion, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916, 951-54
(1988), and Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through
Crowell to Schor 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 789-99 (1986).
235. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283.
236. A further indication that the modem reading of Murray's Lessee is mistaken is that
courts typically take the case out of context. In Murray 's Lessee, the question was the constitu-
tionality under the due process clause of a summary, extrajudicial procedure for the recovery
by the United States of money due from a customs collector. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18
How.) at 275-77. Traditionally, the issuance of this summary distraint warrant has been char-
acterized as analogous to a judicial action by an artice I legislative court. But, as the passage
cited above (see text accompanying note 235 supra) indicates, Murray's Lessee viewed the sum-
mary distraint warrant not as a judicial act by an article I court, but rather as an extrajudicial,
governmental self help remedy. In this context, the famous passage in Murray 's Lessee (see note
234 supra) is a frank statement that Congress has the power to authorize extrajudicial self help
remedies in public rights cases.
Moreover, the modem Justices who, since Ex parte Bakelite have read Murray's Lessee as a
case about the power of Congress to create article I courts have always been unable to define
Murray's Lessee's use of the term "public rights." For example, in Northern Pipeline, Justice
Brennan admitted that "[t]he distinction between public rights and private rights has not been
definitively explained in our precedents." 458 U.S. at 69. Because the original nineteenth
century concept of public rights had been lost, Justice Brennan was forced to employ
(anachronistically) modern concepts to recharacterize the unfamiliar: "[A] matter of public
rights must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others.'" Id. (quoting Bakelite,
279 U.S. at 451). Justice Brennan further misidentified the concept of public rights with that
of sovereign immunity. Idl at 67. Exactly these same misconceptions plague modem com-
mentators who attempt to define the meaning of the term "public rights" as used in Murray's
Lessee. See Fallon, note 234 supra; Young, note 234 supra.
As we have seen, the nineteenth century concept of public rights had nothing to do with
these notions. This new historical information provides a larger doctrinal context that re-
quires a revision of our understanding of this important nineteenth century precedent.
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The second anachronism is the attribution of the private rights
model of constitutional adjudication to Marbury v. Madison.23 7 AIarbury
was a mandamus case and, thus, a manifestation of the public rights
model. But this case arose in the context of a claim of private right,
which perhaps makes it the most celebrated but misunderstood illustra-
tion of the intermediate legal position of public rights law. Much of the
legal discussion in Marbury concerned the power of the courts to re-
quire compliance with the law on the part of executive officers and the
scope of mandamus as an instrument for that purpose.238 The signifi-
cance of the Court's ruling in its own time was its assertion of manda-
mus power over senior officers of the government. 23 9 Its novelty lay in
suggesting that Congress could only vest that power in the lower
courts 240 and not in the Supreme Court, which was the closest Ameri-
can equivalent to King's Bench.
Marbury's assertion of the power of judicial review followed natu-
rally from the affirmation of the public rights model of mandamus
power over executive officials. Marbury's apparent focus on individual
injury as a condition precedent to the court's adjudication 24 1 was a set-
tled part of the law of mandamus in cases of private right, as we saw in
Metz, and not a sine qua non of all constitutional cases. 242 The modern
perspective on Marbury as an instance of the prototypical private rights
model, rather than an instance of the intermediate public rights model,
is a radical prototype effect.
The intermediate legal status of the public rights model and the
phenomenon of prototype effects also help explain a third historical
misconception common to most legal scholarship in this area. Tradi-
237. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87 (1803). For versions of the traditional analysis that
trace the private rights model for constitutional adjudication to Marbury, see Monaghan, supra
note 29, at 1365-68; Chayes, supra note 205, at 1285.
238. Marshall inquired whether Mr. Marbury had a right to his commission, whether the
laws afforded him a remedy, and, if so, whether it "is ... a mandamus issuing from this
court[.]" 5 U.S. at 97-98. After ascertaining Marbury's legal right to his commission, Mar-
shall then discussed the relationship between the principles ofubijus, ibi remedium and what we
commonly call "the rule of law." Id. at 102-05. The answer to the final question quoted
above turned, in part, on "[t]he nature of the writ." Id. at 106. Marshall then discussed the
scope of mandamus to command actions by executive officers. Id. at 106-09.
239. "The decision was criticized for its dictum that the executive could be called to ac-
count by judicial process .... R. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 43 (1960)
(emphasis in original). "Indeed this was regarded at the time as the more critical issue .... "
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 11. "Jefferson insisted
until the end of his life that most of the opinion was 'merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief
Justice.'" G. GUNTHER, supra, note 21, at 12 (quoting a letter from Jefferson to Justice Wil-
iam Johnson dated June 12, 1823). This comment suggests that the irksome aspect of the
Marbuy opinion was not the direct holding concerning judicial review, but rather the dicta
concerning mandamus. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 22 (1978) ("In the
context of the time .... Marbury represented no novel seizure of power; indeed, the records of
the Constitutional Convention itself suggest to at least some scholars that the Framers...
took th[e] power [of judicial review] for granted.").
240. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 109-12.
241. See 5 U.S. at 105, 107.
242. See note 159 supra and accomnpanying text.
1416 [Vol. 40:1371
tional analyses describe the issues raised by nineteenth century citizen-
government relations as concerning intrusions upon citizens' auton-
omy-a sphere marked by the common law protections of person and
property. In this view, the private rights model was sufficient to medi-
ate and accommodate these concerns, but not the twentieth century
concerns about governmental denial of expected entitlements. 243
Modern tensions in standing law have been attributed, incorrectly, to
these ostensible shifts in the focus of citizen-government relations from
concerns about autonomy to issues of entitlement. 244
But the problems of the nineteenth century were not so purely
"Lockean." 245 They also concerned entitlements no less central to the
citizen-government relationship than welfare benefits or access to gov-
ernment contracts are today. In a geographically and commercially ex-
panding nineteenth century America, the building of roads and the
maintenance of navigable waterways were matters of public concern.
Metz and Hall were public rights cases about problems arising from
these entitlements. The public rights model could have provided a
nineteenth century paradigm for modern litigation about entitlements.
It didn't, in part because it had been eclipsed by the private law proto-
type and in part because of the systematic attempt to dismember the
public rights model from 1900 onward.
IV. THE RISE OF STANDING
Metaphor creates a new reality from which the original appears to be
unreal.246
A lot happened to "standing" between the time of John Marshall
and Felix Frankfurter. The term started out as a nonspecific metaphor,
gained currency in equity, and only later became a constitutional doc-
trine. It will require Holmesian (Sherlock, not Oliver Wendell) deduc-
tion to reconstruct that story, and it will prove anything but elementary.
This section is divided into five parts. The first traces the usages of
the term "standing" from Justice Marshall to Justice Brandeis. We will
see the ontological effect of the metaphor in equity, as it exerted pres-
sure on judges and lawyers to see what had been questions of substance
and of remedy as ajurisdictional question of access to a court of equity.
The second subsection traces the history of the concept ofjus tertii.
Originally conceived as a requirement of the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tional statute, it became a tenet of individualism that eviscerated the
243. Albert, supra note 12, at 434; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1717-25; Chayes, supra note
28, at 9-10. The classic treatment of this phenomenon is Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.
733 (1964).
244. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 5, at 1721-22 (due process and standing); Chayes, supra
note 28, at 10.
245. Chayes, supra note 28, at 10.
246. W. STETNS, Adagia, in Opus PosTHuMous, 157, 169 (1957).
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representational models premised on link schemata such as the part-
whole metaphor for society. Its primary elaboration came in equity, with
its emphasis on the individual's irreparable injury as the sine qua non for
the exercise of the court's power.
The third subsection turns to the viability of another version of the
representational model during this period. It briefly traces the doctri-
nal battle over the capacity of a state (as the whole) to vindicate in the
federal courts the interests of its citizens (its parts). We will see the
Court still vacillating between the private and the public rights models
in this area as late as the 1970s.
The fourth subsection takes up the equity versions of the constitu-
ent model: shareholder derivative suits and taxpayer actions. We will
see Justice Brandeis' largely unsuccessful efforts to bar their use. We
will see, too, his near capitulation in 1937. From those ashes we will
see Justice Frankfurter single-handedly raise the phoenix of standing.
The final subsection sketches the historical context which suggests the
motivation of these determined efforts.
A. Substance, Remedy, and the Ontology of "Standing"
The term "standing" was in use in Justice Marshall's time; it was
first used as a metaphor to describe the legal relationship of parties. In
Lidderdale's Executors v. Executor of Robinson,247 a case involving the prior-
ity of creditors, the Court held that sureties "succeed to the legal stand-
ing of their principal .... "248 In Galloway v. Finley,249 an equity action
for the rescission of a contract to purchase land, the Court held that a
buyer who learned that the seller had bad title "could not be permitted
to avail himself of it whilst standing in the relation of a purchaser, to
defeat the agreement .... "250
The Court eventually used the term "standing" to describe a party's
status in the litigation. This usage took two forms, both unrelated to
the modern standing doctrine. The Court used the metaphor most
247. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 594 (1827).
248. Id. at 596.
249. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 264 (1838).
250. Id. at 296. Justice Story used the "standing" metaphor in a similar way in a patent
case, Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 161, 7 Wheat. 356 (1822), concerning whether a user of a poten-
tially infringing device manufactured by the defendant (arguably an interested party) was
competent as a witness. Story described the witness as "standing in the same predicament
with the party sued .... Evans, 20 U.S. at 192, 7 Wheat at 425. Story expressed his conclu-
sion that the witness was competent to testify using terms that sound like modern standing
doctrine.
But in this respect, Frederick stands in the same situation as every other person in
the community. If the patent is declared void, the invention may be used by the
whole community .... It, therefore, rests in remote contingencies, whether Freder-
ick will, under any circumstances, have an interest in the event of this suit, and the
law adjudges the party incompetent, only when he has a certain, and not a contingent
interest.
Id. at 192, 7 Wheat. at 425-26.
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commonly to indicate that a party had no claim on the merits, as it did
in a series of cases concerning land claims in the Louisiana Purchase by
those with preexisting Spanish title.2 51 Congress had required that title
be confirmed by a federal commission. Many of the original settlers
failed to obtain such confirmation, and the Court held against them
expressing its holding in the language of "standing." In Les Bois v.
Bramell, for example, the court rejected plaintiff's unconfirmed Spanish
title because "her claim had no standing in a court of equity or of law
"252
The Court used the term "standing" to refer to the claimant, not
the claim, in its rejection of the claim on the merits in Ritchie v. Franklin
County.253 Mr. Ritchie brought an equity action as a taxpayer to estab-
lish that bonds issued by the county court pursuant to state statutory
authority were illegal under the state constitution. He sued the county
court and the holders of the bonds. The case came to the Court on
plaintiff's exceptions to the answer. The Court upheld the validity of
the bonds, 254 and concluded that "as the defendants claim to be inno-
cent holders, . . . the complainant has no standing in a court of
equity." 255
Although in both Les Bois and Ritchie the Court used the term
"standing" to indicate a loss of the suit on the merits, the two cases
differ substantially when analyzed according to the modem doctrine of
the same name. The private rights model characterized Les Bois; the
plaintiff had clearly suffered particularized injury redressable by a com-
mon law court. By contrast, the constituent public rights model applied
to Ritchie; Mr. Ritchie had suffered no demonstrable injury and he
shared his grievances with all other taxpayers of the county. In neither
case did the Court engage in an analysis that remotely resembled mod-
em article III standing. In each case, the Court's explicit consideration
of "standing" was an inquiry into the merits.256
251. See, e.g., De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. 378 (12 Wheat.) 599 (1827); Menard's
Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 302 (1850).
252. Les Bous, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 517 (1846). See also Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471,477 (1850) (argument by counsel, citing De la Croix, that "such paper can give the
party no standing in the court .... "); Menard's Heirs, 49 U.S. at 316 ("No standing, therefore,
in an ordinary judicial tribunal has ever been allowed to these claims, until Congress has
confirmed them and vested the legal title in the claimant."). Three years later, the Court used
the term "standing in court" in the same sense in Guitard v. Stoddard, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 524,
540-41 (1853).
253. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 67 (1874).
254. If adjudicated today, the Court might have held that Mr. Ritchie's status as a tax-
payer didn't confer standing. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (state
courts may confer broader taxpayer standing, but case dismissed by United States Supreme
Court as presenting no case or controversy because it was not a "good-faith pocketbook ac-
tion"). The more serious article III problem in Ritchie was that the case did not appear to
present a federal question nor to involve diversity of citizenship.
255. Rztchie, 89 U.S. at 77.
256. In a contemporaneous nonequity case consolidating the Elgee Cotton Cases, 89
U.S. (22 Wall.) 180 (1874), the Court used the term "standing" in a similar manner. Under
the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, one could sue in the court of claims to recover for
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The Court also used the term "standing" to describe those parties
identified by article III as supporting party-based subject matter juris-
diction. In Livingston v. Story, the Court dismissed a diversity case be-
cause the plaintiff had not properly pled the parties' citizenship for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Justice Baldwin argued in dissent
that "like all others material to the plaintiff's standing in court, [the
plaintiff] was bound to prove it when called on by an answer, which did
not admit, or put it in issue by a denial."'257 In Georgia v. Stanton,258 the
Court used the metaphor to characterize the decision in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia259 "that the Cherokee Nation could not be regarded as a for-
eign nation within the Judiciary Act; and, that, therefore, they had no
standing in court." 260
The term "standing" had a third nineteenth century usage that first
appeared in equity cases concerning public nuisance. In Georgetown v.
Alexandria Canal Co. ,261 the city of Georgetown sought an injunction in
federal court to stop the construction of an aqueduct over the Potomac
River that threatened to obstruct both the channel and the harbor. The
Court held that the case was not proper for a court of equity. It ex-
pressed this in the language of a familiar battle metaphor: "[T]he
plaintiff cannot maintain a stand in a court of equity .. . ."262
Doctrinally, Georgetown had nothing to do with article III; the case
was solely and explicitly an artifact of the historic jurisdictional fight
between law and equity. The Court first discussed the exercise of crim-
inal jurisdiction over public nuisances by the law courts.263 It then
traced the tenuous exercise of equity jurisdiction over public nuisances,
which "had lain dormant for a century and a half ... from Charles I.
property seized by Union troops during the Civil War only if one could show: ownership, a
present right to the proceeds, and loyalty during the war. Act of Mar. 12, 1863, 12 Stat. 820,
§ 3. The plaintiffs in The Elgee Cotton Cases claimed that, under various contracts, they were
entitled to the proceeds of cotton that had been seized in Mississippi during the Vicksburg
campaign. The Court rejected their claim: "It is the owner alone who has any standing in the
Court of Claims under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act .... 89 U.S. at 185.
Here, the metaphor of "standing" is invoked not to say that the plaintiffs could not sue
because they had suffered no injury but to convey that the plaintiffs had no capacity to sue
because, on the merits, they had no rights. "mhe rights defined are the only ones which can
be enforced in any judicial proceeding. The language of the act makes it plain that no one is
allowed to sue in the Court of Claims for the proceeds.., unless he can prove [ownership] to
the satisfaction of the court .... " Id at 186. At the outset of the opinion, the Court noted
that "in the view which we take of the merits of the controversy it is unnecessary to do more than
examine the contracts themselves ...... Id at 185 (emphasis added). This was, therefore, a
ruling on the merits, rather than about standing in the modem sense.
257. 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 351, 414 (1837) (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
258. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
259. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
260. Stanton, 73 U.S. at 74.
261. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838).
262. Id at 99.
263. Id at 97 ("the ordinary and regular proceeding at law is by indictment or informa-
tion...").
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down to the year 1795. ' '264 The compromise in this jurisdictional bat-
tle between law and equity was a doctrine that required special, private
injury as a prerequisite for an injunction against a public nuisance. 265
The Court accordingly held that the city was not a proper plaintiff.
The significance of Georgetown in the development of standing is not
doctrinal but cognitive. Toward the end of its opinion, the Court ad-
monished that:
The appellants seem to have proceeded on the idea, that it appertained
to them, as the corporate authority in Georgetown, to take care of and
protect the interests of the citizens .... But ... the persons who, by
name, bring the suit, and constitute the parties on the record, [must]
have themselves an interest in the subject-matter .... 266
Though this passage appears in a case that was solely about equity doc-
trines, its language foreshadows that of the later constitutional doctrine
of standing. For, Georgetown and its progeny rejected for equity the kind
of representational model premised on a part-whole schema that charac-
terized Hayburn's Case and mandamus. 267 The invocation of the repre-
sentational model by the city was consistent with the notion of a
municipal corporation; the term is itself a part-whole metaphor for the
human body. 268 The Court, however, rejected just this assertion by the
appellants of the right to sue as "the corporate authority in Ge-
orgetown." This rejection of the representational model premised on a
part-whole schema was not final, of course; the Court vacillated on this
point both in Hall 269 and in later equity cases. The most notable of
264. Id at 98. The Court observed that "[t]his jurisdiction seems to have been acted on
with great caution and hesitancy." Id.
265. Id at 98-99. Georgetown's account of equity law does not, of course, include other
developments such as the relator practice and the resurgence of equity later in the nineteenth
century. Thus, in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, the Court pointed out that equity did allow a
private suit to abate a public nuisance where the harm was common to all and particularly
injurious to the plaintiff. 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875).
266. 37 U.S. at 99-100.
267. See Heffner v. Commonwealth ay. rel. Kline, 28 Pa. 108, 113-14 (1857); Sanger v.
County of Comm'rs 25 Me. 291, 296 (1845); Cleary v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 14
(1820); State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 21 (1821) for statement of the minority
rule that only state officers such as the attorney general or district attorney could seek a writ of
mandamus in a public rights case.
268. The word "corporate" comes from the Latin corporatus meaning "formed into a
body."
269. Hall cited Wheehng Bridge II as an American illustration of equity's general power to
enjoin a public nuisance without the necessity of a claim of private right. 91 U.S. at 355.
Wheeling Bridge II itself was ambivalent on this score. Although it discussed and explicitly
relied on Georgetown, it also cited Bacon's Abridgement for the proposition that "[a]ny individ-
ual may abate a public nuisance." 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 566; see also Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 283 (1855). Ultimately, it relied on Pennsylvania's special injury of the decrease
in toll revenues on the canals that fed into the Ohio, which would have resulted if the nuisance
had not been abated. Id at 561-62. The Court in Hall reasoned that "[t]he injury... was no
more peculiar to Pennsylvania than is the injury to Hall." 91 U.S. at 355. Regardless of
whether the Court in Hall read Wheeling Bridge II correctly, Wheeling Bridge, like Georgetown,
dealt with these questions solely as a matter of the jurisdictional divide between law and eq-
uity. Wheeling Bridge II, 54 U.S. at 562-66. Wheeling Bridge H, however, used neither the term
"standing" nor a variant.
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these was In re Debs.270
When, in Debs, the Court considered the "standing" of the federal
government to obtain an injunction to stop the Pullman strike of 1894,
it did not consider an article III, "case or controversy" question of
standing. Rather, it asked whether the government had acted within its
delegated authority and whether, "[i]f authority exists, as authority in
governmental affairs implies both power and duty, has a court of equity
jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of the performance of such
duty." 27' The Court concluded that the appeal by the government to a
court of equity was appropriate on two grounds. First, the Court in-
voked a private rights model for the government's position: "It is said
that equity only interferes for the protection of property, and that the
government has no property interest. A sufficient reply is that the
United States have a property in the mails, the protection of which was
one of the purposes of this bill."' 27 2 But the Court did not rest there; it
applied the public rights model directly-invoking the government's
obligation "to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdo-
ing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare,"-as a "sufficient"
ground to confer upon the government "a standing in court. '273
In these nineteenth century "standing" cases, the central inquiry
was whether the litigant asserted the kind of interest or right for which
equity would provide a remedy. In Ritchie, the litigant had asserted a
claim that equity would not enforce against an innocent purchaser.
Similarly, in Debs, the Court considered what kind of rights, both public
and private, were enforceable by equity.274 Despite the use, by the
Court in Georgetown, of a variant of "standing" in connection with its
insistence on a private rights model, the Debs Court reaffirmed the pub-
lic rights model in upholding the "standing" of the federal
government.
The significance of Debs to modem standing doctrine was purely lin-
guistic. To appreciate this, it is necessary to understand how wide was
the gap between the original understanding of "standing"-with its
grounding in substantive considerations of equitable rights and reme-
dies-and the later imposed requirement of "injury-in-fact." This gap
lasted well past Frothingham; it wasn't until much later that the term
"standing" was understood as expressing a purely procedural concept.
The Chicago Junction Case,275 decided a year after Frothingham, illus-
trates the gap between the original substantive meaning of "standing"
and its later procedural usage. There, competitor railroads brought a
270. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
271. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 583.
273. Id. at 584.
274. See, e.g., J. POMEROY & S. SYMONS, 1 EQUmrYJURSPRUDENCE § 91, §§ 101-02 (5th ed.
1941). See note 280 infra.
275. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
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suit in equity to set aside a sale approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs had "not the
legal interest necessary to entitle them to challenge the order. 27
6
Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis first observed that the plaintiffs
had "a vital interest .... The diversion of traffic has already subjected
the plaintiffs to irreparable injury ...exceed[ing] $10,000,000."277
That assertion did not address the relevant question because what the
litigant needed for "standing" was not literal injury, but a redressable
right or legal injury. The Court found that right not in "the incident of
more effective competition," but rather in the statutory "injury inflicted
by denying to the plaintiffs equality of treatment." 278
Justice Sutherland dissented on the ground that the railroads had
no "remediable interest." He phrased this argument in terms of
"standing. ' 279 But he did not invoke an article III doctrine; he relied
on general principles.280 "What constitutes a legal or equitable right,
interference with which may give rise to an action? may be tested; and
the determination of that question must still rest upon general princi-
ples of jurisprudence. ' 28 1
276. IdL at 266.
277. Id.
278. Id at 267.
279. Id at 271.
280. For a standing as party plaintiff it is necessary, not only that plaintiff have a
legal entity or existence, and that he be possessed of legal capacity to sue, but also
that this person have, in the cause of action asserted, a remedial interest which the
law of the forum can recognize and enforce.
47 CJ.S. § 30 (1929) (footnotes omitted); Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs II, 13
HARv. L. REv. 659 (1900).
The cases in which equity assumes jurisdiction over controversies between litigants
may be divided into two great classes .... In the first class of cases, the ground upon
which equity takes jurisdiction is that the plaintiff either can obtain no relief at all at
law, or none which is adequate; and, therefore, so far as regards this class of cases,
equity consists merely in a different mode of giving relief from that employed by
courts of common law, i.e., in a different mode of protecting and enforcing legal
rights ....
The other class of cases ... may be divided into those in which the plaintiff sets
up no legal right whatever, and those in which the only legal right he sets up is a
defence to some legal claim which the defendant makes against him. In cases be-
longing to the first subdivision, equity interferes upon the ground that the substan-
tive law (and not merely the remedial law) is inadequate to the purposes ofjustice.
In cases belonging to the second subdivision, equity interferes upon the ground that
justice requires that the plaintiff should be permitted to take the initiative in the
litigation, and procure a decision of the controversy in a suit brought by himself,
instead of being compelled to wait the pleasure of the defendant in suing him at law,
and then to set up his defence. In one important particular, however, cases belong-
ing to these two subdivisions are alike, namely, in the necessity in which they impose
upon equity of creating a new right in the plaintiff's favor;for no action or suit can be
maintained in any court without some right upon which to found it.
Id at 672 (emphasis added).
281. Baltimore and O.R.R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 272 (1924). (Sutherland,
J., dissenting).
A private injury for which the law affords no remedy cannot be converted into a
remediable injury, merely because it results from an act of which the public might
complain. In other words, the law will afford redress to a litigant only for injuries
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As late as Ashwander,28 2 Justice Brandeis shared Justice Sutherland's
doctrinal premises. In his famous concurrence in Ashwander, Justice
Brandeis opined that the plaintiffs did not have standing, stating that
"It]he obstacle is not procedural. It inheres in the substantive law, in
well settled rules of equity, and in the practice in cases involving the
constitutionality of legislation. ' 28 3 Justice Brandeis derived none of
these'three obstacles to "standing" from article 111.284 Even his invoca-
tion of the constitutional practice was prefaced with the observation
that the rules developed by the Court were "for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction .... ,,285
It is this understanding of "standing" as substantive that illuminates
the significance of cases like Debs: Debs illustrates the ontological effect
of the metaphor. In the nineteenth century, the phrase "a standing in
court" 28 6 was used to refer to the party's ability to obtain equitable
remedies from the courts. This phrase suggested that standing was a
jurisdictional question, as in Livingston or Cherokee Nation. That inter-
pretation was consonant with both the historical view of equity as a sep-
arate jurisdiction (as it had been before the merger of law and equity)
and the notion that jurisdiction in equity was founded on the availabil-
ity of certain remedies.
But the discussion of concepts of rights and entitlement to equitable
remedies in jurisdictional terminology was understood by the most em-
inent legal scholars of the day as an inaccuracy needing correction.
John Pomeroy decried the phenomenon in 1892: "[T]he 'equity juris-
which invade his own legal rights; and since the injuries here complained of are not
of that character and do not result from the violation of any obligation owing to the
complainants, it follows that they are without legal standing to sue.
Id. at 272-73 (emphasis added). Justice Sutherland rejected the majority's characterization of
the legal interest on the ground that the bill relied only on the theory of harm to the plaintiffs'
interests as competitors, not on a theory of inequality of treatment. Id. at 273-74.
282. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
283. Id. at 341 (Brandeis,J., concurring). In the very first drafts of this concurring opin-
ion Justice Brandeis stated that
[t]he plaintiffs have no standing to require the Court to decide the Constitutional
question. This objection is not procedural. The plaintffs have complied with the
formal requirements of a stockholders' suit prescribed by Equity Rule 27. Their lack
of standing to require a decision of the Constitutional question is due to the absence,
on the findings, of a substantive right to interfere with the internal management of
the corporation.
THE Louis DEMBiTZ BRANDEIS PAPERS, Box 96, Folders 1-7 (Library of Congress microfilm
series, Part II: United States Supreme Court October Terms 1932-1938, Reel 16, # 0447).
284. Discussing the first obstacle, the substantive law, Justice Brandeis observed that
"[t]he fact that the bill calls for an enquiry into the legality of the transaction does not over-
come the obstacle that ordinarily stockholders have no standing to interfere with the manage-
ment." Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 343. Discussing the second obstacle, the equity practice,
Justice Brandeis began: "Even where property rights of stockholders are alleged to be vio-
lated by the management, stockholders seeking an injunction must bear the burden of show-
ing danger of irreparable injury, as do others who seek that equitable relief." Id. at 344-45.
285. Id. at 346.
286. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Franklin County, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 67, 77 (1875); Florida v.
Anderson, 91 U.S. 667, 675 (1876).
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diction' is constantly confounded with the right of the plaintiff to main-
tain his suit . -"287 In 1926, in State Grange v. Benton, Justice Holmes
admonished that: "Courts sometimes say that there is no jurisdiction in
equity when they mean only that equity ought not to give the relief
asked. In a strict sense the Court in this case had jurisdiction. ' 28 8 At
the very time of Frothingham and Fairchild, the Supreme Court was try-
ing to disentangle "standing" from notions of jurisdiction. In 1926,
the Court wrote: "Whether a plaintiff seeking such [equitable] relief
has the requisite standing is a question going to the merits, and its de-
termination is an exercise ofjurisdiction. If it be resolved against him,
the appropriate decree is a dismissal for want of merits, not for want of
jurisdiction. '2 89
Nevertheless, the ontological effect of the metaphor was overpower-
ing: "A standing in court" sounds like a question ofjurisdiction because
standing up is a prerequisite to being heard in court. Justice Holmes,
Pomeroy, and the Supreme Court did battle with the metaphor, but
lost. "Standing" became a question of jurisdiction in the more funda-
mental sense of justiciability under article III.
B. Jus Tertii and the Elaboration of the Individualist Model
The analytic antecedents of the modern doctrine of standing can be
traced to the cases that we now see as presenting problems ofjus tertii:
when a litigant seeks to invoke rights "belonging" to a third party.2 90
The connection between thejus tertii cases and their modem doctrinal
descendent lies in their common conceptualization by means of the in-
dividualistic metaphor of "standing." If a litigant can assert only his or
her own "personal" rights, then that person cannot assert the rights of
another (jus tertii) and that person cannot assert the rights of the group
(standing) unless he or she actually has suffered personal injury and the
rights asserted are only coincidentally those of the group.
Viewed through this lens, bothjus tertii and modem standing cases
concern situations in which the court dismisses the litigant's claim be-
cause he or she is the wrong person to assert it. But these two types of
cases relied on different doctrines. The jus tertii cases were not pre-
mised on article III minima derived from the "case or controversy" re-
quirement as is the modem understanding of standing. As Justice
Brandeis explained in Ashwander,jus tertii was a rule the Court applied in
287. J. POMEROY & S. SYMONS, 1 EoUrrYJURISPRUDENCE § 131 (5th ed. 1941) (annotating
Pomeroy's original works). Pomeroy's concern was that it was "productive of much confusion
in the discussion of equitable doctrines." l
288. 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926) (Holmes, J.). In Benton, the Court rejected a challenge to
the adoption of Daylight Savings Time brought by parties who "do not even allege any direct
interest" and by another who raised "matters that do not concern her." Id. at 528.
289. General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1926) (citations
omitted).
290. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943).
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"cases confessedly within its jurisdiction .... ,"291 None of thejus tertii
plaintiffs lacked the requisite relationship to the court now delineated
by the modem doctrine of standing. Each plaintiff had a sufficient in-
terest to make the dispute a "case." Each had suffered an injury-in-fact;
each was affected in a particularized way by the private or public actions
about which he or she complained; and, had the courts adjudicated the
claim, each predicament would have been redressed by the relief
sought.
Equity doctrine provided the link that allowedjus tertii cases to be-
come transformed into the modem standing doctrine with its focus on
injury and direct causation. To document this link, I will demonstrate
that thejus tertii doctrine itself evolved from two separate lines of cases.
The first line of cases evolved from an 1809 decision by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Owings v. Norwood's Lessee.29 2 Mr. Owings, the defend-
ant in an ejectment action, had come into possession of the property
after an attachment and unexecuted judgment of condemnation had
been obtained by a creditor of the mortgagee.29 3 Mr. Owings' defense
to the plaintiff's claim of title was that superior title had passed to the
mortgagee, an English merchant named Mr. Scarth. The Maryland
courts held that Mr. Scarth's interest had been confiscated by the state
in 1780. Mr. Owings argued that the confiscation in fact occurred in
i794 and, therefore, was invalid under the provisions of the treaty of
peace with England. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction because
"[t]he 25th section of the judiciary act must be restrained by the consti-
tution, the words of which are, 'all cases arising under treaties.' The
plaintiff in error does not contend that his right grows out of the
treaty." 294
The next day, plaintiff's counsel addressed the Court, stating his
understanding of the basis of the Court's decision. He suggested that
the Court had reached its decision by interpreting its power to review
state court judgments "where the party himself did not claim title
under a treaty." ChiefJustice Marshall responded that plaintiff's coun-
sel "had misunderstood the opinion of the court, in that respect. It was
not that this court had no jurisdiction if the treaty were drawn in ques-
291. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
292. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809). Owings is, in fact, miscited as the first example of the
jus teriii doctrine, as I explain in the text below. Compare Owings, 9 U.S. at 348, with Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 395, 408 (1900). Tyler, however, provided a
critical link in the chain of development of the modern doctrine of standing. See text accom-
panying notes 329-342 infra.
293. Owings, 9 U.S. at 344.
294. id at 347-48. At first blush, this reasoning appears inconsistent with Justice Mar-
shall's later holding concerning the "arising under" jurisdiction in Osborn that "it be a suffi-
cient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by
one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction .. " Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824).
As explained below, however, the inconsistency is more apparent than real.
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tion incidentally."' 295 Rather, Mr. Owings could not invoke the Court's
appellate jurisdiction because his was not a case presenting a federal
question.296 Mr. Owings claimed no title under the Englishman Scarth.
Nothing in the case concerned the rights or treatment of an English
national, the subject to which the treaty's provisions were addressed.
The invocation of Mr. Scarth's title was relevant only as a matter of
state property law to defeat the plaintiff's ejectment claim. 29 7 That
question could be invoked by Mr. Owings in the Maryland courts.298
But, the purposes of the treaty protections-that is, the federal inter-
ests299-were absent; the case was wholly dependent on state law. 300
In its own time, however, Owings was understood as construing sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as limiting the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction to cases in which the plaintiff-in-error claimed or
set up a title of his or her own derived from the Constitution, a treaty,
or a law of the United States.30 1 This was, in part, because ChiefJustice
Marshall's opinion appeared to be concerned with the definition and
ownership of rights. 30 2 It is not surprising that this notion ofjus tertii
was understood as statutory rather than constitutional. For the con-
temporaneous informer, relator and mandamus cases taught that arti-
cle III did not necessarily bar a litigant from raising another's rights. If
295. Owings, 9 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
296. See G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 511 n.43 (1981).
297. The same issue arose in Henderson v. Tennessee, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 311 (1850).
There the Court explained that:
[I1n the language of ejectment law, an outstanding title means a title in a third per-
son, under which the tenant in possession does not claim.... The right to make this
defence is not derived from the treaties, nor from any authority exercised under the
general government. It is given by the laws of the State, which provide that the
defendant in ejectment may set up title in a stranger in bar of the action.
Id. at 323.
298. Owings, 9 U.S. at 348.
299. Chief Justice Marshall observed that:
[A]ll persons who have real claims under a treaty should have their cause decided by
the national tribunals. It was to avoid the apprehension as well as the danger of state
prejudices .... But if the person's title is not affected by the treaty, if he claims
nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be protected by the treaty. If Scarth or his
heirs had claimed, it would have been a case arising under a treaty.
Owings, 9 U.S. at 348.
300. Cf. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950) ("language in
the contract may have a scope independent of the proper construction of § 7(c)" of the Natu-
ral Gas Act); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (applying independent and adequate state
ground rule).
301. G. HASKINS & H.JOHNSON, supra note 296, at 553, 625 (1981); see Montgomery v.
Hernandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 129, 132 (1827); Henderson v. Tennessee, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
311, 323 (1850); Hale v. Gaines, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 144, 160 (1859); Long v. Converse, 91
U.S. 105, 113-14 (1875); Giles v. Little, 134 U.S. 645, 650 (1890).
302. The words of the constitution are, 'cases arising under treaties.' Each treaty stipu-
lates something respecting the citizens of two nations, and gives them rights. When-
ever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the
laws and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be
protected.
Owings, 9 U.S. at 348 (emphasis in original).
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there was a rule of law that did so, it would have to have been the stat-
ute. The Court continued to interpret its jurisdictional statute as the
source of the principle ofjus tertii well into the twentieth century.303
The generalized notion ofjus tertii that we are familiar with today
developed instead from an entirely different source: state mandamus
cases as interpreted by Dean Thomas Cooley.304 Precisely because
mandamus practice allowed strangers to litigate constitutional claims of
governmental excess, those queasy about the exercise of the strong
medicine ofjudicial review questioned whether any public spirited citi-
zen should be able to invoke it.
This notion ofjus tertii was derived from the distinction between un-
constitutional statutes as void or merely voidable.30 5 In Marbury's con-
ceptual system, unconstitutional statutes were conceived of as void
because beyond the legislative power in the first place.30 6 Marbury's
conception was soon questioned in the state courts, where the practice
of judicial review was recognized, but not embraced so unqualifiedly.
In re Wellington,307 the Massachusetts court propounded its own, pre-
mature Brandeisian catalogue of devices for avoiding the invalidation
of state statutes on constitutional grounds.308 Amongst these was the
recognition that
when such an act is alleged to be void, on the ground that it exceeds
the just limits of legislative power, and thus injuriously affects the
rights of others, it is to be deemed void only in respect to those particu-
lars, and as against those persons, whose rights are thus affected.30 9
Wellington was a classic public rights case. Joshua Wellington and his
co-plaintiffs sought, by means of mandamus, to compel county commis-
sioners "to consider and determine whether it be of common conven-
ience and necessity," that a road be built across a corner of Cambridge
303. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,437-38 (1939); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138,
148-49 (1903); Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1901); Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U.S.
301, 305 (1892). The Court did not use the term "standing" in these cases. The appellees in
Smith, however, phrased their argument in that way: "Plaintiff in error has no standing in this
court, and has no right to invoke the power of this court .... Smith, 191 U.S. at 146.
304. See notes 315-317 infra and accompanying text.
305. As such, these state mandamus cases relate more to modem notions of overbreadth
than tojus tertii. Compare Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), with Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106 (1976). Of course, overbreadth likejus tertii can be conceptualized in terms of
"standing"-again, the court dismisses the litigant's claim because he or she is the wrong
person to assert it.
306. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 87, 111 ("an act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the constitution, is void").
307. In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834).
308. Id. at 95-97. The "devices" included the exercise of "great caution" in approach-
ing the question; an examination of "every possible aspect"; deliberation as lengthy and pa-
tient as necessary to "throw any new light on the subject"; a commitment not to void a statute
on constitutional grounds unless the matter was "beyond reasonable doubt"; and a presump-
tion that the circumstances necessary to support the constitutionality of the legislation in fact
exist. Id.
309. Id. at 96.
[Vol. 40:13711428
common.3 10 On the merits, the petitioners argued that the state statute
establishing the commons was unconstitutional because it failed ade-
quately to provide for compensation to the original property owners,
all of whom were third parties. The court recited the limitation noted
above, but ruled against the third party claim on the merits. 31 '
Only at the close of the opinion did the court consider "whether the
petitioners in the present case stand in such a relation to the cause and
the subject matter, as to warrant them in applying to this Court for a
writ of mandamus. ' 3 12 It suggested that "it may perhaps be urged with
some force, that petitioners so situated are parties and as such have an
" 313interest in the final and correct determination of the cause ....
Ultimately, the court concluded that it need not reach the "standing"
question because it disposed of the case on the merits of petitioners'
third party claim.3 1 4
But Dean Thomas Cooley adopted Wellington's notion that statutes
were only unconstitutional as applied to specific people. He discussed
it in his influential treatise on constitutional limitations on state govern-
ments,3 15 a major source of late nineteenth century legal views on indi-
vidualism.31 6 Cooley interpreted Wellington as a case about the
individualistic basis of rights that stated a general rule ofjus tertii: "Nor
will a court listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act
by a party whose rights it does not affect, and who has therefore no
interest in defeating it. ' '317
Some state courts applied Cooley's analysis318 , but the Supreme
Court was initially less receptive.3 19 Thus, although the Court asked
310. Id at 93.
311. Id. at 97-105.
312. Id at 105. Here the Court uses the metaphor of "standing" to refer to the relation-
ship between the litigant and the adjudicative process.
313. Id at 106 (emphasis added). The court confessed to experiencing some befuddle-
ment about the intermediate nature of the case, which it characterized as a "somewhat anoma-
lous proceeding." Id at 105-06. It considered the formal constraints imposed by the
mandamus petition-that the petition gave adequate notice "to all parties interested" and
that the jurisdiction of the commissioners was strictly limited by the terms of the petition, see
text accompanying note 208 supra,-and concluded that these were sufficient to permit the
suit. Id
314. Id at 106.
315. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868). Cooley's book was
called "the most influential treatise ever published on American constitutional law." E.
CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 116 (1948). Justice Brandeis relied on this book in
his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936).
316. B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 22 (1942). See also Seagle, Thomas
McIntyre Cool&y, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 357 (1930).
317. T. COOLEY, supra note 315, at *163 (3d ed. 1874).
318. See, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118 (1900) (quoting opinion Kansas
Supreme Court).
319. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, was not yet prepared in
1868, nor for some years afterward, to yield itself to the leadership of Cooley and
those who, including an important section of the American Bar, shared his views.
This was because a controlling majority of the Court felt that the duty immediately
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the rhetorical question in Supervisors v. Stanley, 32 0-- "What legal interest
has he in a question which only affects others?" 32 1 -it did not decide
the case by invoking Cooley's (or Owings', for that matter) concept ofjus
tertii. Rather, the Court concluded that the New York statute "was void-
able but not void." 322 It found that the provisions of the New York
statute were severable,3 23 and could be applied in cases in which no
conflict with the federal statute existed.3 24
The watershed came in three cases at the turn of the century. In the
first, Clark v. Kansas City,3 25 the Court cited Cooley and Stanley as illus-
trations of the proposition that "a court will not listen to an objection
made to the Constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does
not affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it. 1 326 In
Clark, a railroad challenged a state statute exempting agricultural land
from municipal annexation. It argued that the statute discriminated be-
tween the owners of agricultural and other types of land, as well as
among owners of various classes of agricultural land, in violation of the
equal protection clause.327 Because the railroad owned no agricultural
land, the Court only considered the alleged discrimination between
owners of agricultural and nonagricultural land, but would not con-
sider discrimination among owners of various classes of agricultural
land. The Court applied the source-path-goal metaphor of the private
rights model; because the railroad had suffered no legal injury-that is,
no source for the remedial request the railroad-had no cause of
before it was to prevent "the federal equilibrium" from being completely under-
mined by the Reconstruction program of the Radical Republicans.
E. CORWIN, supra note 315, at 118. See also Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the
Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 39.
320. 105 U.S. 305 (1881). In Stanley, plaintiffs were shareholders in a national bank
whose shares were taxed by New York, as then permitted by federal statute. They argued that
"the statute of New York, under which the shares were assessed, was void, because it did not
permit the shareholder to make deduction of the amount of his debts from the valuation of his
shares .... Id. at 305.
321. The full passage is as follows:
What is there to render it void as to a shareholder in a national bank, who owes no
debts which he can deduct from the assessed value of his shares? The denial of this
right does not affect him. He pays the same amount of tax that he would if the law
gave him the right of deduction.... What legal interest has he in a question which
only affects others? Why should he invoke the protection of the act of Congress in a
case where he has no rights to protect? Is a court to sit and decide abstract questions
of law in which the parties before it show no interest, and which, if decided either
way, affect no right of theirs?
Id. at 311.
322. Id. at 315.
323. Id. at 312.
324. Id. at 315-16. Four years later, the Court said that it "has no jurisdiction to pro-
nounce any statute, either of a state or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with
the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies." Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigra-
tion, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
325. 176 U.S. 114 (1900).
326. Id. at 118.
327. Id. at 117-18.
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The second case, Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration,3 29 is the
most significant of the three: It is one of two opinions authored by
Justice Brown that form the basis of the modern standing doctrine; 330 it
was the first opinion to combine the statutory and generalized versions
ofjus tertii;33 ' and, most importantly, it was a prerogative writ case, thus
challenging the viability of the representational model on its home turf.
Tyler was a challenge to the Massachusetts Land Registration Act of
1898,332 which provided for an in rem proceeding through which an
owner could settle title as against all potential claimants. Mr. Tyler was
the owner of a lot adjoining one that was about to be registered; he was
concerned that the registration, specifying the boundaries of the lot,
would prejudice a dispute over the boundary between that land and his.
He sought a writ of prohibition to stop the registration court from pro-
ceeding. He argued that the registration statute was unconstitutional
because it failed to provide notice to absent third parties who might
have an interest in the land to be registered. The Court declined re-
view because Mr. Tyler clearly had notice, and therefore did not have
"the requisite interest to draw in question the constitutionality of this
act. ... -333 Mr. Tyler could not invoke the concerns of others, who had
to complain for themselves. 3 34
The four dissenters were astonished by the Court's ruling.3 3 5 And
328. The Court observed that: "The discrimination occurs only in a particular use of
the lands, and it would seem obvious that such use must be shown to make a cause of action-
a right infringed and to be redressed.... Not a law alone but a law and its incidence are
necessary to a justiciable right or injury ... ." Id at 118. The use of the source-path-goal
schema in the reasoning in this passage appears first in the argument that there must be a
source ("such use") for the court to entertain the railroad's quest for its sought after goal (that
is, a "cause of [the court's] action"). It appears again in the Court's definition of cause of
action. "Right" derives from the Latin rectus and "redress" from the Latin directus: both mean
straight and thus are further instances of the source-path-goal structure of the notion of a pri-
vate cause of action. See Winter, supra note 66.
329. 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
330. Members of the Court relied upon the two cases, Tyler and Davis & Farnum Mfg.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903), in their later opinions developing the under-
pinnings of modem standing. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 130 (1922) (Brandeis,J.,
citing Tyler); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis,J.,
concurring citing Tyler); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam, citing Tyler);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 466 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring, citing Tyler); Bar-
rows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 265 (1953) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting on standing grounds,
citing Tyler); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154 & n.3 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring, citing Davis); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring, citing Tyler); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (Burger, C.J., citing Tyler).
331. Justice Brown also combined the two concepts in dicta in Red River Valley Bank v.
Craig, 181 U.S. 548, 558 (1901) (citing Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U.S. 276, 283 (1901); Clark v.
Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118 (1900); Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305 (1881)).
332. Massachusetts Land Registration Act, 1898 Mass. Acts, ch. 562.
333. Tyler, 179 U.S. at 410.
334. Id.
335. Every element requisite to the maintenance of our jurisdiction exists, and ...
we cannot decline to exercise it because of any supposed error on the part of the
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they had good reason to be: Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Holmes had authored the opinion below and had not questioned
Mr. Tyler's capacity to bring the action.33 6 Furthermore, in Massachu-
setts in 1900, as at the time of the Framers, a writ of prohibition of the
type sought in Tyler was available at the behest of a stranger, let alone a
petitioner with an injury of his or her own.3 3 7
But Justice Brown and the majority opined:
The prime object of all litigation is to establish a right asserted by the
plaintiff or to sustain a defence set up by the party pursued. Save in a
few instances where, by statute or the settled practice of the courts, the
plaintiff is permitted to sue for the benefit of another, he is bound to
show an interest in the suit personal to himself, and even in a proceed-
ing which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public, as, for example,
in cases of nuisance, he must generally aver an injury peculiar to him-
self, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens.33 8
The Court failed to explain in doctrinal terms why Mr. Tyler's action
did not provide a proper "instance[] where, by ... the settled practice
... the plaintiff is permitted to sue for the benefit of another." The
Court also ignored the fact that Mr. Tyler had alleged an injury peculiar
to himself: an adjudication by the registration court of the boundaries
of the adjoining property that would, at least de facto, alter his rights.
Finally, the opinion invoked the law of nuisance as its paradigm, an
analogy underlining the degree to which the notion of "standing" was
bounded by the relevant substantive law and, thus, undermining the
Courts generalized assertion that a plaintiff could not sue on behalf of
others.
What Justice Brown's opinion did instead was neatly to sever the
plaintiff's connection to the absent third parties by rejecting the suffi-
ciency of the part-whole metaphor for society: Mr. Tyler needed to make
a personalized legal claim "as distinguished from the great body of his
fellow citizens."'3 39 Doctrinally, the opinion invoked Owings and its
progeny34 0-as well as aspects ofjusticiability such as mootness, ripe-
ness, and the ban on advisory opinions.3 41 It did not raise the question
state court in respect to entertaining the suit .... The state court ruled that the
petition was sufficient to raise the Federal question; that petitioner was competent to
raise it; and that he was entitled to preventive relief if his contention was well
founded.
Id. at 413-14 (Fuller, J., joined by Harlan, Brewer, & Shiras, JJ., dissenting).
336. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812 (1900).
337. See cases cited supra note 167.
338. Tyler, 179 U.S. at 406.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 407-08. See notes 292-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of Owings.
341. Justice Brown noted that "the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it." TyLer, 179 U.S.
at 409 (quoting California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893)). InJustice
Brown's view, the abstractness of Mr. Tyler's case turned on an assessment of the contingen-
cies: If the registration statute were later held unconstitutional "the proceedings against him
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we now view as central to standing: the degree of injury a litigant must
suffer to establish his or her entitlement to use the judicial process. To
the contrary, Justice Brown acknowledged that Mr. Tyler was free to
intervene in the registration process and pursue his claim in that case all
the way to the United States Supreme Court. 342
Thus, Tyler was not a case of article III standing in the modem
sense. But, it was an important step toward the modem doctrine be-
cause it specifically rejected application of the representational model
with the writ of prohibition. The final link, transforming a doctrine
preventing injured parties from invoking third party rights into a doc-
trine requiring direct injury, came from familiar doctrines of equity.3 4 3
Two years after Tyler, in Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,344 Justice Brown employed the metaphor of "standing" and in-
voked thejus tertii reasoning of Tyler by analogy.
In Davis, a subcontractor on a gas tank construction project sought
to enjoin Los Angeles from enforcing municipal ordinances banning
the project. The subcontractor had an obvious economic interest in the
project, and employees of the subcontractor were being prosecuted for
violating the ordinance. The subcontractor sought to enjoin the pend-
ing state criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds, claiming that
later enacted ordinances impaired the obligation of a preexisting con-
tract to build the gas works.345 In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Brown dismissed the subcontractor's interest as too indirect: "[T]his is
not a bill by ... the owner of the land and of the proposed gas works
... nor by the contractor, with which she had made a contract to erect
these works; but by a subcontractor ....
The Court held that the subcontractor did not "stand . . . in [a]
position ... to take advantage of the unconstitutionality of [the] law"
because "it has an action against the Gas and Fuel Company, which is
presumed at least to be able to respond in damages for all such as
plaintiff may have suffered by the interruption of the contract. .... .347
[Mr. Tyler] would simply go for naught." Tyler, 179 U.S. at 410. Alternatively, if Mr. Tyler
participated in the registration statute proceedings and "that court shall eventually uphold his
contention with respect to the boundary, he will have no ground for complaint." Id. Only if
Mr. Tyler lost below would the case be proper for the Court's review. Id.
342. Id
343. One might have assumed that the direct injury requirement was rooted in an a
fortion logic of "standing": If an injured party could not sue when the alleged illegality did
not affect her, then certainly she should not be able to sue when she had suffered no injury at
all.
344. 189 U.S. 207 (1903). Professor Vining identified Davis as the first case to contain
the term "standing," albeit in a headnote. J. VINING, supra note 27, at 55.
345. The Court first noted that equity would not enjoin criminal proceedings. It then
inquired whether the case fell within the exception for unconstitutional state laws that
threaten irreparable harm to property, Davis, 189 U.S. at 217-18, considering Davis's impair-
ment of contract claim.
346. Id at 218.
347. Id at 219. That the Court assumed that the city had not impaired the subcontrac-
tor's contract at all also explains the unavailability of equitable relief. "Whether the Gas and
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Thus Davis was not a case of "standing" in which the Court viewed the
plaintiff as having no personal interest in the outcome of the dispute.
Conceptually, Davis held that the subcontractor could not use apart-
whole schema or a link schema to invoke the "personal" claim of the
general contractor. The subcontractor's complaint, after all, was that
the municipal ordinance affected everyone in the chain extending from
the land owner, to the general contractor, through it (as an intermedi-
ate link), to its own employees. The Court said that the subcontractor
could not invoke the joint interest of the whole chain. The subcontrac-
tor would have to deal with the other link, the general contractor, on its
own.
Doctrinally, the lower federal courts interpreted Davis as concerning
the scope of the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 48 Two other
equity cases, frequently cited in modem standing opinions, illustrate
this equitable, rather than constitutional, origin of the link between ju-
risdiction and adequacy of one's personal interest: McCabe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 34 9 and Truax v. Raich.350
In McCabe, five black persons sued to enjoin compliance by five rail-
roads with the terms of a post-Plessy v. Ferguson351 Oklahoma statute.
The statute explicitly required that railroad provide separate but equal
facilities. But it allowed one-race sleeping, dining, and chair cars with-
out providing such "luxury" accommodations to the other race. The
district court upheld the statute. The Court questioned that part of the
statute which deviated from the separate-but-equal doctrine, rejecting
the state Attorney General's argument that the railroads experienced
insufficient demand for services to justify all-black sleeping, dining, and
chair cars. 352 "It makes the constitutional right depend upon the
number of persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the es-
sence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one."'353
The Court nevertheless affirmed. Citing Davis and Tyler, the Court
Fuel Company in such action could defend upon the ground that the municipality had forbid-
den the prosecution of the work might depend somewhat upon the terms of the contract .... "
Id. The Court saw only a contract issue: If the contract contained aforce majeure clause, then
there was no contract to be impaired because both parties would have accepted the risk of
such an ordinance. If the contract did not contain such a clause, then there was still an
unimpaired, enforceable contract.
348. Venner v. Great N. Ry. Co., 153 F. 408, 411 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1907); Poor v. Iowa
Cent. Ry. Co., 155 F. 226, 230 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1907); see also Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 156
F. 1002, 1006 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1906).
349. 235 U.S. 151 (1914). McCabe is cited in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974), Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962)
(per curiam), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
350. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Truax is cited on the issue of standing in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 124 (1973), Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring), Barrows, 346 U.S. at 258, and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
351. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
352. McCabe, 235 U.S. at 161.
353. Id. (emphasis added).
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held that plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable relief. It reasoned
that, in order to justify such relief, the plaintiffs must demonstrate per-
sonal injury,3 54 and there must be no adequate remedy at law.35 5 The
concluding passage of the opinion reveals that the Court was consider-
ing traditional rules of equity, not constitutional or prudential rules of
"standing":
Nor is there anything to show that in case any of these complainants
offers himself as a passenger on any of these roads and is refused ac-
commodation equal to those afforded to others on a like journey, he
will not have an adequate remedy at law. The desire to obtain a sweep-
ing injunction cannot be accepted as a substitute for compliance with
the general rule that the complainant must present facts sufficient to
show that his individual need requires the remedy for which he asks.356
In Truax, decided a year after McCabe, the Court revealed the flip
side of an equitable, nonconstitutional analysis that depended on the
directness of the plaintiff's interest. Mr. Raich, who was from Austria,
was a cook in Mr. Truax's restaurant. Arizona passed a statute requir-
ing that at least 80 percent of a business' employees be Americans. Mr.
Truax informed Mr. Raich of his intention to discharge Raich because
of the statute. Mr. Raich subsequently brought an action in equity to
declare the statute unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement. 35 7 The
state argued that the employer was subject to criminal prosecution, not
Mr. Raich, and that therefore Raich could not sue to present the em-
ployer's complaint.358 The Court rejected the argument, premised on
McCabe, that "the complainant cannot sue save to redress his own griev-
ance .... .359 It noted that "the discharge of the complainant will be
solely for the purpose of meeting of the requirements of the act and
avoiding threatened prosecution .... It is, therefore, idle to call the
injury indirect or remote. '3 60 The Court added that Mr. Raich had no
adequate remedy at law, concluding, "that the case falls within the class
in which, if the unconstitutionality of the act is shown, equitable relief
354. "The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt." Id. at 162.
355. Id. In Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941), the Hughes Court reversed a
ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) on substantially similar facts. Applying
the modern conception of standing, the Court held that Congressman Mitchell had standing.
313 U.S. at 92-93. On the merits, the Court held that Mitchell was entitled to an order from
the ICC forbidding discrimination in the future because " 'the incident was... representative
of an alleged practice that was expected to continue.' " Id. at 96 (quoting Mitchell v. Chicago,
229 I.C.C. 703, 704 (1938). The irony is that McCabe was written by Associate Justice Hughes,
and Mitchell was authored by Chief Justice Hughes.
356. Id at 164. The Court later relied on this passage in Schlesinger v. Reservists Com-
mittee to Stop the war, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974). The McCabe reasoning is similar to that
which precluded Adolph Lyons from enjoining the chokehold practice. See text accompanying
notes 14-18 supra.
357. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
358. Truax, 239 U.S. at 37, 38.
359. l (citing McCabe, 235 U.S. at 162).
360. Id at 39.
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may be had."3 6 1
Taken together, McCabe and Truax illustrate the equitable source of
the modem doctrines of injury-in-fact and of prudential avoidance of
constitutional decisions. These cases concerned traditional rules of eq-
uity about the limits of its jurisdiction: Equity acted only when neces-
sary; equity grew out of the discretion of the chancellor to determine
which interests were sufficiently important to justify the invocation of a
coercive, in personam, remedial power rooted in a concern for jus-
tice.3 6 2 These doctrines, and not article III specifications about the suf-
ficiency of the litigant's interest, dominated the discourse when the
Court subsequently dealt with the question of citizen and taxpayer
"standing."
The significance of cases like Tyler, Davis, McCabe, and Truax to the
development of constitutional standing, however, was not doctrinal.
Rather, these cases were important because they rejected the underly-
ing representational model of the previous century in favor of a model
that was strictly individualist. Only Mr. Raich's claim could be main-
tained because his was not dependent on a representational schema.
Mr. Raich's claim was consistent with the causal source-path-goal meta-
phor. The Court noted that the purpose of the act was directed at aliens
such as Mr. Raich and that the path was neither circuitous nor attenu-
ated.3 63 On the other hand, Mr. Tyler's link to other members of the
community no longer sufficed to justify his invocation of the concerns
of other parts of "the great body of his fellow citizens." 3' The fact that
Mr. McCabe was challenging the actions of a public carrier on behalf of
all black passengers no longer sufficed as in Hall; the fact that the sub-
contractor in Davis was an intermediate link in the chain affected by the
municipal ordinance was no longer relevant. The Court disapproved
the representational submodels premised on link and part-whole sche-
mata and these links between individuals were severed. Yet, the public
rights submodels with simplerpart-whole schemata, that is, the represen-
tational model in which the whole acted for theparts, and the constituent
model in which one part acted for the entity itself remained intact until
the next decade.
C. States' Rights, Private Rights, and Public Rights
The Court invoked the private rights model in the 1860s to block
the attempts by southern states to challenge the Reconstruction pro-
gram. Professor Monaghan cited this invocation as the clearest demon-
stration of the limitation of article III jurisdiction to "concrete 'private
361. Id.
362. See Langdell, supra note 280, at 672.
363. Truax, 239 U.S. at 39-40 ("[Tlhe act undertakes to operate directly upon the employ-
ment of aliens .... (emphasis added)). Id. at 38.
364. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900) (emphasis
added).
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rights.' ",365 However, Monaghan's analysis is distorted by hindsight.
In the 1860s, the Court did not apply the private rights model as an
alternative to the intermediate public rights model, but rather as an
alternative to viewing certain matters as nonjusticiable "political ques-
tions." Indeed, the Court vacillated for decades on the issue of
whether states could invoke the public rights model on behalf of their
citizens.
In Georgia v. Stanton,3 66 the state filed an original bill in equity, ask-
ing the Court to restrain the execution of the original Reconstruction
Acts setting up military governments in the southern states. The Attor-
ney General argued against jurisdiction on the grounds, inter alia, that
the case presented a political question, was premature, and that the al-
leged harm was speculative.3 67 The state argued that equity jurisdic-
tion was proper: "Much has been said about all the evil alleged in the
bill being contingent and future .... The fact is quite otherwise. A bill
quia timet is one of the very heads of equity jurisdiction."3 68 Georgia
took the position that the case was justiciable because it fell within the
familiar forms. 369
The Court conceded that it had a "case" before it that appeared, in
form, to fall under equity jurisdiction, but agreed with the Attorney
General that the case was political and nonjusticiable: " [I]n order to
entitle the party to the [equitable] remedy ... the rights in danger...
must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which
do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity." 370
Florida v. Anderson,37 1 decided seven years later, reads like an asser-
tion of the private rights model. The majority opinion even expresses
the jurisdictional question in terms of "a standing in court. ' 372 Ander-
son was an original bill in equity instituted by the Florida Attorney Gen-
eral on behalf of the state and the trustees of its internal improvement
trust fund. The suit sought to protect a statutory lien on some railroad
property by setting aside a prior judgment foreclosing on the property
365. See Monaghan, supra note 29, at 1367-68.
366. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
367. Id. at 54-62. The Attorney General also argued that there were no proper party
defendants since the case was really against the federal government and not the named fed-
eral officers, and thus not within the specific grant ofjurisdiction under article III. Id. at 53-
54. But see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state attorney general held proper party
defendant in suit brought to enjoin enforcement of state law).
368. Stanton, 73 U.S. at 63.
369. The Attorney General of Georgia argued that:
It is untrue that questions of a political nature, according to the vulgar acceptation of
that phrase, are unsuited to judicial cognizance. Of course no court can, judicially,
investigate or determine any question unless parties, between whom it has cogni-
zance, are regularly before it; unless the disputable facts, if any, be susceptible of a
judicial trial, and unless the relief sought be judicial in its form and nature....
ld at 67.
370. Id. at 76.
371. 91 U.S. 667 (1876).
372. Ide at 675-76.
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and by invalidating the subsequent sale of the railroad.3 73 The defend-
ants challenged the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that only the
trustees were proper party plaintiffs, and that the trustees could not
invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court. The Court held that the
state was the real party in interest and, thus, could invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction. 374
In Anderson, as in Stanton, the Court defined its equity jurisdiction in
terms of the private rights model's focus on property rights.375 In An-
derson, the issue was whether the state's interest was sufficiently direct to
invoke the extraordinary equity power to set aside judgments and inval-
idate sales. It was solely in this sense that the Court asked whether the
state had "a direct interest in the . . . controversy . . . as to give it a
standing in court."'3 76 The use of the term "standing" did not address
the constitutional impermissibility of asserting public rights in the ab-
sence of private injury. The Court, which endorsed the public rights
model in Hall the same Term that it decided Anderson, is unlikely to
have intended to reject in Anderson what it had just approved in Hall.37 7
Indeed, Anderson appears to have had no direct impact on the later
development of the doctrine of standing. The only time the Court
cited Anderson was in the companion case to Frothingham, Massachusetts v.
Mellon.3 7 8 In its discussion of the political question doctrine, the Court
cited Anderson as an example of the kinds ofjusticiable questions that a
state may raise.37 9 The Court did not cite Anderson as an example of an
373. Id. at 671.
374. The first question which naturally presents itself is, whether the State of Flor-
ida has such an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and in the controversy re-
specting the same, as to give it a standing in court. It is suggested that the trustees of
the internal-improvement fund are the only parties legally interested, and that they
have no right to bring an original bill in this court. To this it may be answered, in the
first place, that the State has a direct interest in the subject-matter (the railroad in
question) by reason of holding (as it does) the four millions of bonds which are a
statutory lien upon the road. In the next place, the interest of the State in the inter-
nal-improvement fund is sufficiently direct to give it a standing in court, whenever
the interests of that fund are brought before a court for inquiry.
Id. at 675-76.
375. Anderson, like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), involved a
question of "standing" in the context of the Court's original jurisdiction under article IIl.
The "real-party-in-interest issue" was a problem familiar to the lower courts in the diversity
context, but not one that invoked the "standing" label. In Anderson, the Court relied on cases
in which the circuit court exercised jurisdiction where there was diversity as between the real
parties, but not when one of the nominal parties' citizenship was considered. 91 U.S. at 676-
77 (citing Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1870)). The term "standing" does
not appear in this discussion of diversity cases.
376. Id. at 675.
377. Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1876).
378. 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
379. Id. at 481-83. The Court noted several cases brought by states in which it had
declined jurisdiction. It also listed others, such as Anderson, in which it had maintained juris-
diction, because they concerned proprietary rights. Without elaboration, it observed simply
that "[tihe foregoing [cases], for present purposes, sufficiently indicate the jurisdictional line
of demarcation." Id. at 482. It then turned to the question of Massachusetts' claim: "What,
then, is the nature of the right of the State here asserted.. ?" Id.
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article III limitation to the private rights model in its consideration of
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's interest in Frothingham.
Subsequent to Anderson, the Court invoked the public rights model
in a similar federal context in Debs.380 For the next half century, the
Court vacillated over the permissibility of state invocation of the public
rights model. The firstJustice Harlan argued frequently for the private
rights model as a "case or controversy" limitation on suits brought by
the states;38 1 Justice Holmes, by contrast, argued that the states could
appear to vindicate "quasi-sovereign interests. '3 82
The public rights model of state litigation was ascendent for a time.
The Court recognized the state's interest "as the representative of the
consuming public" in 1923 in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,383 and "as
agent and protector of her people" in 1945 in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad.384 In 1971, the second Justice Harlan reaffirmed the jus-
ticiability of a public nuisance case brought by the State of Ohio. 3 85
Five years later, however, the Court reversed course yet again. In Penn-
sylvania v. New Jersey,386 a case involving interstate taxation, the Court
rejected a parens patriae suit by Pennsylvania as "nothing more than a
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked con-
tention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several States .... [I]t
is plain that that question, as it is thus presented, is political and not judicial in char-
acter, and therefore is not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power.
Id. at 483.
380. In re Debs, 15 U.S. 564 (1895). See also Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S.
405, 425-26 (1925) (United States "has a standing in this suit.., to remove obstruction to
interstate and foreign commerce, the main ground") (Holmes, J.). Id. at 425.
381. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 220 U.S. 277, 287-89
(1911) (opinion for the Court per Harlan, J.); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 239-40 (1907) (Harlan, J., concurring); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1900)
(Harlan, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Harlan had dissented in Tyler on the
ground that the third party claim had been properly raised and considered in the state courts.
See notes 335-336 supra and accompanying text.
382. See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (opinion for the Court per Holmes, J.) (empha-
sis deleted). See also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (opinion for the Court per
Shiras, J.).
383. 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923). In this caseJustice Holmes dissented on the merits. Id.
at 600-03. Justice McReynolds dissented on the ground that the case was not justiciable be-
cause it was not ripe, id. at 603-04, and because the defense of "interstate commerce is not
committed to any state as parens patriae." Id. at 604. Justice Brandeis was alone among the
dissenters in arguing that the cases did not present a "case or controversy." Id. at 610.
384. 324 U.S. 439, 443 (1945). This battle is chronicled in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 270-75, which attempts to account for the issue
without reference to the public rights model: "[C]onsider ... whether the function of the
original jurisdiction as a substitute for diplomacy and war justifies a more liberal standard of
justiciability in actions between states than in actions by a state against individuals." Id. at
271. But see Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), discussed infra note
385.
385. In Wyandotte Chemicals, the Court affirmed its jurisdiction but held that the case
could not appropriately be handled as an original matter in the Supreme Court. Previously,
Justice Harlan had interpreted article III not to bar public rights litigation brought by private
attorneys general. Instead, he opposed such suits on policy grounds. See Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 121-23 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
386. 426 U.S. 660 (1976).
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collectivity of private suits .... ,,387
In the first quarter of the century, the disagreement on the Court
about the public rights model of state litigation was related to the con-
tinued viability of the constituent submodel of the public rights model.
Justice Brandeis' solitary dissent in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia identi-
fied the traditional syllogism of the forms with the private rights model:
"They are not proceedings 'instituted according to the regular course
of judicial procedure' to protect some right of property or personal
right."388 In doing so, however, he not only failed to carry any other
votes with him, but also failed to produce any authority. The statement
quoted by Brandeis was not attributed to any source; earlier drafts at-
tributed it to Marbury v. Madison3 89 until the Justice's law clerk pointed
out that Marbury contained no such statement.39 0
Justice Brandeis' attack on the public rights model had yet to be
formulated into a coherent strategy premised on a recognizable doc-
trine ofjusticiability.391 But there was no doubt about the prospective
nature of his concern nor that he saw it as a matter for justiciability
doctrine. As he expressed it to his confidant Felix Frankfurter:
The most terrible thing the Court did was assumption ofjurisdiction in
West Virginia Natural Gas case. Van D[evanter] by general phrases
glides over total absence ofjurisdictional basis in Record. I don't care
much about natural gas-it will soon be all gone-but the decision is
very important as to hydroelectric.3 92
And the hydroelectric issue did come in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority,393 brought to the Court by means of the stockholder derivative
instance of the constituent model.
387. Id- at 666.
388. 262 U.S. 591, 610 (1923) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). AlthoughJustice Brandeis used
the syllogism of the forms in his 1926 opinion for the Court in Tutun v. United States, 270
U.S. 568, 576-77 (1926), he did not limit, in that case, the cognizable forms to private rights
cases. Rather, the Tutun opinion stressed that it was only the form and not the subject matter
that controlled. Id. See note 116 supra.
389. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187 (1803).
390. THE Louis DEMBrrz BRANDEIS PAPERS, Box 18, Folders 2-9 (Library of Congress
microfilm series, Part I: United States Supreme Court, October Terms, 1916-1931, Reel 15,
# 0075).
391. In a handwritten note to Justice Brandeis, his law clerk said: "Your frst' is lacking
in unity. You express 2 distinct objections: (1) moot case-no real issue; no threat of legal
wrong; (2) 'political' question-not fit for any court to consider." THE Louis DEMBrrz BRAN-
DEIS PAPERS, Box 18, Folders 2-9 (Library of Congress microfilm series, Part I: United States
Supreme Court, October Terms 1916-1931, Reel 15, # 0075).
392. THE FELix FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 114, Folder 10 at 8 (Library of Congress pho-
tocopy of typescript of Box 114, Folders 7 and 8; holograph notes of FF conversations with
LDB, Chatham, Mass., 1922-26); THE Louis DEMBrrZ BRANDEIS PAPERS (Library of Congress
microfilm series, Part II: United States Supreme Court, October Terms 1932-1938, Reel 33,
# 0450).
393. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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D. Constituent Standing
Equity developed its own version of the constituent model premised
on the part-whole schema: the shareholder derivative suit. There too,
the courts spoke in terms of "jurisdiction" and, as in Ashwander, "stand-
ing." The question was whether equity could be invoked at the request
of a constituent part to prevent illegal action harmful to the entity as a
whole. It was derivative because the constituents' claim was premised on
a source-path-goal schema that applied to the entity. The claims sought
to address the injury of the corporation. This doctrine served as the
model for the taxpayer actions of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.
The first shareholder suit to reach the Supreme Court was Dodge v.
Woolsey, 39 4 a challenge to a state tax on a corporation. The Court in-
voked the part-whole metaphor, noting "that courts of equity, in both
[England and the United States], have a jurisdiction over corporations,
at the instance of one or more of their members." 3 95 The Court also
justified this jurisdiction with a familiar doctrine having a communitar-
ian ring: "breach of trust."'3 96 The Court subsequently upheld share-
holder standing in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust,3 9 7 Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust,3 98 and Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.3 9 9
The Court's doctrinal concern, when first considering taxpayer and
citizen suits, was with the availability of the equity power. This was
clear in Crampton v. Zabriskie,400 a case brought by municipal taxpayers.
394. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856).
395. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
396. Id.
397. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The Court noted that equity jurisdiction in shareholder cases
"has been frequently sustained." Id at 553.
398. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). The Court held that: "The general allegations as to the inter-
est of the shareholder, and his right to have an injunction to prevent the purchase of the
alleged unconstitutional securities by misapplication of the funds of the corporation, give ju-
risdiction under the principles of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company and Brushaber v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company." Id at 201-02. Smith was an important "well-pleaded com-
plaint rule" case on the scope of federal questionjurisdiction. But the references to Pollock, to
Brushaber, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), to the interests of the stockholder, and to his "right" to an
injunction also established the availability of federal equity jurisdiction.
399. 297 U.S. 288, 319-20 (1936) ("The right of stockholders to seek equitable relief has
been recognized .... ) (citing Pollock, Brushaber, and Smith).
In Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916), the Court explained its use of the
shareholder equity version of the constituent model in language that echoed the prototype
effect of the private rights model in Blackstone's description of the prerogative writs. Black-
stone had characteriied those writs as having "a peculiar and eccentrical nature." 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 115-16. In Brushaber, the Court noted familiar doctrines of eq-
uity and "the peculiar relation of the corporation to the stockholders." Brushaber, 240 U.S. at
9.
The Court also cited the "absence of all means of redress" that is, the absence of an
adequate remedy at law, and the possibility of a "multiplicity of suits" as reasons to allow
shareholders equitable relief. Id at 10. Both factors are classic bases for the exercise of equity
jurisdiction. See 1 J. POMEROY & S. SYMONDS, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 216-222, 243-275
(5th ed. 1941).
400. 101 U.S. 601 (1880).
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In Crampton, the Court held that there was "no serious question" about
"the right of resident tax-payers" to use an equity court to prevent the
county from creating debts for which the plaintiffs "in common with
other property-holders of the county" would eventually be liable.401 In
Crampton, the Court recognized the analogy to the part-whole schema of
the shareholder suit: "[T]here would seem to be no substantial reason
why a bill by or on behalf of individual tax-payers should not be enter-
tained to prevent the misuse of corporate powers." 40 2
Five times before Frothingham, the Court passed over the putatively
jurisdictional issue of "standing" in taxpayer suits. In Bradfield v. Rob-
erts,403 Wilson v. Shaw,404 and Millard v. Roberts,40 5 taxpayer suits to en-
join federal actions were rejected on the merits. And, in Hawke v.
Smith,406 and Leser v. Garnett,40 7 citizen taxpayer suits to enjoin allegedly
unconstitutional state actions also were decided on the merits.
The briefs in these cases underscore the degree to which the ques-
tions of "standing" and the constituent model were seen as nonconsti-
tutional and a function solely of the rules of equity jurisprudence. For
example, the federal government's brief in Bradfield conceded that the
Court would probably want to reach the merits and noted that: "[tlhe
Government has no strenuous objection to interpose. 408
In Wilson, the plaintiff responded to the argument that "a private
citizen has not the necessary interest in the subject-matter of the con-
troversy" by noting that "It]he objections urged here are the same,
which from the beginning have been brought against the jurisdiction of
equity in all cases of this character." 40 9 He relied on the shareholder
constituent model as support: "Private citizens under such circum-
stances occupy exactly the position of stockholders in private corpora-
401. Id. at 609.
402. Id.
403. 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899). In Bradfield, the plaintiff sought to enjoin, as a violation
of the establishment clause, federal payments pursuant to a contract with a District of Colum-
bia hospital run by Catholic nuns.
404. 204 U.S. 24, 31 (1907). In Wilson, the plaintiff sought to enjoin as unconstitutional
payments for the completion of the Panama Canal.
405. 202 U.S. 429, 438 (1906). In Millard, the plaintiff challenged District of Columbia
expenditures for private railroad improvements.
406. 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). In Hawke, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the printing of
federal ballots for the referendum on the ratification of the eighteenth amendment. The
Court later relied on Hawke to reject the argument that citizen/taxpayer suits are forbidden by
article III. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 439 (1939).
407. 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922). In Leser, plaintiffs who were Maryland voters sought to
strike the names of certain women from the list of qualified voters, challenging the nineteeth
amendment. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 439, for the Court's subsequent reliance on Leser to
reject the argument that citizen/taxpayer suits are forbidden by article III.
408. Brief for the United States at 7, Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (No. 76).
The government did cite as objections that the "complainant sues as citizen and taxpayer, yet
informa pauperis" and that, in order to enjoin a public law, the plaintiff should be threatened
with real, particularized personal injury that is imminent. Id. at 7-8 (citing Grant v. Cooke, 7
D.C. (2 MacKay) 165, 203-4 (1871)).
409. Brief for Appellant at 6, Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) (No. 43).
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tions .... ",410 The federal government replied by invoking equity's
individualist model, citing treatises on equity in support of its proposi-
tion that a plaintiff must show "some direct and personal injury to him-
self above that suffered by others. '4 11 The Court declined to rule on
the sufficiency of Mr. Wilson's interest in maintaining the suit, instead
ruling against him on the basis of familiar equity doctrines. It observed
that the plaintiff's interest was insufficient to justify the issuance of an
injunction to stop work on the Panama Canal, given the balance of
hardships. 4 12
Thus, when the attack came on the constituent model at the federal
level, it did not come in terms of standing as we now view it. Rather, it
was articulated in much the same way as injustice Brandeis' opinion in
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the natural gas case in which he attacked
another version of the part-whole public rights model.
4 13
Fairchild was a constitutional challenge to the adoption of the nine-
teenth amendment, which granted women the vote. Once again, Jus-
tice Brandeis invoked the syllogism of the forms.
Plaintiff's alleged interest in the question submitted is not such as
to afford a basis for this proceeding.... In form it is a bill in equity; but
it is not a case, within the meaning of § 2 of article 3 of the Constitu-
tion... for no claim of plaintiff is "brought before the courts for deter-
mination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or
custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs." 4 14
Justice Brandeis' attack on the constituent model followed, but it was
terse and conclusory: "Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every
citizen, to require that the government be administered according to
law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general
right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the Federal
410. Id.
411. Brieffor the United States at 2, Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) (No. 43) (citing
1 BEACH, MODERN EqurrvJuRISDICTxON §§ 642-643; 1 HIGH ON INJUCTION § 9).
412. For the courts to interfere and at the instance of a citizen, who does not dis-
close the amount of his interest, stay the work of construction by stopping the pay-
ment of money from the Treasury of the United States therefor, would be an exercise
ofjudicial power which, to say the least, is novel and extraordinary.
Clearly there is no merit in plaintiff's contentions. That, generally speaking, a
citizen may be protected against wrongful acts of the Government affecting him or
his property may be conceded. That his remedy is by injunction does not follow. A
suit for an injunction is an equitable proceeding, and the interests of the defendant
are to be considered as well as those of the plaintiff. Ordinarily it will not be granted
when there is adequate protection at law. In the case at bar it is clear not only that
the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction, but also that he presents no ground for
any relief.
Wilson, 204 U.S. at 31.
413. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). See notes 388-392 supra and accompanying text.
414. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32
F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) and Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
Justice Brandeis also used this formulation in his opinion for the Court in Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-77 (1926). See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
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courts .... ,,415 He cited Tyler as an analogy in support of this last
proposition.416
A reading of the briefs from the federal government in Fairchild, and
its companion case, Leser v. Garnett,4 17 strongly suggests that Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Fairchild was not yet a constitutional restraint on
the constituent model. The federal government's brief in Fairchild ar-
gued that the action was not a "case" in law or equity under article III
because of the absence of a "practical conflict of interest. '418 No cases
were cited as authority for this proposition; the brief relied on the re-
fusal of the Court to provide an advisory opinion when requested to do
so by President Washington. 419 In contrast, the government's amicus
brief in Leser acknowledged without explanation that the state judgment
on review did "present a concrete 'case' within the meaning of the Judi-
ciary Article .... ,,420 As we have seen, Justice Brandeis' opinion in
Fairchild did not adopt fully the "practical conflict" position, but rather
folded it into the traditional syllogism of the forms. Justice Brandeis
also authored the Court's opinion in Leser, which was announced the
same day as Fairchild. In Leser, Justice Brandeis argued that the suit
could be brought: "The laws of Maryland authorize such a suit by a
qualified voter .... ,"421 That case was decided on the merits despite
the absence of a "practical conflict", and upheld the validity of the
nineteenth amendment. Thus was the government's attempt to invoke
a novel article III "case or controversy" bar temporarily rebuffed and
the public rights model and the traditional syllogism of the forms
maintained.
Frothingham422 followed. The Frothingham Court began its analysis
with a discussion of nonconstitutional doctrines of equity, proceeded to
reason from the constituent model in a way that shows clear prototype
effects, then rejected the intermediate status of the public rights model,
and finally raised constitutional considerations that helped lead to a
415. Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 129-30.
416. Id. (citing Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900)). The
cite to Tyler was cf. In the final opinion, Justice Brandeis also cited Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475 (1902).
417. 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
418. Brief for Appellees at 5-8, Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (No. 148).
419. Id. at 7. In contrast, the government's position as originally expressed in its Motion
to Affirm or Dismiss argued that the case presented "[o]nly a moot question." Motion to
Affirm or Dismiss at 3, Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) (No. 148). The "mootness"
was tied to the plaintiff's lack of a demonstrated "interest," but was not further explained. In
this, the government's original position showed the same embryonic form and lack of theoret-
ical coherence as had Justice Brandeis' very first efforts in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. See
note 391 supra.
420. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130
(1922) (No. 553).
421. Leser, 258 U.S. at 136. Leser probably explains the later confusion over whether
federal standing requirements are applicable to state court actions raising federal questions.
See note 453 infra and accompanying text.
422. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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modem conception of standing. Yet, the Court closed not with a doc-
trine of standing, but with an invocation of the syllogism of the forms.
The Court first considered whether the federal taxpayer could in-
voke the equity power.423 The Court used familiar equity doctrines to
distinguish the municipal taxpayer standing cases in a manner that dis-
played a partial reduction-to-prototype effect. It reasoned not that the
more "direct" interest of the municipal taxpayer affected the article III
calculus of "case or controversy," but that the discretionary availability
of the equity power properly considered questions of immediacy and
the degree of threatened harm. "The interest of a taxpayer of a munici-
pality in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate .... ,,424
The Court acknowledged, therefore, the continuing viability of the con-
stituent model for that level of government: "The reasons which sup-
port the extension of the equitable remedy to a single taxpayer in such
cases are based upon the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the cor-
poration, which is not without some resemblance to that subsisting between stock-
holder and private corporation.' '425 The federal taxpayer's connection to
the body politic, in contrast, seemed too far removed from the corpo-
rate prototype of equity's constituent model. The Frothingham Court
characterized the federal taxpayer's constituent interest as "minute,"
"indeterminable," and "so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no
basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity."426
Frothingham makes historical sense as a case about the availability of
an equitable remedy. On a doctrinal level, it was the invocation of eq-
uitable discretion to deny a remedy on the basis of the directness of the
plaintiff's injury. The Court started with the constituent model avail-
able in equity and used prototype reasoning to exclude taxpayer ac-
tions as too great an extrapolation. The opinion was not entirely
consonant with the public rights model known to the Framers, for it
saw the corporation, and not the society, as the prototype of apart-whole
organization. But the opinion maintained a certain doctrinal consis-
tency. The English writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari were
available to a stranger without a direct interest. 427 In those cases, how-
ever, the court retained discretion to adjust or withhold the remedy in
order to prevent abuse and to achieve just results.428 The courts' dis-
cretion derived from the fact that, although these writs were devices of
the King's Bench, and thus remedies "at law," they also were instru-
423. The issue was "[tihe right of a taxpayer to enjoin the execution of a federal appropri-
ations act." Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
424. 262 U.S. at 486.
425. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
426. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478 (1938)
(citing Frothingham for the proposition that "the interest of a taxpayer in the moneys of the
federal treasury furnishes no basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of
equity").
427. See notes 134-135 supra and accompanying text.
428. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 356 (1876).
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ments of the sovereign's power and therefore implicated the preroga-
tive of royal discretion typical of equity. 429
Frothingham's reliance on separation of powers notions can be un-
derstood as the invocation of structural concerns to guide the discre-
tionary use of the court's equitable power.430 Indeed, Justice Brandeis'
unheeded argument thirteen years later in Ashwander was premised on
exactly this blend of equitable discretion and prerogative writ
practice.431
In Frothingham, as in Fairchild, the Court was struggling with the con-
stituent model. Frothingham did not recognize an intermediate status
for the public rights model. Instead, it insisted on an individualist
model: The question of additional taxation was "essentially a matter of
public and not of individual concern. ' 432 But the Court stayed decid-
edly within the tradition in its notion ofjusticiability, still reasoning in a
quite old-fashioned way about the scope of the judicial power, as had
Justice Brandeis. To the 1923 Court, no less than to the Court of a
hundred years earlier, a legal question had to "assume such a form that
429. "Although the remedy by mandamus is at law, its allowance is controlled by equita-
ble principles ... and it may be refused for reasons comparable to those which would lead a
court of equity, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to withhold its protection of an un-
doubted legal right." United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1933)
(Stone, J.).
430. Frothingham conditioned its invocation of the separation of powers notion as fol-
lows: "The general rule is that neither department may invade the province of the other and
neither may control, direct or restrain the action of the other. We are not now speaking of the
ministerial duties of offiials." Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added). The Court sup-
ported this last statement with a cite to Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347 (1869),
which held that neither mandamus nor an injunction would lie to control discretionary execu-
tive action. The Gaines Court in turn relied on Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 105
(1803), and Mississippi v.Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). Although the Court was thus
adverting to questions ofjusticiability (in the political question sense, see Marbury, 5 U.S. 105,
107-08), the questions did not concern the plaintiff's ability to invoke the judicial power in the
sense of "standing":
[H]owever the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of parties in suits properly
before them, pass upon the legality of their acts, after the matter has once passed
beyond their control, there exists no power in the courts, by any of its processes, to
act upon the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment while... the
law reposes this discretion in him for that occasion, and not in the courts. The doc-
trine, therefore, is as applicable to the writ of injunction as it is to the writ of
mandamus.
Gaines, 74 U.S. at 352.
431. "Even where by the substantive law stockholders have a standing to challenge the
validity of legislation under which management... is acting, courts should, in the exercise of
their discretion, refuse an injunction unless the alleged invalidity is clear." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In closing, Jus-
tice Brandeis also invoked the prerogative writ parallel:
"Where the matter is not beyond peradventure clear we have invariably refused the
writ [of mandamus], even though the question was one of law as to the extent of the
statutory power of an administrative officer or body." A fortiori this rule should have
been applied here where the power challenged is that of Congress under the
Constitution.
Id. at 356 (quoting United States ex reL Chicago G.W.R. v. ICC, 294 U.S. 50, 63 (1935))
(bracketed material added by Justice Brandeis).
432. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
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the judicial power is capable of acting on it.' 43 3 Because the Frothing-
ham Court concluded that the case did not present a proper bill in eq-
uity, it held that the case did not assume a recognizable form; because
the Court did not recognize the intermediate nature of the nineteenth
century public rights model, it did not see before it one of those things
to which the judicial power extended. The Court held that:
The party who invokes the [equity] power must be able to show... that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury .... If a case for preventive relief be presented the court enjoins,
in effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official ....
Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. Looking through the
forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that
officials of the executive... will execute an act of Congress asserted to
be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would
be not to decide a judicial controversy .... 434
What Frothingham had accomplished through its equity reasoning was to
recreate the private rights model as the only available form. To invoke
the equity power, the plaintiff had to establish the causal source-path-goal
schema-that is, the plaintiff had to establish "that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury." Direct in-
jury was thus essential to make a proper bill in equity, and a proper bill
was necessary to make a "case." Drop the syllogism of the forms, how-
ever, and you have the modern doctrine of standing: Direct injury (as
in the causal source-path-goal schema) becomes necessary to a constitu-
tional "case."
Neither Frothingham nor Fairchild became cases of "standing" until
later.43 5 Rather, the Court continued to talk of "standing" solely in the
context of equity as it had before. In fact, only a few years after Froth-
ingham and Fairchild, the Court reaffirmed that "standing is a question
going to the merits, and... determination [of standing] is an exercise
of jurisdiction." 43 6
In the meantime, Justice Brandeis continued to argue-usually
alone-the broader implications of his Fairchild opinion for the constit-
uent model. In 1923, the same year as Frothingham, he failed to con-
vince his colleagues that the original bills in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia
"present[ed] neither a 'case' nor a 'controversy' within the meaning of
the Federal Constitution," but were instead "instituted frankly to se-
cure from this Court a general declaration that the West Virginia Act
433. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
434. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488-89.
435. The first application of the term "standing" in the context of taxpayer suits came in
the lower court decisions following Frothingham. Wheless v. Mellon, 10 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir.
1926); Elliott v. White, 23 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.
Mass. 1934). The cases include no discussion of the terminology; they are little more than
quotations of Frothingham with the characterization of "standing" attached.
436. General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1926) (citations
omitted).
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.. is unconstitutional." 43 7 Thirteen years later in Ashwander, he tried
to destroy equity's constituent model at its source. His memorandum
to his colleagues argued that:
Stockholders may, within the recognized limits, invoke the aid of the
courts to enjoin illegal acts which threaten their own property rights.
But they are no more entitled to a judicial remedy to restrain action
which ... do not imperil their property, merely because the action is
alleged to be illegal. They are not guardians of the public. The func-
tion of guarding the public interest against acts ultra vires or otherwise
illegal rests with the public officials. The belief that the company ac-
tion is unconstitutional gives the stockholder no greater right than that
possessed by any other citizen.43 8
Ultimately, Justice Brandeis dropped this position and argued that
the primary obstacles to the shareholders' suit were nonconstitutional.
The final version of his argument-which garnered the support ofJus-
tices Cardozo, Roberts, and Stone- characterized Tyler, Fairchild, and
Frothingham merely as examples of the canon of judicial self-restraint
that "[t]he Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon com-
plaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation." 4 39
In a historically overlooked portion of the opinion, Justice Brandeis
concentrated much of his fire on the impropriety of the shareholder
derivative version of the constituent model, trying to limit or disap-
prove the holdings of Pollock, Brushaber, and Smith.440
In 1937, in a per curiam opinion denying the motion challenging
Judge Black's appointment, the Court interpreted Tyler, Fairchild, and
Frothingham as limiting the availablity of the "judicial power" to one
who "has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct
437. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 610 (1923). See notes 383 & 388 supra
and accompanying text.
438. THE Louis DEMBiTz BRANDEIS PAPERS, Box 96, Folders 1-7 (Library of Congress
microfilm series, Part II: United States Supreme Court, October Terms, 1932-1938, Reel 16,
# 0447). The quoted passage comes from a three page memorandum that appears to be the
second draft. The original two page draft contains a similar passage in which the second and
third sentences are reversed. In the original, the third sentence read: "They are no more
entitled to a judicial remedy to restrain illegal acts of the corporation which do not imperil
their property, than is any stranger." Id.
439. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Injoining this concurrence, Justice Cardozo noted prophetically that: "It will be
a treasure house of instruction for many a day." THE Louis DEMBrrZ BRANDEIS PAPERS, Box
96, Folders 1-7 (Library of Congress microfilm series, Part II: United States Supreme Court,
October Terms, 1932-1938, Reel 16, # 0447).
440. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 349-53. Before joining the part of the opinion that at-
tempted to invalidate the shareholder derivative version of the constituent model,Justice Car-
dozo argued that Justice Brandeis had gone too far in characterizing the prior shareholder
derivative suits as unsupported, and suggested that Ashwander was distinguishable on its facts
from'Pollock. Letter of January 29, 1936, from Benjamin N. Cardozo to Louis D. Brandeis,
THE Louis DEMBrrz BRANDEIS PAPERS, Box 96, Folders 1-7 (Library of Congress microfilm
series, Part II: United States Supreme Court, October Terms, 1932-1938, Reel 16, # 0447).
Brandeis nevertheless concluded his discussion with the observation that: "If, or in so far as,
any of the cases discussed may be deemed authority for sustaining this bill, they should now
be disapproved." 297 U.S. at 352.
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injury .... "441 But, the degree to which this constitutionalized inter-
pretation was not yet a conventional understanding of these cases is
underscored by the Court's conclusory rhetoric, referring to this as an
"established principle." 442 It was another year before Justice Frank-
furter linked the term "standing" with article III in his concurring opin-
ion in Coleman v. Ailler.443 And, even then, it came very much by
surprise to the participants and the Court.
In Coleman, Kansas legislators challenged the means by which their
state had voted to ratify a pending amendment to the Constitution.444
The legislators filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the state
courts. The state court upheld its jurisdiction over the mandamus peti-
tion, but denied relief. The Coleman Court rejected "the contention
that petitioners lack an adequate interest to invoke our jurisdiction
... ."445 The majority held that the Kansas legislators had "standing"
in the sense of Owings v. Norwood 446 because they had alleged an in-
fringement of their right to vote and thus "come directly within the
provisions of the statute governing our appellate jurisdiction." 447 The
Court cited Leser for the proposition that it had jurisdiction, noting the
contrast to Fairchild, which had been decided the same day.4 48
The Coleman majority also rejected decisively the notion, put for-
ward by Justice Frankfurter, that jurisdiction only extended to cases
that fit the private rights model, that is, cases of "private damage."'449
The Court cited Frothingham to illustrate that the question of a tax-
payer's interest raised not a threshold problem of justiciability, but
rather was only a matter of degree.450 The Court, nevertheless, held
the case nonjusticiable as presenting a political question. 45 1
The majority's discussion of these questions reflected the argument
in the federal government's amicus brief, signed by Solicitor General
Robert Jackson and by Special Assistant Paul Freund. The brief noted
that the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' interests under Fairchild was a prob-
lem that only arises in a federal action.452 The government, therefore,
accepted that the decision of the state courts below to entertain the suit
441. Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
442. Id.
443. 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (concurring opinion joined by Justices Roberts, Black,
and Douglas).
444. A companion case from Kentucky was also before the Court. Chandler v. Wise, 307
U.S. 474 (1939) (dismissed as moot).
445. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438.
446. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809). See notes 291-301 supra and accompanying text.
447. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438. The Court's opinion in Coleman clearly considered
"standing" from the perspective of Owings and its progeny.
448. 307 U.S. at 438-41.
449. Id at 445.
450. d 
451. Ide at 454.
452. Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae at 34, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1938) (Nos. 7, 14).
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
"does not present a Federal question." 453 The only question ofjuris-
diction, according to Jackson and Freund, was whether the Court could
consider the case under its jurisdictional statute. Since the legislators
had set up a right or title of their own-"the privilege of carrying out
their functions as public officers" 454 -the brief concluded that
"[s]tatutory jurisdiction in this Court, then, clearly exists. 4 5
Having disposed of the Fairchild and Owings questions, the brief then
turned to what it viewed as a question of an entirely different order:
"[T]he essential question is not strictly jurisdictional but relates rather
to... standing .... ,"456 The brief concluded that standing was present
in the Kansas case because the petitioners were legislators who claimed
an infringement of their right to vote.4 5 7
Although the government's position and its understanding of the
foundations of the standing concept were accepted in the majority
opinion, Justice Frankfurter had an entirely different view. At oral ar-
gument, Justice Frankfurter asked Mr. Coleman's lawyer to reconcile
the case with Fairchild. The petitioners subsequently submitted a mem-
orandum brief on jurisdiction that reveals how startling the question
really was:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the bench asked me to reconcile this case
with Fairchild v. Hughes. We regret our inability to do so in oral argu-
ment, but the case of Leser v. Garnett, decided the same day and re-
ported in the same volume with Fairchild v. Hughes, is such a complete
answer that it seems as though I must have misunderstood the purport
of the question. 45 8
[T]he state is a party to the litigation and all of the people of the state
are interested.... So far as the right of the parties to maintain the suit
in the state court is concerned, it is definitely settled and that brings us
squarely within the rule of Leser v. Garnett. This is so evident that it
seems I must have misunderstood the real purport of the question.4 59
453. Id. at 34-35. Subsequently, in Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952),
JusticeJackson wrote for the Court that it would "not undertake to say that a state court may
not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even under such circumstances
that it can be regarded only as advisory. But... our own jurisdiction is cast in terms of'case
or controversy.' " Id. at 434. Paul Freund suggested, in response, that standing to raise a
federal question in state court should be governed by federal law. Freund, Discussion in
SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 31, 35 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). Freund's position makes sense
if standing is a threshold question concerning the judicial process delineated by article I1. See
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 181. But neither
Freund's nor Justice Jackson's later positions square with the argument, based on Leser v.
Garnett, that they presented in 1938 in Coleman.
454. Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae at 35, Coleman (Nos. 7, 14).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 44. The brief acknowledged standing in the Kentucky case because the state
officers were seeking to support state action that had been declared unconstitutional. l
458. Memorandum Brief on Jurisdiction at 1, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1938)
(No. 796).
459. Id. at 2-3.
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It is understandable that counsel missed the import ofJustice Frank-
furter's question and relied on the public rights model of mandamus by
insisting that "all of the people of the state are interested." And, I
think, it is safe to assume that Justice Frankfurter's question was calcu-
lated. For, in his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter opined, in
contrast to that which the parties argued, that courts could only con-
sider "cases and controversies. '460 Invoking Fairchild, he argued that
"[iln the familiar language ofjurisdiction, these Kansas legislators must
have standing in this Court." 46 1 'Private damage' is the clue ... and
determines [the] scope ... of [such] cases in this Court ... "462
Thirteen years later, in Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,463 Jus-
tice Frankfurter took Coleman a step further and made the first attempt
to synthesize this private rights model, the constitutional phrase, and
the various "standing" cases of the previous half-century into a single
coherent doctrine concerning the sufficiency of the litigant's interest
required by article III and related prudential considerations. 464 It was
not until Doremus v. Board of Education465 that a full Court dealt with
standing in exclusively constitutional terms,466 and not until Baker v.
Canr 467 and Flast v. Cohen 468 that the Court fully discussed the new
doctrine.
For over a hundred years, the metaphor of "standing" was short-
hand for the question of whether a plaintiff had asserted claims that a
court of equity would enforce. Frothingham articulated a familiar doc-
trine of equity concerning direct and irreparable injury, rejected the
application of the constituent model as a matter of degree, and then
applied a traditional notion ofjusticiability that focused on observance
of the forms. But Frothingham arose in the context of a larger dispute
about the viability of the representational and constituent models. In
the end, Justice Brandeis all but gave up the fight. Then, someone else
provided a label to comprehend both the private rights model and
those cases that talked about the sufficiency of the plaintiff's personal
460. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-61.
461. Id at 464.
462. Id. at 469 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (Holmes, J.), and
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld.Raym. 938 (1703)). Herndon and Ashby involved suits challenging denial
of citizens' ordinary rights to vote, rather than suits involving parliamentary or legislative
practices.
463. 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The plurality opinion by
Justice Burton, joined only by Justice Douglas, dealt with standing in the classic terms of
substantive rights. It found standing "clear" because "[tihe touchstone to justiciability is in-
jury to a legally protected right" and the organizational right to be free of defamation "is such
a right." Id. at 140-41.
464. Id at 149-57.
465. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
466. Even so, the Court related its "case or controversy" concept of standing to the ban
on advisory opinions. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434. In this, Doremus is similar to the Solicitor
General's embryonic argument in Fairchild. See text accompanying notes 417-419 supra.
467. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
468. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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interest in terms of "jurisdiction." That label, of course, was one that
fit metaphorically: "standing." A meaning transplant was effected, and
the modem doctrine of standing was born.
E. Ideology and the Motivation of Standing
There are several possible historical explanations for the successful
convergence of the private rights model and the "standing" metaphor
into modem constitutional standing doctrine. Five factors seem to
have contributed to this convergence.
First, the passage of the federal question jurisdiction statute and the
extension of the removal jurisdiction in 1875469 affected significantly
the workload of the federal courts. From the trial courts to the
Supreme Court, "they unloosed a flood of litigation utterly beyond the
existing capacity of the courts to handle. '470 Between 1870 and 1890,
the number of cases on the Supreme Court docket grew almost 300
percent. 47 1 During the same period, the number of nonbankruptcy
cases in the lower federal courts more than doubled. 472 For the next
fifty years, Congress struggled with the problem of an unmanageably
large caseload in the federal courts both by jurisdictional tinkering and
by wholesale court reorganization. 473
It should come as little surprise that the courts were not passive
during this onslaught. Several of the classic exclusionary doctrines of
federal jurisdiction developed in this period, including both the well-
pleaded complaint rule4 74 and the independent and adequate state
ground rule.4 75 Moreover, the growth in the federal workload and the
search for limits coincided with the systemization of the law of eq-
uity, 4 7 6 from which standing law grew. Starting as a question of entre6
469. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470-73 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
470. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 39.
471. Id.; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 60-61
(1928).
472. F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 471, at 60 (from 23,905 in 1873 to 54,194
in 1890).
473. During this fifty-year period, Congress successively increased the jurisdictional
amount, expanded and changed the role of the circuit courts, and decreased the Court's obli-
gatory appeal jurisdiction (creating the larger discretionary jurisdiction by writ of certiorari).
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 40-41; F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, supra note 471, at 60-61.
474. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Metcalf v.
Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
475. Compare Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), with Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
476. It was during this period that John Pomeroy, Christopher Langdell, and Wesley
Hohfeld were developing the field of equity and its relationship to "law." Pomeroy wrote his
treatise on equity jurisprudence in 1881; his son produced revised editions in 1892, 1905, and
1918. J. POMEROY & S. SYMONS, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE ix (5th ed. 1941). Langdell wrote a
series of ten articles in the Harvard Law Review between 1887 and 1900, which first appeared
under the misnomer A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1887); 1 HARv. L.
REV. 111 (1887); 1 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1888); 2 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1889); 3 HARV. L. REV. 237
[Vol. 40:13711452
to equity jurisdiction, "standing" could, in a time of severe docket pres-
sures, naturally evolve into a doctrine about entr6e into the federal
court system itself.
Second, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the modem administrative state began to take root. The Interstate
Commerce Commission was formed in 1887, the Federal Trade Com-
mission in 1913, and the Federal Power Commission in 1920. Adminis-
trative law, of course, created the potential for more adjudication, with
its strain on court workload. Administrative agencies also created a
vastly larger machinery of government, increasing the interaction be-
tween government and the citizenry and the potential for the invoca-
tion of the public rights model. This increasing interaction was a
potential source of strain for the previous equilibrium of public and
private rights in the legal and social system. In each of their respective
areas, the administrative regimes created new webs of legal require-
ments and potential entitlements in previously unregulated comers of
society. With the extension of government regulation to vast new do-
mains, the public rights model and application of the classic model of
rights and correlative remedies to redress all injuries presented inordi-
nate new problems.
Third, at precisely this time an old but previously marginal legal
concept stepped to the fore in a dramatic way. "From . . . 1880 to
1920, damnum absque injuria [that is, damage without cognizable injury]
emerged as the central issue of theoretical concern" to those attempt-
ing to synthesize and explain the law. 47 7 Perhaps not coincidentally,
this concept served to defuse the pressures of the administrative state.
The theoretical incorporation of damnum absque injuria revolved
around three major areas of inquiry. They were: (1) the emergence of
the concept of legally protected interests; (2) focus on economic com-
petition as an alternative model... ; and (3) the problem of uncorrob-
orated liberties generally.... To the extent that others have the legal
liberty to act or not to act, the damage they inflict on us violates "no
[legal] rights" of ours, and we have no claim on the legal system to
protect us from such harms or to provide us with remedies. 4 78
The potential problems of the administrative state could thus be fore-
stalled by the extension of a traditional doctrine: damnum absque injuria
counselled that "[1legally protected interests are not granted absolute
protection, as the concept of protected rights had misleadingly im-
(1890); 4 HARv. L. REV. 99 (1890); 5 HARV. L. REV. 101 (1891); 10 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1896);
Langdell, Classificatzon of Rights and Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1900); Langdell, Classification
of Rights and Wrongs H, 13 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1900). In 1913, Hohfeld published his lecture
notes on the relationship between equity and law. Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and
Law, I1 IMICH. L. REV. 537 (1913).
477. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. REV. 975, 1025.
478. Id. at 1026 (bracketed material in original).
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plied."'4 79 The administrative state could be domesticated; extensive
new regulations and interests could be created without necessarily cre-
ating new legal entitlements.
These three notions raised by the incorporation of damnum absque
injuria into the legal mainstream are reflected with clarity in the non-
constitutional precursors of standing, especially in the equity and early
administrative law cases: the legal interest test,48 0 the denial of com-
petitor "standing, ' 48 1 and the repeated denial of injunctive relief to
litigants who had suffered actual harm.48 2 While not yet a theory of
"standing," damnum absque injuria provided a basis for, and a model that
justified, a later constitutional doctrine that recognized the validity of a
complaint but refused to provide a judicial forum.
Fourth, the rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century led to the
primacy of the private rights model and to modem standing law in two
ways. A basic tenet of liberalism is the primacy of the individual as the
focus of the political and moral world.48 3 "Standing" is a conceptual-
ization of the individual as the primary rights-holder, to the exclusion
of his or her place in a larger community of interdependent legal and
social interests.48 4 Liberalism is further premised on the freedom of
each individual to choose his or her own, equally viable ends. 48 5 Ac-
cordingly, it focuses upon a regime that achieves agreement on process
rather than end goals.48 6 Liberalism intensified the preexisting
proceduralism of the law; where the writ system had treated procedure
and substance as closely interrelated, standing law turned from the
legal interest test to focus instead on a definition of process separate
from the substantive merits of the reason for which it is invoked. This
concept of neutral, process-oriented criteria, entirely separated from
the merits, constitutes the second major component of the "standing"
metaphor, as we have seen.48 7
Fifth, the thrust of the enlargement of the federal court workload
479. Id. at 1050.
480. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42 (1911); Tennes-
see Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
481. See, e.g., Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923);
Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
482. See, e.g., Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). Justice
Sutherland's dissent in The Chicago Junction Case, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 264 U.S.
258, 272-74 (1924), expresses the notion of damnum absque injuria in arguing against competi-
tor standing. See note 280 supra.
483. See R. UNCER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 783 (1983).
484. SeeJ. VINING, supra note 27, at 2.
485. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 26-27 (1971); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 33 (1974); 1. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (L.W. Beck ed. 1957).
486. "[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the
right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed." J.
RAwLs, supra note 485, at 86.
487. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
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and the weltanschauung of liberalism interacted in a specific, synergistic
way. It occurred during the time of substantive due process and the
exercise of expansive federal judicial power in the economic sphere to
invalidate progressive legislation.488 It is thus no accident that many of
the early taxpayer standing cases involved attacks on federal legislation
addressed to an activist conservative Court.489 The first few were re-
jected on their merits. But soon the primary stance of the liberal judi-
cial resistance was the development of doctrines of procedural
limitation. 490 In this formative period, Justice Brandeis reported to his
confidant Felix Frankfurter his famous remark to Justice Holmes: "I
tell him, 'the most important thing we do is not doing.' "491 Frothing-
ham was a product of the liberal judicial resistance to substantive due
process, as Justice Douglas explicitly acknowledged in his separate
opinion in Flast v. Cohen.492
While my analysis suggests that the development of standing was a
calculated effort, this account is consistent with a theory that stresses
the unconscious, ontological effects of the relevant metaphors and cog-
nitive models. It is the concept of motivation that explains the relation-
ship between conscious intent and these unconscious, ontological
effects. People use cognitive models and metaphors to express and ac-
complish their purposes. In reimagining the world, we make use of the
existing conceptual system.
[T]he theory we have given makes a prediction: the generated images
will be among the conventional images of the culture, they will make
488. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
489. See, e.g., Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) (challenging the construction of the
Panama canal); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) and Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130
(1922) (challenging the adoption of the nineteenth amendment); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923) (challenging a federal entitlement program); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) (challenging the Child Labor Amendment).
490. The Brandeis concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
241 (1936) is the quintessential exposition of this view. But this process was at work earlier in
Fairchild and Pennsylvania v. west irginia, as we have seen.
491. THE FELIX FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 114, Folder 10 at 15 (Library of Congress
photocopy of typescript of Box 114, Folders 7 and 8; holograph notes of FF conversations
with LDB, Chatham, Mass., 1922-26); THE Louis DEMBrrz BRANDEIS PAPERS, (Library of Con-
gress microfilm series, Part II: United States Supreme Court, October Terms, 1932-1938,
Reel 33, No. 0450).
Throughout the period of the I 920s and 30s, Justice Brandeis was in constant touch with
Frankfurter concerning the issues before the Court. Justice Brandeis supplied Frankfurter
with ideas and inside information that Frankfurter recycled as topics for student papers in his
seminar entitled "Jurisdiction and Procedure of Federal Courts" and in his own scholarly
writing, including the series of articles from 1925 through 1938 that ran under the title "The
Business of the Supreme Court." See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION
76-78, 84-89 (1982) (Several of the Frankfurter articles that were part of this series are cited
and discussed in note 26 supra); See also Urovsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985
Sup. CT. REv. 299.
492. 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Frothingham, decided in 1923,
was in the heyday of substantive due process .... A contrary result in Frothingham in that
setting might well have accentuated an ominous trend to judicial supremacy."). See W.O.
DouGLAs, WE THE JUDGES 53 (1956) ("Justice Louis D. Brandeis used to say that what the
Court did not do was often more important than what it did do.").
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use of cultural knowledge, and there will be one or more metaphors
already in the conceptual system that link the image and the knowledge
to the meaning.... In short, the principles we have proposed to char-
acterize the nature of motivation... constrain what such images can be
like.493
[T]he fact that extensions from the center of categories are neither
predictable nor arbitrary, but instead are motivated, demonstrates the
ecological character of the human mind.... [T]he term "ecological"
[expresses] the sense of a system with an overall structure, where ef-
fects cannot be localized-that is, where something in one part of the
system affects things elsewhere in the system. Motivation depends on
overall characteristics of the conceptual system, not just local charac-
teristics of the category at hand.4 9 4
In trying to develop doctrines of jurisdictional limitation, Justices like
Brandeis and Frankfurter naturally reached for the cognitive tools at
hand. They naturally focused on those models and metaphors that fit
their purposes. And they naturally chose the private rights model and
the "standing" metaphor, which had become conventional in legal
culture.
The liberals were interested in protecting the legislative sphere
from judicial interference. Their goal was to assure that the state and
federal governments would be free to experiment with progressive leg-
islation.4 9 5 The private rights model was not just an available proto-
493. G. LAKOFF, supra note 64, at 450.
494. Id. at 113.
495. On the eve of the New Deal, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimen-
tation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs.... To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsi-
bility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. The Court has the
power to prevent an experiment.... But in the exercise of this high power, we must
be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds he bold.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). In the omitted footnote, Brandeis cited F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS Gov-
ERNMENT 49-51 (1930).
Frankfurter's vision ofjudicial restraint was the same as that of Brandeis.
Frankfurter thought of himself as a member of a select legal fraternity whose mem-
bers understood the true gospel. He often wrote of "the experience that I have had
down here [on the Supreme Court], which so decisively confirms the philosophy in
which Mr. Justice Holmes, Judge Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Brandeis and I were
bred, to wit: James B. Thayer's outlook on the reviewing power of this Court."
Thayer's self-restraint, Frankfurter was convinced, provided the only assumption
upon which a liberal and democratic jurisprudence could be based.
H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 129 (1981). But see id. at 129-30 ("Frank-
furter was committing a giant oversimplification .... Although both Holmes and Brandeis
endorsed Thayer, they did so for different reasons and to a different extent .... Frankfurter's
pre-Court ideology was, in fact, much closer to Brandeis's than to Holmes's .... Yet... 'his
tenure on the Court was marked by a self-conscious attempt to make Holmes the model for
the proper Justice.' ").
1456
type, it was an ascendant prototype that would serve their purposes
well. By excluding the public rights model with its part-whole schema,
the liberals could preclude any dissatisfied private citizen from invoking
the Constitution in the courts to challenge the progressive programs
enacted by the polity.
Moreover, the source-path-goal schema of the private rights model
could make a distinct and important contribution to the liberals' aims.
The broad social and economic experiments of the New Deal, like the
hydroelectric program at issue in Ashwander, would have varied and un-
predictable effects throughout society. The causal source-path-goal
schema limits litigation to direct victims. It therefore serves to insulate
from judicial scrutiny governmental actions with many, diffuse, and in-
direct effects. It was just this insulation that was required for the suc-
cess of the social and economic programs that were the center of
Brandeis' and Frankfurter's concern.496
In adopting these cognitive tools, the effect on the liberal Justices
was ecological: This explains Brandeis' position, in Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Association,497 that a declaratory judgment was not a proper
bill in equity and, thus, was beyond the federal judicial power. His pro-
gram of judicial restraint entailed a limitation of the federal courts to
suits that fit the source-path-goal schema of the private rights model. The
declaratory judgment action did not fit comfortably with that schema.
By definition, there is no injury at the time a declaratory judgment
plaintiff seeks the court's intervention. The suit, therefore, has no
source.
As we have seen, Justice Brandeis never fully articulated these con-
cepts. The Court had already begun, in cases like Tyler, Davis, and Mas-
sachusetts State Grange v.Benton,498 to apply equitable, preconstitutional
doctrines of directness of injury and of standing, to reject citizen claims
in neutral, process-oriented terms. In Fairchild, Justice Brandeis con-
nected these notions to the traditional article III syllogism of the forms.
Ashwander was a partial retreat, recasting the same cases back into their
equitable forms as discretionary doctrines. Then, Frankfurter grasped
the cognitive tools and fashioned an article III doctrine called "stand-
ing" that made a constitutional prerequisite of the prototypical private
rights model. Standing law was, thus, the ultimate constitutional legacy
of the program of judicial conservatism that was the liberals' response
to the substantive due process era.
496. This insulating effect is also what makes troublesome the application of standing
doctrine in cases in which the government's action is threatening to constitutional values.
497. 277 U.S. 274 (1928). The Court later approved the declaratory judgment in Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). An opinion by Justice Frankfurter later re-
stricted Aetna's scope by a narrow construction of the interplay between the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act and the federal question jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667, 669-72 (1950).
498. 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926). See notes 285-286 supra and accompanying text.
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V. THE OBFUSCATORY POWER OF METAPHOR
Language is a guide to "social reality." . . . [I]t powerfully condi-
tions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human be-
ings ... are very much at the mercy of the particular language which
has become the medium of expression for their society.4 99
As we have seen above, the original conceptualizations of adjudica-
tion encompassed both a public and a private rights model and con-
tained no constitutional concept of standing. Disparate concepts of
rights and remedies often expressed by the metaphor of "standing"
were replaced by a single, conceptual ordering of the adjudicatory uni-
verse requiring injury, consistent with the private rights model. In Cole-
man v. Miller,5 0 0 Justice Frankfurter nimbly invoked two parallel
cognitive processes to combine the prototypical private rights model
with the "standing" metaphor to converge on a single epistemically co-
herent result: a constitutional doctrine of standing.
Part of the explanation for the success of this convergence relates to
the interaction of political power and metaphor: "[W]hether in na-
tional politics or in everyday interaction, people in power get to impose
their metaphors. '50 1 If Brandeis and Frankfurter laid the road from
Fairchild v. Hughes50 2 to Coleman and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath,50 3 the road certainly was neither smooth nor clear. When
New Deal liberalism found its way onto the Court, it needed a mecha-
nism by which to implement and establish this part of its judicial pro-
gram as the orthodoxy that it is today. The repeated use of the
"standing" metaphor, which has an ontological effect, provided that
mechanism:
New metaphors, like conventional metaphors, can have the power
to define reality. They do this through a coherent network of entail-
ments that highlight some features of reality and hide others. The ac-
ceptance of the metaphor, which leads us to focus only on those aspects
of our experience that it highlights, forces us to view the entailments of
the metaphor as being true ....
Though questions of truth do arise for new metaphors, the more
important questions are those of appropriate action. In most cases,
what is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor but the percep-
tions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanc-
tioned by it.50 4
The important question for us, then, is whether the new metaphori-
cally structured reality that emerged in Coleman and McGrath works. For
499. E. SAPIR, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, in CULTURE, LANGUAGE, AND PERSONAL-
rry 65, 68-69 (D. Mandlebaum ed. 1963).
500. 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
501. G. LAKOFF & M.JoHNSON, supra note 63, at 157.
502. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
503. 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
504. G. LAKOFF & M. JoHNSON, supra note 63, at 157-58 (emphasis in original).
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it is one thing to chart the historical development of a new constitu-
tional principle and quite another to argue that no new constitutional
principles are permissible because they are not within the original in-
tent of the Framers. It is one thing to recognize the power of history in
legal thought, as I do: "Just as in a scriptural religion, the most elabo-
rate and established theological system can be challenged by the call ad
fontes ('back to the sources') .... "505 It is quite another to rest on that
argument, which I do not.50 6
A new principle, conceptualization, or metaphor works if the "per-
ceptions and inferences that follow from it and are sanctioned by it"
lead to "appropriate actions." 50 7 I believe that the concept of standing
does not work, but rather is obfuscatory. In saying that standing does
not work, I mean something different than the typical claim that stand-
ing law is confusing and seems incoherent. 508 I mean, rather, that
standing has disordering effects on our legal analysis which produce
bad decisions on the merits. These disordering effects stem from the
cognitive structure of this particular metaphoric conceptualization.
In Section II, we saw that the "standing" metaphor has specific en-
tailments that are expressed in standing doctrine. "Standing" is a met-
aphor of individualism. The metaphor suggests, moreover, that the
individual must have a particular kind of relationship to the adjudica-
tory process-a formal threshold, like standing up to be heard. Standing
doctrine defines an individual's relationship to the adjudicatory process
by a private rights model structured according to two source-path-goal
metaphors: one causal, the other remedial. 509 These metaphors and
their underlying schemata exert powerful influences on standing
analysis.
To focus on "standing" is to do more than ask the doctrine's spe-
cific threshold questions. When we as lawyers focus our attention on
those questions, we necessarily suppress aspects of the case that are
unavoidably related to the very issues before us. This is the ontological
effect of the metaphor. Similarly, the use of the source-path-goal sche-
mata of the private rights model does more than just organize our anal-
ysis of the issues in terms of the elements of the schema. After all,
standing law is a self-conscious effort to limit adjudication to cases that
fit the prototype. It therefore structures our analysis in a way that pro-
duces clear reduction-to-prototype effects. Thus, in organizing the raw
facts of a case, the legal system focuses on and treats only those aspects
505. Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 IowA L. REV.
1427, 1433 (1986). I have previously explored the parallels between religion and judicial
review that account for "not [only] the 'correctness' or legitimating power of the religious
metaphor, but also its curious persistence." Winter, supra note 19, at 694; see generally id. at
692-99.
506. Winter, supra note 19, at 699-700.
507. G. LAKOFF & M.JOHMON, supra note 63, at 158.
508. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
509. See notes 85-94 supra and accompanying text.
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that fit the best examples of the doctrinal elements. For instance, in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,510 the Court under-
stood the plaintiff to complain about a physical injury when, in fact, the
briefs and the pleadings were raising a much larger interest. 511
The practical result of these ontological and reduction-to-prototype
effects is that standing law talks about one thing without talking about
the thing to which it is inextricably attached5 12 and, thus, often gets it
wrong. Alternatively, it talks about one thing by talking about another
and in the process garbles both. To demonstrate this, I will discuss
four well known standing cases-Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War,513 Flast v. Cohen,514 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State,5 15 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization.5 16 Each of these public rights cases would
better fit a constituent model than a private rights one. Distortions oc-
cur when these cases are treated in terms of the schemata of the private
rights model-much like forcing a square peg into a round hole. This
section illustrates the confusion between standing and issues central to
the merits that is the inevitable, distorted result.
5 1 7
A. Standing: The Who and the What
The dogma of standing doctrine that it is a question of access apart
from the merits of the controversy, 518 is a product of the metaphor's
primary ontological effect. This distinction makes sense in terms of the
metaphor itself: The question is not what you have to say, but whether
you can be heard to say it (that is, are you "standing"?). That latter
issue depends on whether you are in a position to state your claim (do
you have "locus standii"?). The effect is ontological, and not just an ap-
plication of appropriate analytic tools, because the effect is at odds with
common sense experience. That is, how can we know whether you
should be heard until we allow you to speak? If what you have to say is
powerful and important, why shouldn't we hear what you have to say?
Once you have spoken, it is entirely likely that we might decide that we
510. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
511. See notes 565-570 infra and accompanying text. In cases such as Simon, the legal
system errs because it fails to perceive the metaphoric dimensions of a term and instead ap-
plies the term in a literalist sense.
512. The reference here is to the famous dictum by Thomas Reed Powell.
513. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
514. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
515. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
516. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
517. Another disordering consequence of the metaphor's ontological effect is the pres-
sure to see all issues in individualist terms. In several recent cases, however, the Court has
departed from the substance of the individualist view in fictitious and distorting ways because
it continues to employ that view's rhetoric. See notes 601-675 infra and accompanying text.
518. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968); see also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
("The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.").
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wanted and needed to hear your statement after all.51 9
Our legal training taught us that the law has its own logic which is
different from common sense. Thus, as lawyers, we can feel comforta-
ble with the notion that separating standing from the merits makes ana-
lytic sense in some circumstances. There are cases in which it seems
appropriate to distinguish the question whether the defendant has vio-
lated the applicable law from whether the plaintiff is the appropriate
person to compel the defendant to stop. But when we look at these
propositions in concrete settings, we find that their coherence is more
apparent than real. What seems to work passably well in a private
rights context is in fact unnecessary. It is distorting when applied to a
public rights context. I will use two variants on a "competitor-stand-
ing" example to clarify what I mean.
Suppose I hold a patent for a new, more efficient, manufacturing
process for high-tech widgets. Provender Enterprises uses my process
to manufacture widgets without first obtaining a license from me. Its
competitor, Widget Wonder, sues to enjoin Provender from violating
my patent. It should not matter that, on the merits, Provender is in
violation of my patent (nor, for that matter, that Widget Wonder is in
fact suffering economic loss from the competition). It is for me to de-
cide whether I am hurt or offended by Provender's action. If I happen
to decide that my continuing relationship with Provender is more im-
portant than the technicalities of a license, Widget Wonder is (in our
system) stuck with my assessment of the relative economic benefits.
But, the reason that Widget Wonder cannot sue even though it has
suffered real economic loss has little to do with an inherent problem of
"standing." Widget Wonder can present a justiciable case. It will,
however, lose on the merits because as a matter of policy our legal sys-
tem does not afford it a remedy. The patent laws were intended to
provide short-term monopolies to inventors, not to protect unrelated
competitors such as Widget Wonder.
In the private rights context, the concept of standing is entirely un-
necessary. In our legal system, we ordinarily handle the same concerns
with other concepts. For example, we consider whether to recognize an
interest that Widget Wonder has in the enforcement of the patent laws
(that is, does it have a right?).520 If we were to decide that Widget
Wonder has a right, then we consider whether it matters that I chose
519. Of course, we may be concerned about the potential effects on absent third parties
ofjudgments obtained by public rights litigants. There are, however, alternative strategies to
imposed silence. By delineating the area of discussion and then allowing others to partici-
pate, we can, as a practical matter, reduce or remove the adverse consequences of ill-consid-
ered action. See In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 106 (1834); Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall,
91 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1876); Tushnet, supra note 14, at 1716-17 (citing Chayes, supra note 90,
at 1311-12). In short, issues about these practical effects reflect instrumentalist concerns, and
there are tools available other than standing law to regulate these problems. See note 713 infra
and text accompanying notes 776-780 infra.
520. We might ask, alternatively, whether I have a privilege not to enforce my patent
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not to enforce, rather than to license (that is, is a remedy appropriate?).
Ordinarily, these concepts adequately distinguish between the accepta-
bility of the defendant's conduct and the entitlement of the particular
plaintiff to relief.
The rigid separation of standing from the merits changes from un-
necessary to unhelpful as we shift to the public rights context. Suppose
Widget Wonder believes that the patent office illegally issued the origi-
nal patent. It would like to compete with Provender, but is afraid that I
might sue to enforce the patent. It could raise the issue as a defense, or
seek a declaratory judgment against me. 52 1 But, because Widget Won-
der has a continuing stake in a fast-changing field of technology and is
concerned that this error resulted from systemic problems in the patent
bureaucracy, it seeks instead a declaratory judgment against the patent
office.
Modern standing law would grapple with this problem by asking a
series of questions about the relationship of Widget Wonder to the ad-
judicatory process: Did it suffer injury-in-fact? Was that injury caused
by the patent office? Would it be redressed by the order sought? Is the
injury like that of a traditional private-rights plaintiff, or one in com-
mon with the public at large?
These questions are separate from the "merits" of the patent of-
fice's conduct; they are threshold questions. But, in a variety of ways,
they draw our attention away from the underlying issues. For example,
standing law tells us to look for direct, concrete injury and then to limit
the suit to a question about the patent office's responsibility for that
injury. But if we do, we will miss altogether Widget Wonder's central
concerns. We will miss as well the public issues raised by the case.
Those issues concern the patent laws' broader role in promoting tech-
nological innovation and economic competition, a social interest that is
stifled by rewarding noncontributing technologies with monopolies.
Those issues also concern the variety and effectiveness of the alterna-
tive mechanisms for enforcing those social interests. 522 The focus on
actual injury instead is a reduction-to-prototype effect that obscures
these larger concerns.
As with the private patent case, these public issues can be cast as
questions of rights and remedies. Or they can be considered as
and, concomitantly, the ability to privilege Provender to use it. If I do, then-in Hohfeldian
terms-Widget Wonder has no-right. See Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 32-33.
521. Under current doctrine, Widget Wonder could only sue me as the patent holder if I
had threatened enforcement or if, for some other reason, Widget Wonder had "a reasonable
apprehension of liability." See, e.g., American Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting
Mills, 379 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1967). Otherwise, Widget Wonder might face ripeness
problems.
522. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (competitor
is in the best position, and possibly the only person, to act as "private attorney general" to
enforce in the licensing process the public interest requirement of the Communications Act);
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 158.
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straightforward matters of policy. In either event, we may decide that
Widget Wonder is not the best party to raise these questions or that
there are other, better mechanisms available to treat them. But to bury
these questions by dealing instead with a question of "standing"-with
the plaintiff's generalized relationship to the judicial process-risks
missing what is most important about the case and the choices that the
case poses. It risks as well some bad choices because of a failure to
focus on the critical questions. Standing doctrine asks about the liti-
gant's stake even as we resolutely refuse to consider "the stakes." Of
course it is obfuscatory.
B. Ontology Redux: A Modern Standing in Court
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,523 the plaintiffs
sought to force members of Congress out of the Armed Forces Reserve
on the ground that their membership violated the Constitution's in-
compatibility clause. 524 The district court had solved the concrete in-
jury conundrum by arguing that the incompatibility clause was
designed to forestall the potential for injury, like a conflict-of-interest
statute.52 5 The Court rejected that analysis because there was no in-
jury-in-fact. 526 In the Court's view, the lower courts had no business
evaluating the meaning and effect of the incompatibility clause to deter-
mine standing: "Standing was thus found by premature evaluation of
the merits of respondents' complaint. '527
The Court's reasoning does not withstand analysis; it can only be
accounted for in terms of the cognitive phenomena of standing's onto-
logical and reduction-to-prototype effects. Let us examine first the
ontological effect of "standing" in the Court's reasoning. What was
accomplished by this fetishistic fastidiousness about "premature evalu-
ation" of the merits? No obvious process values were at stake: The
problem was not the poverty of the record or the lack of participation
by the adverse parties. Nor did the lower court first decide that the
congressmen had violated the Constitution and then reason backwards
in an unprincipled fashion to find standing. Rather, the court under-
stood "the primary if not the sole purpose of the bar against Congress-
523. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
524. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
525. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971).
Interesting to us, although of no relevance to the Court, is the fact that the plaintiffs sought,
along with other action, "an order in the nature of mandamus directed to petitioners [the
Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries] requiring them to strike from the rolls
of the Reserves all Members of Congress .... Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211.
526. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224.
527. I d at 225.
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men holding executive office" to be directed at "maintaining
independence among the branches of government .... ",528 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that "the interest of plaintiffs as citizens is
undoubtedly one which was intended to be protected by the constitu-
tional provision involved." '529
If the district court was correct that the incompatibility clause cre-
ated both an affirmative duty on the respondents and a correlative right
in the citizen-plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs were "in the position of a
traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff' '5 3 0 no less than if they had sued upon
the hypothetical conflict-of-interest statute (or if I sued Provender as
the holder of the patent). If the court found that the plaintiffs' claim
had merit, then denial of standing would be preposterous. If the court
found that the plaintiffs' claim had no merit, it could still dispose of the
case on a motion to dismiss.531 "Premature evaluation" in this context
is a consequence of the ontological effect of the entailment of the
"standing" metaphor that suggests a formal, nonsubstantive threshold.
Its consequence, however, is to obscure the merits and determine them
obliquely.
The Court's rejection of the lower court's conflict-of-interest anal-
ogy illustrates the reduction-to-prototype effect of the injury prong of
standing analysis. The Court saw only "injury in the abstract," 53 2 and
treated as speculative any claim that citizens might actually have been
harmed. But the district court's analysis understood that harm is often
unpredictable or diffuse. An actual injury does not occur every time a
driver runs a red light. But we enact traffic laws both because we know
that sometimes there is an injury and because we want to be able to rely
on the signal and cross the street in safety. We could instead have a
rule that running a red light is only a wrong if someone is hurt, or we
could always wait for the pedestrian's survivors to bring a private suit.
But we don't; we make disobedience of traffic signals a crime because
our capacity to conceptualize and project from everyday experience al-
lows us to plan and to avoid inconvenience and future injury.
We enact conflict-of-interest provisions (or put them in the Consti-
528. Reservists Comm. v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. at 841.
529. Id.
530. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 203 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
generally Hohfeld, supra note 61. Justice Stewart uses the term to denominate the right/duty
structure of the plaintiffs' claim, not the injury, causation, and redressability structure (the
underlying source-path-goal schema) of the private rights model.
Justice Stewart nevertheless concurred in Schlesinger because he distinguished, for pur-
poses of standing, between affirmative and negative duties. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228-29. In
the case of negative duties, the Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968), "nexus" criteria might,
for example, control. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 205 (Stewart,J., dissenting). See text accompany-
ing notes 539-541 infra. Justice Powell is correct that this distinction makes no sense in terms
of current doctrine. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 186-87 (Powell,J., concurring). ButJustice Stew-
art's conceptual reasoning about standing is otherwise sound, even though he was caught up
both by the ontological effect of the metaphor and the desire to establish some limits.
531. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
532. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
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tution) for similar reasons: We consider the issue important and know
that the harms will often be too subtle to perceive directly. Plainly, the
Court confirmed the latter point; it wanted prototypical injury of some
sort.
A footnote to the Court's discussion of the district court's argument
demonstrates the degree to which this reduction-to-prototype effect
distorted the Court's reasoning. The Court acknowledged that Con-
gress could enact a conflict-of-interest statute "directed at avoiding cir-
cumstances of potential, not actual, impropriety ... ." and that if it did,
"the requisite injury for standing would be found in an invasion of that
right."533 But what the Court did and did not conclude from that ob-
servation reveals the distorting effects of its reduction-to-prototype
analysis. The Court never asked the obvious question: If Congress
could enact a statute creating such a right, and if that statute would
justify standing, then couldn't the Framers have already done so when
they wrote the incompatibility clause? The Court did not ask this obvi-
ous question because it was clearly caught in the cognitive trompe l'oeil of
the reduction-to-prototype effect: It posited that even if Congress were
to pass such a conflict-of-interest statute, article III would still require
"concrete harm" before a citizen could complain to a court about an
actual conflict-of-interest. 53 4 In short, the Court concluded (apparently
without realizing it) that Congress had the power only to enact a statute
recognizing the enforceability of fiduciary obligations. A true conflict-
of-interest statute would be constitutionally unenforceable by members
of the public because, by definition, prototypical injury would not yet
have occurred. 535
A possible response to my argument that Schlesinger illustrates the
ontological and reduction-to-prototype distortions of standing doctrine
would be to say that Schlesinger simply overemphasizes the separation
between standing and the merits. Flast, after all, observed that "in rul-
ing on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the
substantive issues .. . to determine whether there is a logical nexus
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. ' 536
But that would not provide a meaningful answer to my critique. Flast,
after all, is one of the primary sources of the doctrine that standing is
separate from the merits: "The fundamental aspect of standing is that
it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
533. Id. at 224 n.14 (citation omitted).
534. Id
535. Imagine how the Framers might have handled this problem when they sat in the
first Congress. They could have authorized a suit by writ of mandamus to enforce the incom-
patibility clause. Or an informer's statute could have made enforceable a true conflict-of-
interest statute at the behest of any member of the public. But, if a simple informer's bounty
of five dollars would have made the issue "justiciable," what possible article III, process value
would be lost without it?
536. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
July 1988] 1465STANDING
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." 537 In es-
sence, Flast says that "we don't look at the merits, but we will look at it
just a little bit."'5 38 Moreover, the Flast position simply digs a deeper
analytic hole: There is little in standing law that is more intractably
problematic than the Flast double nexus test. The test is a wonderful
example of how difficult it can be for the Court to talk about the things
it needs to and still stay within the "standing" metaphor: The contra-
diction in Flast arises because the Court wants and needs to focus on
the merits of the plaintiff's claim and still treat standing as an entirely
threshold question. It bridges these two incompatible positions by ab-
stracting the essential elements of the claim as neutral, process ori-
ented "nexuses."
In Flast, a taxpayer challenged, on establishment clause grounds, a
federal statute providing funds to support the teaching of secular sub-
jects in religious schools. The Court upheld the taxpayer's standing. It
both identified the plaintiff's "personal stake" 539 and distinguished
Frothingham by focusing on "the nexus between the status asserted by
the litigant and the claim [s]he presents .... -540 Like Ms. Frothing-
ham, Ms. Flast challenged a taxing and spending program. But, unlike
Ms. Frothingham, who invoked the tenth amendment, Ms. Flast sued
on the basis of a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and
spending power. Thus, the Court concluded, Ms. Flast and her co-
plaintiffs had "the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the
litigation to satisfy Article III requirements. ' 5 4 1
This analysis fails, as Flast's critics have argued, because the double
nexuses "are not in any sense a measurement of any plaintiff's interest
in the outcome of any suit."' 54 2 Indeed, that critique is unanswerable if
the double nexus test is supposed to address how the litigant's status
relates to any generalizable conception of judicial process. But by
537. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99.
538. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, for example, Justice Powell
characterized this shift in position regarding the relevance of the merits to the standing in-
quiry as "abrupt." 418 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1974). Yet, in his opinion for the Court in Warth v.
Seldin, Justice Powell made just the same maneuver as that which he criticized in Flast:
"Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particu-
lar conduct is illegal .... it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." 422
U.S. 499, 500 (1975) (citation omitted). One can see this as well in Association of Data Processing
Sev. Orgs. v. Camp, where the Court first rejected the "legal interest" test because it went to
the merits, and then adopted the "zone-of-interest" test, which is only a more pragmatic,
Realist's version of the same thing. 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970). In each case the Court is
really asking questions about the merits: Whom does this statute protect? Who has rights
and what are they?
539. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
540. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
541. Id
542. Id. at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord Richardson, 418 U.S. at 182 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[I1t is impossible to see how an inquiry about the existence of 'concrete ad-
verseness' is furthered by the application of the Flast test."); H. FINK & M. TuSHNEr, supra note
14, at 297 ("The subsequent history [ofFlast] illustrates how a rule that is divorced from its
rationale can be readily undermined or discarded.").
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abandoning this threshold entailment of the "standing" metaphor, as
the Court could not, we can make some sense of the Flast nexuses in
case-specific and litigant-specific terms.
Ms. Flast's nexus as taxpayer to her challenge of an exercise of the
taxing and spending power was not significant because it gave her some
greater financial or personal stake in the outcome. Rather, the nexus
was significant because she was asking for nothing more than she was
due under the law: On the merits, she had a first amendment right
regardless of the amount at stake. Ms. Flast was arguing that the estab-
lishment clause protected her from a society in which tax monies would
be used for impermissible, religious purposes. 543 The amount (or lack)
of injury to her pocketbook was beside the point; the exaction of even
"three pence" was enough to establish that the government could
"force h[er] to conform to any other establishment." 544 The first
amendment exists to forestall the more direct injury. In other words,
the Flast nexus that purported to answer the threshold question really
addressed the merits of the plaintiff's claim.545 The Court could only
consider her stake by considering "the stakes."5
46
543. In support of this point, the majority invoked the legislative history of the establish-
ment clause: "[O]ne of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment
Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to
favor one religion over another or to support religion in general." Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
544. Id (quoting J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in 2
WRITINGS oFJAMES MADISON 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
545. See id at 114 (Stewart,J., concurring) ("Because that clause plainly prohibits taxing
and spending in aid of religion, every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to
be taxed for the support of a religious institution."). Justice Fortas also recognized that the
Court's ruling spoke only to establishment clause cases and not to taxpayer standing gener-
ally. Id at 115.
546. Justice Harlan's position perhaps most informs this point. He understood the
Court's opinion as trying to answer the personal stake in substantive terms:
As I understand it, the Court's position is that it is unnecessary to decide in what
circumstances public actions should be permitted, for it is possible to identify situa-
tions in which taxpayers who contest the constitutionality of federal expenditures
assert 'personal' rights and interests, identical in principle to those asserted by
Hohfeldian plaintiffs. This position, if supportable, would of course avoid many of
the difficulties of this case....
Id. at 121. Justice Harlan borrowed the term "Hohfeldian" fromJaffe, supra note 5, and used
it to identify " 'personal' rights and interests." Flast, 392 U.S. at 119 n.5, 121.
Hohfeld wrote about the right/duty duality of the common law, not the degree-of-pri-
vate-interest question that is the concern of modern standing law. See Hohfeld, supra note 61.
In the sense of the traditional public rights model, however, these public interest plaintiffs
were perfectly Hohfeldian: They asserted public rights that entailed correlative duties on the
defendant; the difference was that these duties ran to the public rather than just to the specific
plaintiff.
Despite his insights, Justice Harlan was subject to the "standing" metaphor's ontological
and reduction-to-prototype effects. He rejected the Court's use of criteria for taxpayer
"standing" that did not establish the plaintiff's degree of interest in the outcome of the suit.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 121-24. Justice Harlan, however, did not believe that article III limits the
judicial power to cases brought only by "Hohfeldian" plaintiffs with actual injury to personal
rights. As we have seen, he cited informers' actions as examples of "non-Hohfeldian" suits
that were nevertheless "cases and controversies." Id. at 120 (citing Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S.
212, 225 (1905), and United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546 (1943)). In his
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If Flast reveals the garbled effect standing has on the doctrinal dis-
course, then Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State547 demonstrates the costs-indeed, the mortal con-
stitutional danger-of such disordered modes of thought. In Valley
Forge, an establishment clause challenge to the donation of surplus gov-
ernment property to a sectarian college, the Court applied the double
nexus test of Flast to reject the plaintiffs' standing. The Court reasoned
that, unlike the Flast plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in Valley Forge had not chal-
lenged an exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power on
the basis of a specific limitation on that power. Rather, the plaintiffs
challenged an executive action by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare ("HEW"), authorized by a statute passed pursuant to the
property clause of the Constitution.548
The Court's literal treatment of the Flast nexus test was just as much
a fiction in Valley Forge as in Flast. The double nexus test could no more
demonstrate that the Valley Forge plaintiffs lacked a sufficient interest in
the subject matter than it could explain why an earlier Court had ac-
corded "standing" to Ms. Flast.549 Rather, an entirely different ap-
proach to standing distinguished Flast from Valley Forge. Although Flast
ostensibly established threshold criteria, the Court essentially had
looked for legal injury. The Flast Court found that legal injury in the
nexus between the plaintiffs' claim and the applicable legal principles,
that is, by considering the nature of the plaintiffs' claim on the merits.
In Valley Forge, on the other hand, the Court was literalist and reduc-
tionist: "We simply cannot see that respondents have alleged an injury
of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer standing."550
The court of appeals had tried to use the legal injury approach by
recasting that approach in terms of standing doctrine. The court of
appeals understood the plaintiffs' claim to rest, not on their status as
taxpayers, but rather upon the" 'injury in fact' to their shared individu-
ated right to a government that 'shall make no law respecting [an] es-
tablishment of religion,' "551 which the court viewed as a "particular
and concrete injury" to a "personal constitutional right. ' 552 The
view, the requirement of standing in taxpayer suits was a judge-made limitation imposed for
separation of powers purposes. Id at 130-33.
547. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
548. Id. at 479-80. The property clause grants Congress the power "to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States .... U.S. CONST. ari. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
549. To borrow the majority's own metaphor: "This reasoning process merely disguises
... with a rather thin veil, the inconsistency of the court's results .... Valley Forge, 454 U.S.
at 483.
550. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In the accompanying footnote,
the Court specifically rejected any "spiritual stake" premised on the zone of interest analysis
of Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
551. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. United States Dept. of
HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3rd Cir. 1980).
552. Id. at 265.
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Supreme Court majority rejected the analysis that would make "the
mere allegation of a legal right sufficient to confer standing," 553 and cor-
rectly noted that the lower court's analysis was inconsistent with the
reduction-to-prototype, injury-in-fact analysis of Schlesinger and
Richardson.554
The majority had an important reason to reject an analysis that fo-
cused on the assertion of a right as sufficient to meet the threshold
requirement: To adopt the analysis would recreate the circularity of
the legal interest test and threaten the integrity of the standing con-
cept.5 55 In the public rights context, in which injury had never been
understood as prototypical, there is only legal right (that is, legal in-
jury). The plaintiff sues because the government did something the law
prohibits. The "injury" is to whatever concern lies behind the law.
Thus, to allow "standing" to members of the public because they assert
bona fide legal rights would be to recreate the public rights model.
But consider what this conclusion implies about the stakes in mod-
em standing decisions. A "no-injury" determination is necessarily a
"no-right" determination. Because the "injury" is to the legal interest,
the plaintiff's "stake" is precisely what is at stake on the merits. Once the
tool of liberals to avoid conservative judicial action, the use of standing
law as a jurisdictional bar is now an axe wielded by the conservative
Court to cut down the existence of rights previously unquestioned.
Justice Brennan appreciated part of this argument in his dissent in
Valley Forge, although he failed to grasp its full significance. He noted
that, because
553. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added). But cf Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682 (1946) ("the court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a
cause of action."). Bell presented no problems of standing because the plaintiff in Bell suffered
injury consistent with the traditional private rights model. In Bell, the Court considered
whether Bell's fourth amendment (rather than the state law of trespass) claim was sufficient to
justify federal question jurisdiction. Thus, the question in Bell was one concerning the scope
of a constitutional provision and whether that provision created rights directly enforceable in
a federal court. In that context too, the question ofjurisdiction is in some sense inseparable
from the underlying constitutional claim on the merits. See id. at 680-85; Yazoo County Indus.
Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160-61 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the de-
nial of certiorari).
554. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83.
555. "[A]ssertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Gov-
ernment has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III
without draining those requirements of meaning." Id. at 483. Once accepted, the notion that
the assertion of a right confers standing would render standing law a "collapsed field" in
which the reconceptualization simply obliterates our prior understanding of the subject. See
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology ofJudging, 36J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518, 541 (1986). Professor Kennedy cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as
creating a collapsed field: "[I]f enforcement of discriminatory covenants is state action, then
the private sphere 'disappears,' since all private arrangements are dependent for their struc-
ture on enforcement of private law ground rules." Kennedy, supra, at 541. Compare, e.g., Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (statute authorizing a warehouseman's lien is not
subject to constitutional scrutiny because there is no state action), with id. at 178 ("private"
commercial behavior is only possible because the state provides "a framework of rules"
backed up by the enforcement power of the state).
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[a] plaintiff's standing is a jurisdictional matter for Art. III courts, and
thus a "threshold question".., there is an impulse to decide difficult
questions of substantive law obliquely in the course of opinions pur-
porting to do nothing more than determine what the Court labels
"standing"; this accounts for the phenomenon of opinions, such as the
one today, that tend merely to obfuscate, rather than inform, our un-
derstanding of the meaning of rights under the law. 5 56
He argued that "[t]he drafters of the Bill of Rights surely intended that
the particular beneficiaries of their legacy should enjoy rights legally
enforceable in courts of law."' 55 7 ButJustice Brennan could not answer
the majority's critique; he could not explain his position in terms of the
process limitations expressed in current doctrine. He instead "[read]
cases such as Frothingham and Flast as decisions on the merits of the
taxpayers' claims." '5 58
Justice Brennan was correct. The concept of standing necessarily
undermines the concept of rights under law. He could not answer the
critique because he could not step outside the current doctrine's onto-
logical and reduction-to-prototype effects. We must first accept that
the Court's treatment of standing as jurisdictional is historically unjusti-
fied before we are free to see standing doctrine's inevitable analytic
consequences. The Court's standing doctrine is not just a matter of
misdirected impulse. "Standing" is and can only be a question about
the legal rights at stake. Consequently, the Court's application of
standing to reject "jurisdiction" in public rights cases will always un-
dermine the rights that comprise the core of our current understanding
of the concept of "the rule of law."
The doctrine of standing necessarily undermines our understanding
of the stakes in any given case; the Court focuses on ostensibly neutral,
process-oriented criteria even as it unavoidably decides the merits of
the plaintiff's claim. Perhaps Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization5 59 illustrates best this phenomenon. In Simon, the Court em-
ployed the tripartite injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility test of
standing 560 to reject the claim by indigents that a change in Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") regulations concerning hospitals eligible for
556. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
557. Id. at 494.
558. Id. at 484 n.20 (majority opinion); see also id. at 476 n.13 (majority opinion).
559. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
560. The Simon formulation originated in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),
in which the Court held that a mother had no standing to sue the prosecutor to enforce child
support payment laws. In that case, however, Justice Marshall's majority opinion identified
the requirements as deriving from the "unique context of a challenge to a criminal statute"
and the "special status of criminal prosecutions in our system." Id. at 617, 619. The govern-
ment defendants in Simon understood Linda R.S. in just that way, and framed their arguments
accordingly. Simon, 426 U.S. at 37. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), however, the
Court elevated the Linda R.S. criteria to the constitutional standard for standing. As I ex-
plained in Section II, the recharacterization in Warth of the injury, causation, redressability
criteria is a natural extrapolation from the source-path-goal structure of the private rights
model. See notes 85-95 supra and accompanying text.
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tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3)561 violated the terms of the
statute. The plaintiffs included persons who had been turned away
from hospitals that qualified for charitable status under the new stan-
dards. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury, alleging that
the Nixon Administration's change in the relevant regulations had en-
couraged the hospitals to deny service to indigents.
The Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing. It accepted that
at least some of the plaintiffs might have suffered injury-in-fact when
denied access to needed medical services because they were indigent.
It held, however, that this assumed injury was not enough for standing.
In the Court's view, the existence of a case or controversy between the
litigants depended on a twofold analysis: whether the defendants' chal-
lenged action caused the injury562 and whether a favorable decision was
likely to redress the injury.563 With regard to each prong of this analy-
sis, the Court found the connection speculative: A hospital might have
decided to deny treatment to indigents for reasons other than, or even
in spite of, the tax implications. In that event, no court order restoring
the IRS ruling (requiring treatment for indigents as a condition of char-
itable status) would result in the desired benefits to the plaintiffs be-
cause hospitals might decide to forgo the tax benefits in order to avoid
providing the service.
The plaintiffs countered this reasoning by arguing that the hospital
industry had represented to Congress the importance of such favorable
tax treatment to not-for-profit hospitals. In response, the government
argued that charitable contributions only accounted for four percent of
hospital revenues. The Court interpreted this "conflicting evidence" as
support for the government's position. It held that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that hospitals receiving tax-exempt status depend on
charitable contributions. 564 The Court concluded that "the complaint
suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in this suit would result
in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they desire." 565
Viewed through the lens of "standing," the Court's analysis seems
to make sense. Remove that lens, however, and the elaborate structure
that the metaphor sustains can be seen to collapse.
The reduction-to-prototype effect of the injury-in-fact requirement
for standing focused the Court on the wrong injury. So did the causa-
tion analysis: "Cause" asks for "effect," and the Court looked for con-
561. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) provides that public safety organizations may be
treated as tax exempt.
562. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42.
563. "Absent such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratui-
tous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III (case or controversy] limitation." Id. at 38; see also
id. at 39 ("The necessity that the plaintiffwho seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in
some personal interest remains an Art. III requirement.").
564. Id. at 43-44.
565. Id at 45-46 (emphasis added).
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crete injuries: injuries "in fact." The Court treated the claim of the
Simon plaintiffs in just this way:
The obvious interest of all respondents, to which they claim actual in-
jury, is that of access to hospital services. In one sense, of course, they
have suffered injury to that interest. The complaint alleges specific oc-
casions on which each of the individual respondents sought but was
denied hospital services solely due to his indigency .... [S]ome have
been denied service. But injury at the hands of a hospital is insufficient
by itself to establish a case or controversy in the context of this suit, for
no hospital is a defendant. The only defendants are officials of the De-
partment of the Treasury .... 56 6
There is a subtle and unaccountable shift here from the concept of "ac-
cess to services" to that of "denial of services." In the private rights
model, with its source-path-goal schema of causation by the defendant of
an injury "in fact" to the plaintiff, denial of access is only an intermedi-
ate causal step to the ultimate injury, the denial of needed medical care.
The new IRS policy did not cause that injury: that injury resulted from
intervening causes controlled by other (non)parties. Thus, standing
was lacking.
But the plaintiffs had presented a different case. They were con-
cerned about specific instances of inability to obtain care (the proto-
type). But they experienced their situation and manifested their
concern in terms of their loss of continuing access to care (the concep-
tual extension). They claimed that the charitable treatment of hospitals
existed primarily to provide a source of free care to indigents financed,
not directly by the government, but by private contributors. 567 This
claim rested on an assumption about, and an assessment of, rational
responses to tax incentives. In a sense, then, the plaintiffs claimed to
be third party beneficiaries of the tax incentive scheme of the code.5 68
"The relevant injury ... [wa]s, then, injury to this beneficial interest-
as respondents alleged, injury to their 'opportunity and ability' to re-
ceive medical services."5 69
By changing the determinants of charitable status, the IRS effec-
tively reduced the flow of money that hospitals would use for free indi-
566. Id. at 40-41.
567. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (quoted in Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 332-33 (D.D.C. 1973)).
The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable contributions historically has
been that by doing so, the Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting pub-
lic needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
Government. "The Government is compensated for its loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from
public funds."
McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 456 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938)).
568. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET (1st ed.), supra note 14, at 319.
569. Simon, 426 U.S. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's identification of
"injury" with "opportunity" appears quite awkward. In contrast, use of the legal interest test
would seem quite natural in this context.
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gent care. No longer required to provide free services, the hospitals
could instead funnel those funds to subsidize the care given others: the
well-to-do and the insured. As a result, indigent plaintiffs faced a re-
duction of available services. This was the "injury" caused by the new
IRS policy. Like any sensible, middle class person, the plaintiffs were
concerned about the diminution of access. Most of us place substantial
value on access to medical care when we need it. We do not wait for
the moment of medical need to inquire into the availability of services.
If we are middle class and have the financial resources, we spend sub-
stantial funds to provide ourselves and our families with assured access:
It's called medical insurance. If the insurance company were to abro-
gate our policies, we would have standing to sue without waiting for an
actual physical injury to occur, such as a denial of care because of in-
ability to pay. In the private sphere, the protected interest (the depriva-
tion of which confers "standing") is called "contract." But the Simon
plaintiffs were caught in a double bind: They had neither a prototypical
contract nor a prototypical injury.
Simon, then, illustrates a twofold reduction-to-prototype effect. The
charitable provisions of the code were a nonprotypical contract in
which the government provided tax benefits, the charitable donors pro-
vided money, and the hospitals provided care to the indigents who
were the intended beneficiaries. 570 When the IRS abrogated the deal,
the indigent plaintiffs suffered injury to a vital, life or death interest.
To recognize that the middle class policy holder has suffered a cogniza-
ble injury but to deny to indigents standing to challenge their parallel
reliance on the program of public benefits embedded in tax policy is,
simply, to confer a right on the merits in one case and not the other.
The Court didn't see that because, arising in a setting of public bene-
fits, the situation did not fit the private law prototypes.
AlthoughJustices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the majority
in Simon on the standing issue, they too missed the central issue of the
case. They concurred in the judgment because, to them, the case was
not sufficiently ripe or concrete. It was not ripe because the new IRS
ruling did not specify all of the circumstances and factors that would
determine its application to other hospitals. The case was not concrete
because the plaintiffs had not shown that the specific hospitals which
570. If the insurance analogy seems far-fetched consider the response of the Senate
committee that rejected incorporating the new IRS ruling into the tax revisions of 1969.
"The committee deleted from the bill those provisions which would have conformed the code
to the result reached by the 1969 ruling. The committee decided to reexamine this matter in
connection with pending legislation on Medicare and Medicaid." S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2090 (1969). Congress chose between providing insurance directly or doing
so indirectly by creating tax incentives for hospitals to provide services and for donors to
contribute the necessary funds. The tax incentives operated as a form of insurance for the
indigents, assuring hospitals that they would receive funds from third parties to cover the
expenses of providing medical care to the indigent. The charitable provisions of the code
embodied this nonprototypical contract. Indigents were the third party beneficiaries.
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provided their "opportunity and ability" to obtain free care were in the
class of hospitals affected by the ruling.
If this reasoning sounds suspiciously like the majority's causation
analysis, it is because the concurrence applied the same causal source-
path-goal metaphor to a different goal. Justices Brennan and Marshall
were no less constrained by the private rights model than was the ma-
jority. They also missed the public rights thrust of the plaintiffs' case.
The original Revenue Ruling excluded from the definition of "char-
itable" hospitals that did not provide some free care to indigents.5 7'
The new ruling stated explicitly that the promotion of the health of the
community was inherently charitable "even though the class of benefi-
ciaries . . . does not include . . . indigent members of the commu-
nity."' 572 The indigent plaintiffs knew that this policy revision would
surely affect some of them. They sued to protect those victims, whom-
ever they might be. But the Court wanted prototypical sources, identifi-
able victims with identifiable injuries, and prototypical causation. In
applying the source-path-goal metaphor of the private rights model, the
Court wanted the plaintiffs to show a shorter and clearer path and not
the "attenuated line of causation" 573 of a public case.
In the end, all of the members of the Court simply missed the point
because the reductionist analysis of current doctrine prevented them
from seeing the normative question-the merits-that lay behind the
case. Nevertheless, the decision amounted to the adverse normative
determination that both the majority and the concurrence purported to
avoid.
Simon also reveals the distorting results of the ontological effect of
the "standing" metaphor. The Court treated the question of standing
as addressing the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint.574
Standing purports to be a threshold question ofjusticiability; the logic
of the metaphor therefore argues that standing should be judged on
the basis of the pleadings. But the Court did not really do that. It first
argued that the complaint did not establish the requisite causal connec-
tion between the defendant's action and the injury alleged. The Court
then relied on the conflicting "evidence" and rejected the plaintiffs'
case on causation as "purely speculative." 575
Ordinarily, the allegations of a complaint don't "establish" any-
thing; they merely assert what the plaintiff needs and intends to prove
571. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202-03, quoted in Simon, 426 U.S. at 30.
572. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117-18, quoted in Simon, 426 U.S. at 49 n.l.
573. Simon, 426 U.S. at 45 n.25 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973)).
574. See id. at 39. The case actually went to the Court on cross-motions for summary
judgment. The plaintiffs prevailed on their motion in the district court, but the court of ap-
peals considered the case on the merits and reversed. The Supreme Court granted the cross-
petitions for certiorari and ruled on the defendants' petition raising the jurisdictional issues.
Id. at 35-37.
575. Id. at 42; see id. at 39-46.
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at trial.5 7 6 Ordinarily, a defendant's motion for summary judgment is
the procedural device that tests whether the plaintiffs can establish their
factual allegations. 577 But, in a sense, these criticisms are beside the
point: The Court was deliberately ambiguous about whether the fatal
flaw was a problem of pleading or a problem of proof.57 8 The "stand-
ing" metaphor necessarily produces this ambiguity: If causation is part
of the jurisdictional prerequisite of the standing test, causation should
ordinarily be ascertainable from the complaint. To admit otherwise
would throw the whole endeavor into question. If the plaintiffs lost in
Simon because they could not prove that the IRS caused their injuries,
then they lost not because they had no standing but because the IRS
was not responsible for their injuries. Admit that conclusion and one
has admitted that to ask about causation is to ask about something else
entirely: the merits of a private law dispute.
The Court's causation analysis necessarily suggests that, if we ad-
here to the private rights model, the flaw in the plaintiffs' case was on
the merits. The essence of the remedial source-path-goal metaphor is
proof of the causal source-path-goal metaphor: that the defendant's ac-
tions caused the alleged injury.5 79 Consider a familiar tort paradigm.
576. As Justice Brennan has twice argued, the Court has sidestepped entirely the ordi-
nary liberality of pleading (and amendment) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
iti at 55 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 527 n.6, 528 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
577. If the defendants had tested the causation issue by a motion for summary judg-
ment, they would have forced the plaintiffs to come forward with evidence from which a rea-
sonable trier of fact might be able to infer the requisite causation. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 250-251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986).
578. Only in a footnote did the Court acknowledge the relevance of these ordinary pro-
cedural parameters to the decision in Simon. The footnote attempted to distinguish United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where
although. . . "the Court was asked to follow [an] attenuated line of causation,"...
the complaint nevertheless "alleged a specific and perceptible harm" flowing from
the agency action.... Such a complaint withstood a motion to dismiss, although it
might not have survived challenge on a motion for summary judgment.... But in
this case the complaint is insufficient even to survive a motion to dismiss, for it fails
to allege an injury that fairly can be traced to petitioners' challenged action.... Nor
did the affidavits before the District Court at the summary judgment stage supply the
missing link.
Simon, 426 U.S. at 45 n.25 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688, 689 & n.15). Justice Brennan
argued that this "distinction of SCRAP will not 'wash.'" Id. at 62. But he too would have held
that the plaintiffs failed to show "enough" causation at the summaryjudgment stage. See id. at
53.
579. Both before Simon and since, the Court has treated the causation question as the
critical substantive question of a plaintiff's claim of governmental liability for the actions of its
agents. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). Mo-
nell "imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, 'causes' an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
Professor Casebeer has argued that Rizzo, itself a case that mixes standing and the merits,
illustrates doctrinal manipulation in a Realist mode to sustain unidentified conclusions about
the shape of the legal paradigm being imposed:
The opinion... boldly equates the section 1983 language "subjects or causes to be
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A woman is waiting on line to board a bus. She stands at the rear of
one of those aluminum and plexiglass bus shelters that line some cities'
streets. A man holding a plain, wrapped package boards the bus. The
driver negligently takes his foot off the brake. The bus lurches. The
man falls. The package, containing fireworks, hits the ground and ex-
plodes. The bus shelter collapses and injures the woman. If this mod-
em Ms. Palsgra 580 hopes to recover from the bus company, she will at
least have to prove that the shelter collapsed as a result of the explosion
and not as an independent result of defects in its manufacture. If she
wants to recover from the more solvent manufacturer of the shelter,
she will have to show that there were defects in its manufacture-that
is, that a well designed and constructed shelter would have withstood
the fireworks display. If she fails to prove causation in either case, she
loses not because she had no standing but rather because she failed to
establish the elements of the causal source-path-goal metaphor: she had
no case on the merits. The court exists to make this very
determination.
The degree of causation required for liability is the fundamental
question of the suit. In many cases, causation is unproblematic because
the source is clear and the path is short and direct: I accelerate too fast
and my car hits your car. But in many cases the source is remote and the
path is long. Then we have to ask for the proximate cause: "What we do
mean by the word 'proximate' is, that, because of convenience, of pub-
lic policy, of a rough sense ofjustice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace
a series of events beyond a certain point.' ' 81
Problems of multiple, indirect causation are the most difficult for
the source-path-goal metaphor of causation because there are many sources
and criss-crossing paths.58 2 As the causal paths multiply and cross one
another, the prototype of the causal source-path-goal metaphor fails to
subjected" with the causation-in-fact standing requirement for an article III personal
injury without arguing the exclusivity of direct causation for the responsibility of
state actors to private citizens-in other words, on section II A, see II B; on section II
B, see II A.
Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMi L. REv. 379, 401 (1983)(footnote omitted). My point, how-
ever, is that this identification of § 1983 causation with causation in standing doctrine is not
an invention or abuse perpetrated by Justice Rehnquist; it is a consequence of the develop-
ment of standing law from the source-path-goal metaphors of the private rights model. Substi-
tuting the word "is" for "becomes": "[t]he threshold question of who gets into court [is] the
same question as how functionally do constitutional rights of individuals limit the power of
the Sovereign, which [is] the same question as what is appropriate equitable relief for courts
to grant against administration of government." Id. at 399.
580. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
581. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (emphasis ad-
ded). Judge Andrews added: "This is not logic. It is practical politics." Id
582. Suppose the evidence in my bus shelter hypothetical showed both that the bus
driver was negligent and that there were defects in the manufacture and design of the shelter.
To recover from the manufacturer in that case, my modern Ms. Palsgraf would have to show
not just that the defect was a remote "but for" cause of the collapse, but also that it was the
"proximate cause," that it is the causal source which was closer, its causal path shorter.
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provide much structure and we get all the familiar distortions of proxi-
mate cause analysis. One way we try to find our way out of the maze is
to ask whether one of the defendants was at least close enough to see it
coming: Was the injury foreseeable?58 3 Was the victim amongst thefore-
seeable beneficiaries of the duties we expect of the manufacturer?5 4 Or,
we might accept the limits of the source-path-goal schema and make a
naked normative judgment. 58 5 But even if the path were long and the
proof slim, we would not (in the language of Simon) reject "standing"
because the causal connection was "speculative. ' 58 6 The plaintiff
would have "standing" to try to establish the attenuated causal source-
path-goal metaphor and to argue the normative questions regarding the
scope of the duty.
Simon pretermitted the ordinary judicial process by making these
merits determinations on the pleadings as a threshold matter. The
Court simply declined to trace the causalpath. It could just as well have
said any of the things that courts usually say in deciding the merits of
similar tort cases: that the IRS ruling was not the "proximate cause"
because hospital policy determinations independent of the tax conse-
quences may have been the "real" cause of the denial of service; that it
was not "foreseeable" that hospitals would gauge their provision of
free services for indigents in response to changes in tax incentives
(Congress' attempt to influence hospital behavior in just this way,
notwithstanding); that, when the IRS considered restructuring the tax
incentives, it owed no duty to, and was free to ignore the potential ef-
fects on, indigent patients.
If standing law does no more (and no less) for us as a heuristic de-
vice than does proximate cause analysis in tort law, we should be little
surprised. And if it serves merely to recreate the same sets of questions
that we asked in the context of private tort law, neither should we be
surprised at that result. The congruence between standing law and tort
law is as predictable as is the facial characteristics of an individual and
his or her clone. Standing law and tort law share the same animating
genes-that is, the same conceptual schema.
But there is one critical difference. Standing is a threshold issue. It
asks the same questions, but at the beginning of the lawsuit. Proximate
cause cases at least have the benefit of a completed exploration of fac-
tual complexities and a full development of their analytic and norma-
tive consequences. Constitutional standing doctrine, on the other
hand, asks the plaintiff to unravel all of these intricacies-the multiple
sources and the criss-crossing paths-before the record is developed. It
583. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., (1967) 1 App. Cas.
617 (Wagon Mound IH).
584. See, e.g., Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 341-42, 162 N.E. at 99 (majority opinion).
585. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kinsman
I/); In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman 1).
586. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976).
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is no wonder that the Court seems consistently to require prototypical
injury and prototypical causation: That's all one could possibly see at
that point. And, it is no wonder that this truncated process produces
unsatisfactory opinions and bad decisions.
Standing law and tort law also share the same individualistic entail-
ments of the causal source-path-goal metaphor. Consider the Palsg-raf par-
adigm. The same conceptualizations that separate current standing law
and the older public rights model also divide Judge Cardozo's opinion
for the majority from Judge Andrews's dissent. Judge Cardozo argued
that Ms. Palsgraf could not recover because she had suffered no legal
wrong (no source).587 Judge Andrews's normative approach was more
catholic:
Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent
whether we strike an approaching car or miss it by an inch. The act itself
is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the
radius of danger but to all who might have been there-a wrong to the
public at large.58 8
Judge Andrews did not insist on a source-path-goal metaphor that person-
alized the issue. He took a regulatory approach that understood the
basic unity of the community's interest: Negligent conduct endangers
many different parts of the whole; it is "a wrong to the public at large"
regardless of which individual part is injured. This schism between the
individualistic, "personal" approach to rights and the regulatory, com-
munal sense of law persists in current standing law.
Standing law reflects the features of tort law because, like the clone,
it is an unmediated outgrowth of the original. As we have seen, stand-
ing law developed directly from the private rights model. Standing
doctrine merely teased out the essence of the equity version of that
model.58 9 Thus distilled, it crystallized that essence as constitutional
precipitates consisting of the same elements. The result is therefore
the same. Only the discourse is different, and obfuscatory.
VI. RECONSTITUTING STANDING
Before it can adopt a positive voice, freedom requires an effort at
disalienation. 590
587. "The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Palsgraf 248 N.Y. at 342, 162 N.E. at
100.
588. Palsgraf 248 N.Y. at 349, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting)(emphasis
added).
589. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908) (equity intervenes only for the
protection of property: citing Davis and Dobbins); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241
(1904) (equity intervenes only for the protection of property: injuction of ongoing criminal
proceeding); Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 218 (1903) (equity inter-
venes only for the protection of property); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 583-84 (1895) (equity
available to protect government property in the mail).
590. F. FANON, BLAcK SKIN, WHrrE MASKS 231 (C.L. Markmann trans. 1967).
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What would reconceptualized models of standing look like? What
attitudes should shape participation in a legal system not dominated by
the current metaphor? I suggest that, if we are to reconstitute standing
doctrine in the public law context, we should choose rules that are
reconstitutive rather than alienating. We could start with five
propositions.
First, the Framers did not write a Constitution for, and did not envi-
sion a society consisting of, "a collection of portable little spheres of
interest in which you and I and [others] plunge about like swimmers in
so many diving bells." 59 1 Their society was not organized that way;
modern society isn't either. Each of us lives within interactive webs of
interests. Each of us belongs to numerous communities: the part-whole
configurations that, like concentric rings, comprise the varying relation-
ships of our lives: We are husbands and wives, parents and children,
employers and employees, professionals and clients, as well as mem-
bers of extended families, unions, professional organizations, political
parties, and other citizenship groups.
Second, we ordinarily expect those who share our interests and our
trust-whether intimate, professional, or political-to speak up for us.
We feel betrayed when our family, friends, or professional colleagues
do not stand up for us. The political premise of our democracy is that
it is representative in character.592 This communitarian assumption is no
less characteristic of our practice ofjudicial review, in which the Court
decides rules and principles that govern us all and not just the litigants
before it.593 That universality is one reason for the continued validity
591. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 369 (1974)
(discussing standing in the context of the fourth amendment).
My ... question is whether the amendment should be viewed as a collection of pro-
tections of atomistic spheres of interest of individual citizens or as a regulation of
governmental conduct.... Plainly, the Supreme Court is operating on the atomistic
view, [which] is the premise upon which "standing" to invoke the exclusionary rule
has been demanded, the premise upon which the Court has said that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."
But ... the fourth amendment speaks of "[t]he right of the people," ... as in "We
the People" or-since ... the amendment's purpose may be squarely to control the
police-as in "Power to the People"?
Id at 367 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (citations omitted)).
This atomistic focus is not inherent in any particular constitutional clause or conception, but
rather in the adherence to the private rights model that dominates modern legal thought.
The tension between an atomistic or regulatory focus is a basic dichotomy of social thought
and organization.
592. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing republican form of government).
593. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Attorney General Meese's comments that the Court's authority to
interpret the Constitution is limited to decision of the specific dispute before it and is binding
only on the litigants caused an uproar because we see the Court's role as normative and com-
munal, and not just as about resolving disputes between individuals. Meese Says Rulings by U.S.
High Court Don't Establish Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 6; Washington Talk: Meese
and the Storm Over the Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A20, col. 3. Within the internal logic
of the private rights model, there is something to Meese's point; but the paradigm itself fails
to capture the fullness of the adjudicatory process.
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of de Tocqueville's classic observation: "Scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later, into a
judicial question. '594
Third, society establishes rights in order to protect particular inter-
ests through the medium of laws. The prototypical right is effectuated
by a remedial scheme that involves coercive judicial remedies obtained
by the injured individual. But not all rights fit a single mold. Some-
times the interests that society chooses to protect are shared by a com-
munity. Sometimes the correlative enforcement mechanism relies on
the normative sanctions that can be brought to bear upon the wrong-
doer, such as impeachment, political defeat, or public opprobrium. But
all of these normative sanctions depend on access to some public fo-
rum. Public rights require a public forum, even if only to require the
court to be sure that other kinds of remedies are available and
appropriate. 595
Fourth, the problems that arise from representation are only instru-
mental-that is, only practical problems. Standing law, premised as it is
on individualism, posits otherwise, that there is a fundamental, norma-
tive requirement that rights are personal in nature. But there is noth-
ing inherently wrong with allowing A to represent the interests of B.
To the contrary, there are occasions when such representation is desir-
able or necessary. There are risks to representation, to be sure: The
representative may act against or in ways inimical to the represented
party's real interests. Accordingly, we make choices or impose limits.
We weigh the instrumental benefits as well as the costs. We require
representation at certain times 596 and prohibit it at others.59 7 We im-
pose fiduciary obligations or carve structural limitations.598 But these
are instrumental considerations that present choices to be made, not
594. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1835).
595. For example, it is common in English libel actions that the jury awards the plaintiff
only nominal damages. The real sanction is the normative judgment of the community, which
can only be obtained after a full airing of the facts before the jury.
596. The appointment of guardians ad litem, executors for estates of the deceased, or
administrators for estates of the bankrupt exemplify instances in which the legal system re-
quires representation by those without personal interest. The legal system also allows a peti-
tion for habeas corpus brought by a "next friend." See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bryant v.
Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921). The "next friend," however, must establish a rea-
son for the representation, such as mental incapacity of the detained person. E.g., id at 917
("the application must set forth facts, which will satisfy the court that the interest of the next
friend is appropriate, and that there is good reason why the detained person does not him-
self" apply for relief); see also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1976) (mother has
"standing" only if petitioner is incompetent to seek relief on his own); cf. Rees v. Peyton, 384
U.S. 312 (1966) (court bears ultimate responsibility to decide question of the defendant's
mental competence to withdraw petition when counsel seeks to proceed).
597. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (judgment cannot bind absent third
parties when their interests were not adequately represented).
598. Id. The class action device, with its attendant restrictions, provides the best exam-
ple of pragmatic legal rules designed to protect the interests of absent third parties. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.
1480 [Vol. 40:1371
moral evils pretermitted by a priori philosophic or constitutional
limitations.
Fifth, any particular regime governing participation imposes institu-
tional costs and benefits. The current standing regime obfuscates the
actual costs and exaggerates the benefits. 599 The institutional con-
straints that we should treat as embodied in a "case or controversy"
notion are implicated much more rarely than is suggested by current
doctrine. This argument involves two elements: (1) that courts are bet-
ter suited, more necessary, and more frequently employed as fora for
debate over and enforcement of societal norms than the prevailing
constitutional wisdom suggests; and (2) that the threat to democratic
values stems from the loss of democratic control over decisions about
access to and involvement in that judicial process as much as from the
courts' normative work. Current standing law obfuscates the instru-
mental value of the rule of law in a functioning democratic system and
the imperialism of an unaccountable judiciary that acts as both lawgiver
and gatekeeper. 600
I explore these principles in the four subsections that follow. In the
first, I explore, in the context of recent cases, the ways that the Court
has had to manipulate its own doctrine in order to permit representa-
tive public litigation inconsistent with its individualistic ideology of
standing. In the second subsection, I explain why a multiplicity of met-
aphors better structures meaningful responses to a multidimensional
reality. I develop the advantages of a system that is not restricted to a
single model or metaphor. I illustrate this point with alternative mod-
els and metaphors that do a betterjob of recognizing rights and provid-
ing meaningful remedies in a society characterized by interdependence.
In the third subsection, I consider how the Court's manipulation of
these metaphors undermines self-governance. In the final subsection, I
suggest how alternative models might better enable us to harmonize
the processes of adjudication with notions of democratic governance.
A. Testing and Transcending the Paradigm
One measure of the individualistic paradigm of modern standing
law is the Court's success in employing this paradigm to police the
599. Professor Brilmayer emphasizes the benefits of autonomy and self-determination
thought to accrue from traditional justiciability doctrine. Brilmayer, supra note 11. For one
critique of Brilmayer's thesis, see Tushnet, supra note 14. In saying that the benefits thought
to accrue from standing doctrine are exaggerated, I do not mean to suggest either that auton-
omy and self-determination are unworthy goals or that standing law fails to reflect them.
Rather, standing law works with a notion of autonomy that is so atomistic and fragmented that
justiciability doctrine creates and reinforces conditions thatprevent meaningful self-determina-
tion. See, e.g., note 648 infra and text accompanying notes 662-664 infra.
600. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308, 309 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (upholding the principle that the Court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine its own jurisdiction simultaneously and asserting that a man may not be a judge in his
own case).
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boundaries of adjudication consistent with society's felt needs. The
Court has found it necessary to distort the paradigm-sometimes be-
yond recognition-in order meaningfully to accommodate societal
needs for adjudication in situations in which individualism simply fails
to capture the more complex dynamics of lived, social experience. This
discussion will demonstrate again that the standing paradigm does not
work. The primary purpose of this discussion, however, is to discover
what is needed to replace it.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,601 one white and
one black person sued under the Federal Fair Housing Act60 2 as "per-
sons aggrieved" by their landlord's refusal to rent to other, nonwhite
applicants. The lower federal courts held that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to sue under the Act.60 3 The Supreme Court reversed. The
majority found standing based on the allegation that the "injury to ex-
isting tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment
complex is the loss of important benefits from interracial associa-
tion."' 60 4 This characterization restructured the issue in individualistic
terms: The plaintiffs suffered a loss ih "the very quality of their daily
lives."' 605 But the Court did not stop there. It also considered the con-
gressional grant of a right to sue on two alternative bases not rooted in
the plaintiffs' special injury. It considered that the scheme created by
the Act relied heavily, if not exclusively, on private attorneys general
for enforcement.60 6 And it quoted SenatorJavits' observation that the
injury of housing discrimination is to "the whole community. '60 7
No part of the Court's rationale fits the paradigm of standing. After
all, the Act prohibited discrimination, not the enforced segregation of
whites. The Court's reformulation emphasized the interests of collat-
eral beneficiaries over those of the persons who were actually discrimi-
nated against, in contrast to its usual treatment of the right to be free of
discrimination as a personal right.608 Moreover, even the personal
right the Court did construct was premised on the benefits of commu-
nity. The Court's opinion moved inexorably, therefore, to the broader
implications of the congressional grant of representational standing to
vindicate the concerns of the community.
Nevertheless, Trafficante's treatment of these issues has remained
characteristic. Constrained by the individualist ideology, the Court has
601. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
602. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982).
603. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal.), aft'd, 446
F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
604. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10.
605. Id. at 211 (quoting Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.,
436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970)).
606. Id. at 210-11.
607. Id. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706).
608. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1972) (individual black may sue for employ-
ment discrimination even when employer hires minorities in numbers proportionate to labor
market).
[Vol. 40:13711482
continued to find novel, "personal," congressionally created rights in
order to solve problematic cases of representative standing. And, at
times, this focus upon personal rights has resulted in anomalous hold-
ings. In a subsequent housing discrimination case, Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman,60 9 the Court held that, of two otherwise similarly situated
surrogates, only the black plaintiff had standing to pursue a claim in-
tended to benefit third parties subject to discrimination.
"Steering" by real estate and rental agents is a common practice of
racial exclusion. Typically, real estate agents lie to black applicants for
apartments or homes in traditionally white neighborhoods, telling them
that an advertised unit is no longer available. The agents then take the
black applicants to see an apartment or a house in a black or transi-
tional neighborhood. To prohibit this practice, section 804(d) of the
Act makes it illegal "[t]o represent to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available...
when such dwelling is in fact so available .... ,6 10 But genuine housing
applicants who are victims of this practice rarely know when they have
been lied to. Accordingly, the only meaningful way to enforce the Act
is to employ surrogate "testers": people who pose as renters or pur-
chasers. White and black testers separately answer an advertisement
for the same apartment or home in a white neighborhood. If the black
is told that the unit has already been sold or rented and the white is
shown the unit, then a violation of the Act has been proved. But, be-
cause neither of the testers has an actual interest in the unit, there is a
question whether either has standing. That is, neither has suffered an
injury-in-fact.
In Havens Realty, the Court upheld the standing of the black tester
but denied standing to the white tester.611 The Court started from the
premise that Congress has the power to extend standing "to the full
limits of Art. III" '612 and that, if Congress does so, "the courts ... lack
the authority to create prudential barriers .... -613 Accordingly, "the
Art. III minima of injury in fact" was "the sole requirement for stand-
ing."' 614 The Court found that injury in the deprivation of the "en-
forceable right to truthful information" created by section 804(d).615
Thus, only the black tester had standing because only he had been
given false information. 6 16 Yet the white tester had the same relation-
ship to the case and the same purely representational relationship to
the real beneficiaries of the statute (seekers of housing who encounter
609. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
610. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1982).
611. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-75.
612. Id at 372 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9
(1979)).
613. Id at 372.
614. Id
615. Id at 373.
616. Id. at 374-75.
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discrimination) as did the black tester. The black and the white tester
were as alike as two peas in a representational pod, but the Court man-
aged to discriminate between them nevertheless.
Singleton v. Wulff6 17 even better illustrates the Court's continuing
struggle with the notion of group rights in the context of an individual-
ist ideology. In Singleton, doctors challenged the statutory exclusion of
most abortions from coverage under Medicaid. 618 A unanimous Court
agreed that the doctors had standing because they had suffered injury-
in-fact when they were denied the only source of compensation for
medical services performed for indigents.6 19 The Court split, however,
on the question ofjus tertii: whether the doctors could raise their pa-
tients' constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Justice Blackmun's
plurality opinion upheld third-party standing. 620 The plurality relied
on purely instrumentalist considerations that made representation nec-
essary and reliable. First, it noted the inextricable connection between
the third party's enjoyment of her right and the course of conduct that
the doctor-litigant sought to pursue, 621 the confidential622 and inti-
mate623 nature of the doctor/patient relationship, and the resulting fact
that the doctors were "fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of
the right as the" patient.624 Second, the plurality considered the practi-
cal obstacles to the woman's assertion of her own rights, including the
loss of privacy entailed in a decision to litigate the abortion claim pub-
licly and the imminent mootness of her claim.6 25
But, writing for the dissenters, Justice Powell argued that the plural-
ity had inverted "the Court's previous position that the relationship be-
tween litigant and rightholder was subordinate in importance to 'the
impact of the litigation on the third-party interests.' "626 In his view,
the Court's prior decisions demanded greater practical impediments to
justify third-party standing; he also argued that the plurality had over-
stated the obstacles to the indigent women's assertion of their own
rights.627 The problem of potential mootness was refuted by the "ca-
617. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
618. In Singleton, the Court declined to reach the question of the constitutionality of this
exclusion because the issue had not been pressed or passed on below. Id. at 119-20. Subse-
quently, the Court upheld similar federal legislation excluding nontherapeutic abortion serv-
ices from coverage under Medicaid. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
619. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113. See also id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 122
(Powell, J., Burger, CJ., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part).
620. Id. at 118. Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's analysis only to the extent
that the doctors otherwise had standing because their pecuniary interests were at stake and
that they were asserting their own constitutional rights. Id. at 121-22.
621. Id. at 114-15 (plurality opinion).
622. Id. at 115 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
623. Id. at 117.
624. Id. at 115.
625. Id. at 117.
626. Id. at 128 n.5 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445
(1972)).
627. Id. at 125-27.
1484 [Vol. 40:1371
pable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine exemplified by Roe v.
l Vade. 628 The ability of the litigant to sue under a pseudonym mooted
the privacy point.6 29 Justice Powell therefore accounted for the inver-
sion as a concession of the weakness of the plurality's instrumentalist
arguments for third-party standing. Moreover, because he saw the
question as only instrumental, Justice Powell argued that the nature of
the relationship was only a secondary safeguard to assure adequate rep-
resentation. 630 According to Justice Powell's view, representation was
adequate only when the state directly interfered with the doctor/patient
relationship, as when it criminalized the underlying medical procedure.
Here, in contrast, "nothing more [wa]s at stake than remuneration for
professional services."163 1
Despite the fact that the plurality retained the instrumentalist focus
on adequate representation, Singleton is significant far beyond the re-
finements of doctrine that seem to separate the plurality from the dis-
senters. Singleton's treatment of the relative importance of the nature of
the relationship and of the difficulty of the obstacles, and its inversion
of the criteria, suggest the possibility of two fundamental shifts in the
ideology of standing.63 2
First, reliance on the instrumentalist necessity of representation as the
only justification for third-party standing gives way to a concept of
shared interests or relational standing. This is the true import of the plu-
rality's discussion of the confidential and intimate nature of the rela-
tionship. The doctor/patient relationship-particularly with respect to
a highly personal decision like contraception or abortion "in which the
physician is intimately involved" 63 3-is a paradigmatic relationship of
trust. In this relationship of reliance and vulnerability, social mores al-
ready impose-or, at least, expect-duties of confidentiality, loyalty,
and fiduciary obligation. This special relationship makes Singleton the
easy case compared to those of self-appointed contraception advo-
cates634 or buyers and sellers of real property63 5 relied upon by both
the plurality and the dissent. In contrast, the dissent's blighted vision
saw only an extension from one form of third-party self-interest (avoid-
628. Id. at 117 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973));
see zd at 126 (Justice Powell's discussion of plurality's statement).
629. See id. at 126. Justice Powell did not discuss the imperfect anonymity of pseudony-
mous litigation that might require the plaintiff to be available for deposition or to appear in
court to testify.
630. See id. at 128 n.5.
631. Id at 129. As he had in his opinion for the Court in Simon, Justice Powell ignored
the obvious relationship between ability to pay and access to medical services in our economic
system. See notes 567-570 supra and accompanying text.
632. Justice Powell argued that the plurality opinion "appears to have articulated a new
rule ot third-party standing" that "will be difficult to cabin." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 130 n.7.
633. Ide at 117; see also id at 115 (discussing the confidential relationship between a doc-
tor and married patients whom the doctor had advised on matters of birth control in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
634. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
635. Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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ance of criminal sanction) to another, weaker form (mere pecuniary
gain); from a direct prohibition on the relationship, to a mere economic
inconvenience. 636
Second, Singleton suggests a fundamental shift away from an under-
standing of representation as a grudging exception to an appreciation
of its ubiquity. Contrary to Justice Powell's critique, Justice Blackmun's
plurality opinion openly acknowledged the pliability of the "obstacles"
to the women's own pursuit of their cases. It even suggested another
available exception to mootness (in addition to the example of Roe v.
Wade): "a class... whose fluid membership always included some wo-
men with live claims."' 637 To the plurality, these arguments counseled
in favor, rather than against, third-party standing because both doc-
trines already implied the acceptability and normalcy of third-party rep-
resentation: "[I]f the assertion of the right is to be 'representative' to
such an extent anyway, there seems little loss .... ",638
The Court continued this debate four years later in United States Pa-
role Commission v. Geraghty639 and Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Roper.64° In these cases, plaintiffs who had failed to obtain class certifi-
cation continued to pursue their cases even after their individual claims
were resolved. In Geraghty, the named plaintiff's case was moot by the
time an appeal from final judgment could test the class issue.641 In
Roper, the named plaintiffs' individual claims had been subject to an
offer of judgment for the full amount. The district court entered judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs, who nevertheless appealed the denial of
class certification.642
In each case, while the majority opinion talked in terms of proce-
dural doctrines such as finality of judgments,643 relation back,644 and
the doctrine of mootness-avoidance known as "capable of repetition yet
636. My colleague Michael Fischl has emphasized to me the power of this judicial focus
on self-interest to obscure the relevance of the altruistic motives of the litigants, and its persis-
tence. See Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Contract Imagery and Protected Activities Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (forthcoming) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
637. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117.
638. Id at 117-18.
639. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
640. 445 U.S. 326 (1980). The lineup in Geraghty was the same as in Singleton, except that
Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. The Court was fragmented in
Roper. Seven Justices concurred in the judgment. Justice Blackmun thought Roper was con-
trolled by Geraghty. Id. at 344. Justice Rehnquist concurred on the ground that the two cases
were distinguishable, but that Roper followed from the Court's previous, if "muddled and
inconsistent" cases. Id. at 341; see id. at 340. ("If I were writing on a clean slate, I might well
resolve both these cases against the respondents."). Justice Stevens' position is discussed in
the text accompanying note 671 infra.
641. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 394. Geraghty challenged the Parole Commission guidelines.
By the time of his appeal, however, he had served his entire sentence and was released.
642. Roper, 445 U.S. at 329-31. Roper was a consumer action against a bank for credit
card interest overcharges, brought pursuant to the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99
(1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
643. Roper, 445 U.S. at 332-35.
644. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398, 406 n.1 1.
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evading review,"''645 the dissent found no "case or controversy." But
the majority clearly stumbled on the article III issue. It recounted the
individualist dogma of standing and struggled to fit the case to that
mold: "The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution are
sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-interested
parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.1'646 In both Geraghty
and Roper, the Court could avoid dissonance only by using the Traf-
ficante sleight of hand. That is, the Court found that Congress had cre-
ated a personal right to obtain class status, to be invoked by the
putative class representative, when it passed Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 647 Once that right was recognized, the in-
jury-in-fact and personal stake conundra could be solved: "The pro-
posed representative retains a 'personal stake' in obtaining class
certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not
undermined."648
This "personal stake" in serving as a class representative is a fiction
just as great as those invented by the Court in Trafficante and Havens
Realty. The plaintiffs and putative class representatives in both Geraghty
and Roper had exhausted all of their self-interest.649 As in Trafficante or
Havens Realty, the plaintiffs were acting, not for themselves, but for
645. Id at 398.
646. l at 403 (emphasis added).
647. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
648. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404; see also Roper 445 U.S. at 331-32 (characterizing "the pri-
vate interest of the named plaintiffs" as including the "right ... to employ in appropriate
circumstances the procedural device of a Rule 23 class action to pursue their individual
claims.")
It may well be the case that the Court's willingness to stretch standing doctrine in Geraghty
and Roper was the result of two intensely pragmatic concerns. It had held that the denial of
class certification is a nonappealable, interlocutory order. Yet it understood that mootness, as
in Geraghty, or an offer ofjudgment, as in Roper, could forever insulate from appellate review
an erroneous denial of class certification by a trial court. The nonappealability of a denial of
class certification and the vulnerability of the plaintiff to strategic actions by the defendant,
moreover, created opportunities for abuse by defendants in class action cases.
The problem with standing law, however, is that it prevents the Court from openly en-
gaging in precisely such an instrumentalist calculus. The Court must instead create new, sur-
realistic, "personal" rights. And, of course, the continued treatment of altruistic litigation
behavior as impermissible has real world consequences in other cases. Thus, in Hewitt v.
Helms, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2672 (1987), the Court reversed a grant of attorneys fees under
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1983), to a litigant
who had not achieved the relief he sought for himself, even though he obtained substantial
benefits for others in establishing state law due process procedures before confinement to
administrative segregation. The Court reasoned that he was not a "prevailing plaintiff"
under the statute. d at 2674. The legislative history is clear, however, that the purpose of
the statute was not just to reward successful, self-interested litigants, but to encourage "pri-
vate attorneys general." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 3 (1976); see also H.R. REP.
No. 1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 6-7 (1976).
649. "The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to respondent that may be re-
dressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question." Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 420 (footnote omitted) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell also rejected the majority's characterization of the procedural "right" to certifi-
cation as a personal one. He argued that Congress had no power under article III to confer
jurisdiction in the absence of standing. Id. at 421.
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other, absent victims of the primary illegality. But the reformulated
"personal stake" of the representative was an even greater fiction in
Geraghty and Roper. For the Court derived the "personal right" to serve
as a class representative not from a substantive statute like the Fair
Housing Act, but from Rule 23, a procedural rule. And, that "personal
right" was ephemeral in the extreme: Everyone agreed that once the
appeal had been taken and the class certified, the "proposed class rep-
resentative" would be dismissed on typicality grounds.650
To defend its treatment of justiciability under article III, the Ger-
aghty majority abandoned any notion of formal restraint, such as that
usually ascribed to standing. Instead, it characterized justiciability doc-
trine as "flexible," 651 "uncertain and shifting," 65 2 "riddled with excep-
tions,"' 65 3 and highly pragmatic. 654 Indeed, the Geraghty majority
conceded partial, conceptual defeat:
The dissent is correct that once exceptions are made to the formalistic
interpretation of Art. III, principled distinctions and bright lines be-
come more difficult to draw. We do not attempt to predict how far
down the road the Court eventually will go toward premising jurisdic-
tion "upon the bare existence of a sharply presented issue in a concrete
and vigorously argued case." 65 5
Thus, cases like Geraghty do not fit the doctrinal categories of standing
and the presumed exclusivity of the private rights model. These cases
test the paradigm and find it wanting. To make the model meet soci-
ety's needs, the Court is forced to indulge in fictions.
So what? If the Court can do it all the same, what does it matter? It
matters. It matters because the use of fictions produces a body of case
law that is thrice removed from reality. First, the Court ascribes to
Congress the creation of "rights" that, doubtless, Congress never con-
sidered. The doctrine produces a series of anomalies, not the least of
which is that Congress has the power to create rights exactly where the
Framers did not. Thus, cases like Trafficante, Havens Realty, and Geraghty
recognize new rights, "the invasion of which creates standing"; 65 6 yet
the Court rejects precisely that syllogism in cases like Valley Forge,65 7
650. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399-400 (majority opinion).
651. Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
652. Id. at 402.
653. Id. at 406 n.l1.
654. Id. The discussion of article III in Roper was less intensive and more murky than
that in Geraghty. In Roper, the Court noted that the only self-interest asserted by the plaintiffs
was "their desire to shift to successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses that
have been incurred in this litigation .... " Roper, 445 U.S. at 334 n.6. The nineteenth century
Massachusetts court in Wellington rationalized, with a similar argument, its petitioner's pursuit
of mandamus relief absent a personalized stake different than that of the public at large. In re
Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 67, 105-06 (1834); see notes 307-314 supra and accompanying
text.
655. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 406 n. 11 (quoting the dissent, id. at 421).
656. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
657. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982). See notes 547-558 supra and accompanying text.
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Schlesinger,658 and Richardson.659
Second, it matters if the Court uses fictions to avoid existing stand-
ing doctrine because such fictions focus the rhetoric and, consequently,
the Court's attention on the wrong people and the wrong things. That
is, our ingenuity is engaged in finding "rights" granted to third-party
surrogates when we should be concentrating on the problems of the
real victims of the prohibited practice. We inevitably undervalue the
suffering of these victims and, as a result, are less able adequately to
respond to that suffering.660 For example, focusing on the black tes-
ter's personal right to truthful information, rather than on his or her
capacity as representative of the actual victims, limits the remedies
available in a tester's suit to those coextensive with the newly-defined
"right." Thus, damages will be available to remedy the provision of
false information. But, under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 66 1 the tester
will not have standing to obtain an injunction against the practice.
In Lyons, the Court held that Adolph Lyons, a victim of a police
chokehold, could seek only personal damages. The Court held that he
did not have standing to enjoin the practice because, in its view, it was
speculative that Mr. Lyons would again be subjected to the chokehold.
But if the Court viewed the tester-or Adolph Lyons-as representative
of the legal interests of absent victims, then these plaintiffs' "standing"
to obtain injunctive relief on behalf of the absent victims would follow
logically. Once again, the putatively jurisdictional question of "stand-
ing" is in fact several questions: Who has rights? What are they? And
how can they best be effectuated?
Third, standing law distorts the very issues and values that it pur-
ports to vindicate. Standing law is frequently defended as assuring ade-
quate representation to insure vigorous advocacy or protecting the
autonomy and self-determination of the interested parties. 662 In many
cases, however, standing law does just the opposite. In Burstyn v. Miami
Beach,663 several plaintiffs joined in a suit challenging a local zoning
ordinance that limited the number of Adult Congregate Living Facili-
ties ("ACLFs"), community-based alternatives to nursing homes or
658. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974). See
notes 523-535 supra and accompanying text.
659. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 204 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In
dissent in Richardson,Justice Stewart analogized the statement and account clause of the Con-
stitution to the Freedom of Information Act and argued that the constitutional clause gave to
each citizen a right to receive public information regarding appropriations. Accordingly,
standing existed by virtue of the denial of this specific, personal right.
660. For an excellent exposition of this argument, see Randall Kennedy, Race Relations
Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1660-
61 (1986).
661. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Lyons-like Havens Realty and Trafficante-was not brought as a
class action.
662. See Brilmayer, supra note 11.
663. No. 84-515 Civ-King (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 1985) (considering plaintiffs' standing). A
favorable decision on the merits of the exclusionary zoning claim was rendered on June 12,
1987. Burstyn v. Miami Beach, No. 84-515 Civ. (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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hospital care for elderly persons. The plaintiffs claimed that there were
many more elderly persons than there were facilities to serve their
needs. The case focused on two buildings that the owners wanted to
convert to ACLFs. The plaintiffs included the state ombudsman coun-
cil, two senior citizen groups, and one notorious ACLF proprietor who
had been cited numerous times for abuses and violations by various
state agencies. The district court held that only the proprietor had
standing. The district court faithfully tracked the Court's holding in
Warth v. Seldin,664 a case concerning a racial challenge to exclusionary
zoning practices.
The significance of cases like Trafficante, Singleton, and Geraghty is not
that they test the individualist paradigm of standing, but that they tran-
scend it. These cases covertly reestablish the part-whole and link sche-
mata that typified the public rights model. Trafficante concerned the
legal recognition of interests in community; Singleton concerned rela-
tional interests; Geraghty concerned the instrumental value of
representation.
Each of these cases can be better reconstructed in terms of one of
the historical public rights models. Trafficante and Havens Realty, for ex-
ample, become simple cases of representative, private attorney general
standing, with congressional authorization to sue applied to all persons
with relevant information. These cases become no more difficult than
Adams, qui tam v. Woods,665 in which Congress authorized informers'
suits against slave traders. Geraghty and Lyons become no more difficult
than County Commissioners v. People ex rel. Metz 66 6 or Union Pacific Railroad
v. Hall,66 7 in which the courts held that members of the public could
sue in mandamus when "the duty they seek to enforce by the writ is a
duty to the public generally. '668
The public rights approach was referred to in Singleton,669 hinted at
(but not relied on) in Geraghty,670 and all but adopted injustice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Roper. He put it plainly: "[T]he absent members
of the class should be considered parties to the case or controversy
."671 In each of these cases-Traficante, Havens Realty, Geraghty, and
664. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Burstyn, the court also cited and relied on Lyons and Valley
Forge.
665. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805); see notes 201-202 supra and accompanying text.
666. 11 111. 202 (1849); see notes 157-162 supra and accompanying text.
667. 91 U.S. 343 (1875); see notes 169-173 supra and accompanying text.
668. Hall, 91 U.S. at 354.
669. In Singleton, Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion noted that one way to avoid the
problem of mootness was the certification of "a class . . . whose fluid membership always
included some women with live claims." 428 U.S. at 117.
670. "It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines is
still a 'live' one between petitioners and at least some members of the class respondent seeks
to represent." Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 396 (majority opinion).
671. Roper, 445 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 344 ("[I]n this case, as
in Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate representatives of the class at
least for that limited purpose."(footnote omitted)).
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Lyons-the real plaintiffs were the members of some absent group.
The area in which the courts have come closest to achieving this
reconstituted public rights model is the one in which the communal
stakes are most obvious: the environmental cases. This is the answer
to the particularization conundrum raised in the introduction. It is not
that some rights are "personal" and others "group" rights. Rather, it is
that the courts can most easily see the widely shared "personal" stake
in fresh air,6 72 clean parks, 6 73 and unspoiled wilderness areas 67 4 be-
cause these are things we experience directly as individuals even as we
share them in common with society.
In all of these cases, there is a "case or controversy" because there
is a real, adversary issue presented in a concrete factual setting turning
on questions of law. In each case, the nominal plaintiff was in fact act-
ing for the group in a representative capacity without regard to his or
her self-interest. Justice Blackmun's observation in Singleton concerning
the normalcy of such representation is equally apt here: Since the as-
sertion of rights is so often representative in our system "there seems
[to be] little loss . . . . 675 There may, in fact, be substantial gain.
B. Meaning and Multiplicity of Metaphors
We have seen how metaphors and models are central to human cog-
672. The Clean Air Act provides that "any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf... against any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of... an emission
standard or limitation under this chapter .. " 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982). The D.C. Circuit
held that this statute is a grant of citizen standing, without any requirement of injury-in-fact.
Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The Second Circuit disagreed. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.
1977). Federal Courts casebooks commonly ask readers, as a challenging question, whether
the apparent grant of standing without reference to injury-in-fact under the Clean Air Act is
constitutional. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WESCHLER, supra note 21, at
183; D. CURRIE, supra note 21 53-54.
673. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973).
674. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (Scenic Hudson 1) (Hays, J.). cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); but see
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Broadcast licensing, as well as environmental protection, is also a prototype in which the
communal interest is salient. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940). The commonality of the air waves and the centrality of the media in American
society may explain the salience of the communal stake in broadcast regulation. Woody Allen
recently presented testimony to the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in support of a bill that would recognize the moral rights of artists in
their work (in response to the recent "colorization" of classic black and white films). Mr.
Allen connected the communal value of art in culture with a "standingless" public rights
model of enforcement, arguing that the legal system should protect the works of "people who
contribute to the society by doing creative work" and that "this principle can be argued justly
by any citizen"; the legal protection need not be invoked by "a directly involved artist." Legal
Issues That Arise W1hen Color is Added to Films Originally Produced, Sold, and Distributed in Black and
White: Hearing 100-391 Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1987) (statement of Woody Allen), re-
printed in Allen, True Colors, THE N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1987, at 38.
675. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18.
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nitive processes and how they operate to structure thought.676 We have
seen, as well, how they sometimes disorder our legal thinking in sur-
prising ways. 67 7 In this section, we consider again the role of metaphor
in language and thought in order to further the project of reconstruc-
tion. We will examine three important aspects of the operation of met-
aphor in thought. We will explore why it is always necessary to employ
multiple metaphors to establish meaning, describe the variety of types
of metaphor, and inspect the connection between purpose and
metaphor.678
Suppose that we are standing by the ocean on a windless day. We
might describe the sea as calm or flat. If it were a windy day, we might
remark on the whitecaps or say that the sea was hoary or that the waves
were rushing toward the shore. Each of these descriptions employs
metaphor, although some so common we no longer perceive them as
such. Each metaphor tells us something about the ocean. At the same
time, each metaphor is partial and incomplete; it hides or negates other
truths about the ocean. Even when a particular metaphor may be ap-
propriate, it nevertheless hides other important aspects of the sea. The
waves may appear to rush toward the shore and may, as any surfer
knows, propel objects in that direction. But we also know-as we watch
a discarded paper cup bob in place-that the water actually moves in
place in a circular motion. The surface of the sea may appear flat, but
beneath the surface is a reality of valleys, ridges, trenches, and the like.
While the surface may appear calm, there also may be a deadly current
underneath. We would use another metaphor to describe that part of
the sea's reality: We call it the undertow-as if some underwater tug had
fastened a tow line about our ankles with which to drag us out to sea.
We experience reality like the ocean. We structure our perception
of it by means of metaphors, models, concepts, and categories. Each
metaphor takes a slice of reality and compares that cross section with
some aspect of our physical experience. These basic orientationa
679
and ontological metaphors680 are then combined and recombined to
676. See notes 61-103 supra and accompanying text.
677. See notes 499-675 supra and accompanying text. Milner Ball's discussion of the law
also uses the methodology of metaphor suggested by the work of Lakoff and Johnson. See
generally, M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985).
678. I draw heavily upon G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, which persuasively
documents the overwhelmingly metaphoric nature of our language and thought.
679. Id. at 14-21. Orientational metaphors arise from schemata premised on basic kin-
esthetic experience such as up-down. A familiar example of an orientational metaphor in the
legal world is the cry of the losing litigant: "I'll take it up; I'll take it to the highest court in the
land if necessary."
680. Id. at 25-32. Where I grew up we "stood on line"; most of the rest of the country
"stands in line." The latter is a metaphor based on the container schema: We conceptualize
the line as a container holding the people, who are "in" it. The former employs the source-path-
goal schema and an object metaphor: We conceptualize the line of people in terms of the path
beneath them and the goal in front of them; they stand on the surface of the object beneath
them. I suspect that it is not accidental that the source-path-goal schema which delineates pur-
pose is the one used by New Yorkers.
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form more descriptive structural metaphors. 681 These in turn are used
to form cognitive models or concepts. 68 2 We use multiple metaphors-
repeated cross sections or multiple snapshots-in order to capture
more of what we experience and construct a more useful picture of the
reality around us. We construct complex models of various sorts and
use metaphoric extensions to reason about the world. This layering of
metaphors and of models enables us to achieve meaning.
Part of the process of achieving meaning stems from the varieties of
metaphor. The two metaphors invoked above-the ocean isflat and the
ocean is calm-are of differential usefulness in structuring the concept
"Ocean." The first metaphor, premised on the basic, ontological object
metaphor, is of limited usefulness: The ocean can be flat because it has
a surface; it must have a bottom and edges. On the other hand, the
second metaphor-the ocean is calm-is premised on the much richer
personification metaphor. Thus, the ocean can be calm, treacherous,
unforgiving, moody, a demanding mistress, or a stem taskmaster; the
tide can come in and go out.683 Similarly, the sea can have the specific
attributes of personhood of the English working class sailor, as in the
personification metaphor: Davy Jones' locker.
Metaphors based on simple physical concepts-up-down, in-out,
object, substance, etc.-which are as basic as anything in our concep-
tual system and without which we could not function in the world-
could not reason or communicate-are not themselves very rich. To
say that something is viewed as a container object with an in-out orienta-
tion does not say very much about it. But, as ... with the mind is a
machine metaphor and the various personification metaphors, we can
elaborate spatialization metaphors in much more specific terms. This
allows us not only to elaborate a concept (like the mind) in considerable
detail but also to find appropriate means for highlighting some aspects
of it and hiding others. Structural metaphors (such as rational argument
is war) provide the richest source of such elaboration. Structural meta-
phors allow us to do much more than just orient concepts, refer to
them, or quantify them, as we do with simple orientational and onto-
logical metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one highly struc-
tured and clearly delineated concept to structure another.68
4
The more important the concept the more likely that the concept is
structured in terms of many different and richer, structural metaphors.
Lakoff and Johnson identify at least five standard metaphors that our
culture uses to understand and describe the concept "love," 68 5 and at
681. Id. at 61-68.
682. Id at 56-60.
683. The expression, the tide comes in and goes out, also depends upon a metaphor that
conceptualizes the dry land in terms of a container schema. It provides a good illustration of
the way in which different but coherent metaphors are combined to achieve meaning.
684. G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 61 (italics in original).
685. Id at 49. LakoffandJohnson also discuss a nonstandard metaphor-Love is a collab-
orative work of art-that reveals very different dynamics about a love relationship. Id at 139-43.
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least eleven for the concept "idea." 68 6 In the latter case, each of these
structural metaphors is based on one of two more basic ontological
metaphors, ideas are objects or ideas are living organisms. Some examples of
standard metaphors for the concept of "idea" follow.
Ideas (theories) are buildings: The argument is shaky; it needs more sup-
port; these are the building blocks of my theory.
Ideas are food: I can't swallow that metaphor theory; let me chew on it
a while; he spits out ideas.
Ideas are people: That's her brainchild; he breathed new life into that idea.
Ideas are plants: The roots of this theory lie in the work of Sapir and
Whorf; that idea has borne fruit; let me plant this thought.68 7
We establish truth by testing metaphors and their combinations
against our experience for functionality. Truth (or relative objectivity)
is both contingent on our metaphors and provisional on our experi-
ence. Since individual metaphors are inherently limiting, we modify
them, reject them, or supplement them in order to achieve a better,
more effective "fit" in our interaction with "reality." 688
The value of this metaphoric theory of meaning is that it provides
an elegant explanation of some otherwise unaccountable phenomenon.
In the context of the law of standing, this theory can help bring a mea-
sure of coherence to otherwise unanswerable doctrinal difficulties. By
examining the role that the standard cultural metaphors play in shaping
our thinking, we can answer the injury conundrum raised in the intro-
686. Id. at 46-48.
687. Id. at 46-48. Lakoff and Johnson identify seven other metaphors for ideas:
Ideas are products: He has generated a lot of ideas; the idea is a little rough and needs to be
refined.
Ideas are commodities: It's important to package that idea the right way for it to be saleable.
Ideas are resources: I ran out of ideas; let's pool our thoughts.
Ideas are money: He put in his two cents' worth; he's rich in ideas.
Ideas are cutting instruments: That's an incisive thought; she cut his theory to shreds.
Ideas are fashions: Ideas may be chic or out-of-date.
Ideas are light: Arguments and discussions may be transparent or opaque. Id at 47-48.
There are others that are less prevalent in our culture such as-Ideas are a physical force:
That is a powerful idea; that idea really makes it work; and Ideas are (knowledge is) water. The ideas
pour out of him; he thirsts for knowledge.
These structural metaphors are cultural. For example, Knowledge is water is a persistent
biblical metaphor. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 32:2 (Soncino ed.) ("My teachings shall fall as rain, my
speech drip as the dew; as the light rain upon the tender grass and as the showers on the tall
grass"); Proverbs 10:11 (Soncino ed.) ("The mouth of the righteous is a fountain of life."); id.
18:4 ("The words of a man's mouth are as deep waters; flowing brook, a fountain of wis-
dom."). Of course, the ancient Israelites lived in an exceedingly arid climate. Thus, one can
see how their use of this metaphor was conducive to a cultural commitment to education.
688.
[Trruth is relative to understanding, which means there is no absolute standpoint
from which to obtain absolute objective truths about the world. This does not mean
that there are no truths; it means only that truth is relative to our conceptual system,
which is grounded in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other
members of our culture ....
G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 193. For a further discussion on this and on the
related issues of knowledge and objectivity, see G. LAKOFF, supra note 64 at 294-303.
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duction. 68 9 And by examining the relationship between purpose and
the use of multiple models, we can see both why standing law is natu-
rally dysfunctional and how we could begin to reconstruct it.
Two of the related conundra of standing law that we have examined
are the effects of the injury-in-fact analysis and the scope of congres-
sional power to create standing. In Schlesinger,690 the Court struggled
with the notion that a conflict of interest, that is, the threat of a breach of
fiduciary duty, could constitute an injury-in-fact.69 1 The Court sug-
gested that Congress could enact a conflict of interest statute, but that
standing to enforce such a statute would nevertheless have to be pre-
mised on actual injury. 69 2 In Richardson, plaintiffs could not enforce a
constitutional provision granting a right to public information because
no one had suffered specialized injury.6 93 But in Havens Realty, a simi-
lar congressional grant of a right to accurate information did serve as
the basis of standing because the deprivation of that right was the in-
jury-in-fact. 69 4
This conflict between the dicta in Schlesinger, in one case, and be-
tween the holdings in Richardson and Havens Realty, in another, suggests
two problems that only the concept of metaphors and models can ex-
plain. First, why is it that the right to information granted by the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA") 69 5 or the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 69 6 for example, can give rise to standing, while the same
right granted by the statement and account clause cannot? The notion
of "standing" suggests that the answer lies in the metaphor of individu-
alism. The FHA and the FOIA directly address individual persons who
ask for information. 69 7 The statement and account clause, on the other
hand, delineates what Congress may do. The connection between that
689. See notes 44-54 supra and accompanying text.
690. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
691. See notes 524-535 supra and accompanying text.
692. 418 U.S. at 224 & n.14.
693. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
694. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982).
695. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982).
696. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
697. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(c) (1982) ("[a]ny" person making a request to any
agency"); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (making it unlawful "[tlo represent to any person").
The expression of the statutory prescription in individualistic terms is clear in cases like
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979), where the Court focused on the statutory lan-
guage in determining whether to imply a private cause of action from an otherwise regulatory
statute. ld at 689-94. In Cannon, Justice Stevens's majority opinion observed that
this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the
statute explicitly conferred a right on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in
the case .... Put somewhat differently, because the right to be free of discrimination
is a "personal" one, . . . a statute conferring such a right will almost have to be
phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.
Conversely, the Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions
under statutes that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at
large.
Id at 691 n.13.
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clause and the complaining individual is twice derivative: Congress is
accountable to the citizenry at large; the plaintiff is only one of many
indistinguishable citizens.
The FHA and the FOIA organize our perception of the right to in-
formation of the bipolar private rights model and the source-path-goal
schema. The plaintiff is the source of the request, which is a physical
thing he or she makes698 and delivers to the defendant. The remedial
source-path-goal metaphor moves that information from the governmen-
tal source to its goal: the citizen. The imagery of the statement and ac-
count clause, in contrast, is communal, not individualistic. The clause
talks of drawing from the public treasury (as if from the communal well)
and of publishing (from the same root as public) an account. This com-
munal well metaphor does not cohere with the remedial source-path-goal
metaphor of the private rights model. The relationship of the claimant
in Richardson to the process, however, is not different in any meaningful
sense from that of the FOIA plaintiff. It is only that we see the relation-
ship differently.
But, how does this explanation address the injury-in-fact conun-
drum? Why can Congress say that the FHA tester or FOIA plaintiff has
standing to enforce a right to obtain information even if he or she has
by definition suffered no actual injury as a result of the withholding of
that information? If the deprivation of the right is itself the injury-in-
fact, then what of the hypothetical conflict of interest statute mentioned
in Schlesinger or the plaintiffs in Valley Forge? In those cases, the Court
seemed to be saying that real injury-in-fact is an irreducible constitu-
tional requirement for standing, even when there is congressional spec-
ification of a right and authorization to sue to enforce it.
The answer lies in the way we use metaphor to think about informa-
tion. Ideas are conceptualized by means of the ontological metaphor
ideas are objects. In our legal system, the denial of an object that some-
one is entitled to receive is a classic injury: When real physical objects
are involved, denial is a deprivation of property.699 Thus, we perceive
the denial of information as an injury-in-fact. 700 But a conflict of inter-
est is a state, and it is a state that pertains to some person other than
the plaintiff. Because a conflict is not conceptualized via the object meta-
698. The statutory language in the FOIA is: "Any person making a request to any
agency." 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C) (1982)(emphasis added).
699. Many forms of property recognized by the law are really metaphoric extensions of
the physical objects that are prototypical property, which is probably why lawyers refer to land
as real property.
700. The role of the object metaphor in our conceptualization of information explains
why information was seen as a link between the informer and the injured party in the repre-
sentational model of the common law informers' statute. See text accompanying notes 199-
200 supra.
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), revealed a process of
reductive, non-metaphoric reasoning about the concept of injury similar to that in Schlesinger.
Denial of medical care was "injury," but denial of reliable access to care was not. See notes
559-573 supra and accompanying text.
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phor, it is not a thing that can be denied. For a conflict to be actiona-
ble, there must first be a consequential, objective injury.
There is a necessary relationship between variable human purpose
and our ability to fashion and deploy multiple models in order to inter-
act successfully with our environment. For example, there are many
ways to conceptualize the planet we live on; each of these models works
quite well for specific purposes. Thus, the idea that the earth is flat
works perfectly well if I want to navigate from my house to the law
school; a simple, two dimensional model-a road map-will suffice.
But for other purposes, the two dimensional model would be entirely
misleading. Once I estimated the time it would take me to travel from a
small town near Santander to Santiago de Compostela on the north
coast of Spain. I computed the distance on the map and figured the
average speed the bus would make. When I boarded the bus on the
main road, which stretched straight ahead for miles, I was confident
that I would be in Santiago by mid-to-late afternoon. By the time I
arrived at midnight, I wished that I had had a three dimensional or
topographical map that showed how mountainous Galacia is.
I must replace the model the earth isflat (but bumpy) with the model the
earth is a sphere if I plan to circumnavigate the globe. But if I plan to
orbit the planet, I may want to know that it is flattened at the poles and
bulging at the equator; I might also want to know that the essentially
spherical earth has an irregular, nonspherical magnetic field.
In each of these examples, a particular model worked perfectly well
for some purposes but not for others. It is not that pre-Copernican
humans were silly to think the world flat, and that we are smarter be-
cause we know the earth is "really" round. Rather, a workable under-
standing of the planet emerges when we know that we may treat it as
flat for some trips, bumpy for others, and round for yet others. Simi-
larly, it is difficult and dysfunctional to try to capture all the possibilities
and uses of adjudication in a single metaphor or model.
That the single term "law" should cover the Rule against Perpetuities
as well as the result of a controversy under the Commerce Clause is a
prolific source of confusion. It is a great pity that the differences in the
content of the material, the intellectual approach, and the technique of
adjudication between the two types of cases are not indicated at least
by recognizing the broad classification of "private law" and "public
law." 70'
Yet, our legal doctrine uses a single, simple orientational metaphor
("standing")-and a single, related model (the private rights model)-
in its attempt to capture all of the limits and possibilities of the process
of adjudication. Public rights cases simply do not fit into the more lim-
ited private rights model: They are square pegs forced into round
701. Frankfurter, Twenty lems of .Ab. Justice Htolnes" Constututtonal Opinions, 36 HARV. L.
REv. 909, 910 (1923).
1497STANDINGJuly 1988]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1371
holes. Thus, the law of standing seems incoherent much of the time
and, in fact, does not work very well. In contrast, we employ a rich
variety of structural metaphors that inform our understanding and or-
ganize our experience of the functional aspects of the adjudicatory
process.
Litigation is an ordeal: The basic event is a trial, which is usually a
continuous event with a final, determinative end.70 2 The actual experi-
ence of trial is an ordeal for most litigants and lawyers.703
Litigation is combat: Litigators are adversaries; they talk strategy and
make a plan of attack; they go for the jugular. They fight it out in court.
This metaphor derives from the rational argument is war metaphor that is
conventional in our culture.70 4
Litigation is a play: There is much role playing at a trial; all lawyers
want their witnesses to stick to the script. We try to tell a story.70 5
Litigation is a religious ritual706: Judges wear priestly robes; the par-
ticipants have special, even honorific, names; even simple forms of
speaking are ritualized ("Did there come a time that...).707
Litigation is a game 708: There are winners and losers, rules of the game,
prosecution and defense teams.70
9
702. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(emphasis on finality of trial); but compare with Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Inter-
est, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); and Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L
REV. 837 (1984) (discussing the benefits of repeated review).
703. See, e.g., Eisenberg, A Doctor on Trial, N.Y. Times,July 20, 1986, (Magazine) at 26, 28
("I was accustomed to stress in delivery and operating rooms, but my trial was a stress mara-
thon."); Geoghegan, Warren Court Children, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1986, at 17, 19-20 ("To
me, the great surprise was that a trial is ... a physical contest not so unrelated to trials in
primitive times. Through the trial, you are constantly sizing up someone's stamina ....
When lawyers say they are 'on trial,' it is no slip: you are 'on trial,' like the client.").
704. See notes 211-213 supra and accompanying text. One of the more colorful invoca-
tions of this metaphor is the Court's expressed desire to make "the state trial on the merits
the 'main event' so to speak, rather than a 'tryout on the road.'.. ." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 90 (1977). The Court draws on the world of boxing in its reference to "the main event"
and "tryout on the road."
705. See Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of
Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975); M. BALL, supra note 677, at 23 ("A trial is a theatrical
performance in which each side seeks to persuade the judge or jury by means of a play which
passes from fact to metaphor."); see generally J. HUIZINGA, HoMo LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE
PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 76-88 (1950).
706. I invoked a variant-Law is a religion-in the text at note 506 supra. For a discussion
of the persistence of the metaphor of religion in legal scholarship, and its role in the process
ofjudicial review, see Winter, note 19, supra at 692-99.
707. The structure of both the courtroom and the proceeding is designed, like religious
ritual, to reinforce basic social values. For example, the robes and the bench emphasize the
authority of the state; the right to be heard expresses the dignity of the individual. See, e.g., T.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 125-32 (1935); C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES:
PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 123-35 (1970); Tribe, Trial by MIathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-92 (1971). Professor Simon
mounts a critique of the use of this notion of ritual to justify the trial process in The Ideology of
Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIsC. L. REV. 29, 94-101.
708. SeeJ. HUIZINGA, supra note 705.
709. Simon, supra note 707, argues that the game analogy is more apt than is the reli-
gious ritual analogy because games divide the participants into winners and losers and reli-
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Apparently inconsistent metaphors, such as these metaphors about
litigation, are coherent, and therefore work together, when they each
have similar entailments. 7 10 Each of these structural metaphors shares
entailments with the orientational "standing" metaphor: We stand at
religious ceremonies; most of our fighting is upright (as in "stand up
and fight like a man"); the notion of ordeal is often expressed through
this metaphor (as in "if you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen"); and the only people who always remain seated at a play are
the audience. Games commonly have threshold requirements as any-
one who couldn't "ante up" in poker or didn't make the cut for the
varsity squad knows all too well.
There is, however, an important structural metaphor with which
"standing" does not fit: Adjudication is a dialogue. "Dialogue" is from
the Greek dialogos. It is formed from the preposition dia-meaning
through, between, or across 71 '-and the noun logos, which signifies the
universal rationality. 712 The dialogue metaphor does not fit either sense
of "standing": Not only do we usually converse seated, but we usually
welcome participation from anyone with something meaningful to
add.7 13 This metaphor is, therefore, partially submerged in our system.
Although the dialogue metaphor is invoked-whether we argue a mo-
tion, put on witnesses, or introduce physical evidence, we commonly
gious ritual is generally designed to establish and maintain community. Id. at 100 (citing C.
LEvi-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 32 (1966)).
Simon, however, errs on two counts. First, one need only think of excommunication to
conclude that religious ritual may separate as effectively as it conjoins. The truth is that reli-
gion (at least Western religion) is as much about hierarchy and authority as it is about true
community. Consider the biblical story of Korah. The premise of his challenge to Moses was
that "all of the congregation in its entirety is holy and God is in their midst; why do you place
yourselves above the congregation of God?" Numbers 16:3 (Soncino Press 1941). The re-
sponse was that the earth swallowed up these mutineers. Id at 16:31-33. Second, Simon's
assumption that only one analogy is "apt" misses the point that we frequently use more than
one metaphor to capture (and structure) different aspects of a described reality.
710. G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 41-45.
711. The dia prefix is not the same as dyo, which means two and is the source of the
English prefix "di-."
712. 1 choose dialogue because it is so much richer in its connotations of community,
rationality, and cosmology than is the word "conversation."
713. Of course, it is also true that a conversation can be overwhelmed and communica-
tion destroyed if there are too many participants. This objection is projected onto the stand-
ing context in the form of the fear of a flood of litigation if the standing requirements are not
rigidly enforced. The answer, however, is simple and belies the seemingly inescapable logic
of what is, after all, only an instance of metaphoric reasoning and not a description of "real-
ity"-that is, of actual behavior by real world litigants. First, the real world costs of litigation
form a substantial barrier to the profligate use of adjudication. Second, the asserted "flood-
gates" problem is merely a pragmatic one; it can be controlled by a variety of instrumentalist
mechanisms such as attorney fee provisions, Rule I 1 sanctions where appropriate, and other
equitable devices. Third, and most important, legal metonymies may be employed to see that
many viewpoints are represented while still keeping the number of participants down to man-
ageable size.
Many of these devices are already subsumed in Rule 23 governing class actions and other
current practices. The appointment of class representatives, the definition of subclasses, the
participation of intervenors and amici curiae by leave of court all illustrate the conventionality
and manageability of more pluralistic participation in the adjudicatory process.
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refer to the event as a hearing-the dialogue metaphor is more typically
used in descriptions of the appellate process. 714
The coherence of the individualist metaphor of "standing" with the
five structural metaphors for litigation discussed above highlights that
which is ritualized, painful, and disjunctive about the process. To-
gether with the related private rights model, the individualist metaphor
obscures and partially excludes from our legal world several critical as-
pects of our social world. The metaphor recognizes only self-interest
as a motivator of human action; it denies the possibility that we may
care for others and be moved to act upon that concern. It obscures not
just that we are relational beings, but also that we exist in a variety of
different kinds of relations and groups.
A fuller and more functional system would recognize at least five
different group models based on part-whole and link schemata in addi-
tion to the familiar individualist, private rights model of legal contro-
versies premised on the source-path-goal schema.
(1) An aggregative model: This model is exemplified by the class ac-
tion premised on a common question of fact, which prior to the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was referred to as
the "spurious" class action. 715 In these circumstances, the class is re-
ally just an aggregation of individual claims connected by a common
circumstance, such as multiple accident victims in an airplane crash.
(2) - A representational model: This model is altruistic. The individual
may act for other affected individuals because the latter are unable to
act for themselves. The altruism may be partial or pure. The petition
for a writ of habeas corpus brought by the "next friend" of the person
714. See Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts, 79 F.R.D. 165, 171 (1977)
("Oral advocay of this caliber truly makes argument, as Felix Frankfurter observed, 'a socratic
dialogue between the Court and counsel.' "); Board of Students Advisors, Harvard Law
School, INTRODUCTION TO ADVOCACY 136-37 (3d ed. 1985) (describing oral argument as a
"conversation").
A wonderful and rich use of the dialogue metaphor appears in the classic article by Pro-
fessor Aleinikoff and the late Robert Cover. They use the metaphor to characterize federal
habeas corpus as a "federal-state dialogue" in which "an open-ended dialogue can ensue.
The 'dialectical federalism' that emerges from this dialogue becomes the driving force for the
articulation of rights." Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
Yale L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). See also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 6
(1980) ("the principle of Rationality conceives ... dialogue as the foundation of all claims of
right"); M. BALL, supra note 677, at 122 (proposing the metaphor of "law as medium-law as
connecting rather than disconnecting, enhancing a flow of dialogue"); Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1873-77, 1886 (1987) (conceiving "rights
as tools of communal dialogue"). Compare, however, the Court's use of the boxing metaphor
in its development of the doctrine of procedural default in habeas. The boxing metaphor is
not only combative, but also dialogue-ending. Cf E. SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 4 (1985) (Discussing the practice of torture, Scarry notes:
"Prolonged pain does not simply resist language but actually destroys it, bringing about an
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being
makes before language is learned.") The legal implications of Scarry's work are discussed in
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1602-03 (1986).
715. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes to the 1966 Amendment.
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who is incarcerated illustrates the pure model: In contrast, the in-
former's action brought by someone who has information about, but is
unaffected by, an illegal action illustrates the partial model: The in-
former is offered private gain as a consequence of his or her public
service.
(3) A communal model: Individuals may share more than a predica-
ment; they may actually share a community of interest. This rationale
led to the modification of Rule 23 in 1966, and is illustrated by an early
school desegregation case, Potts v. Flax,716 relied on by the drafters of
the amendment. 717 ,
In Potts v. Flax, the school board challenged the district court's
award of class-wide relief. In the board's view, a "class action was not
appropriate since each student is admitted, assigned and transferred as
an individual. . . . [The board questioned] the right to bring a class
action by reason of the intrinsic nature of the rights involved. 718 But
the Fifth Circuit held that: "The peculiar rights of specific individuals
were not in controversy. ' 719 Indeed, the court of appeals held that,
even if the case had not been brought as a class action, the district court
could not have entered an order specifying that only the named black
plaintiffs be admitted to the previously all-white school. Rather, only
class-wide relief would have been constitutionally permissible.
There is at least considerable doubt that relief confined to individual
specified Negro children either could be granted or, if granted, could
be so limited in its operative effect. By the very nature of the contro-
versy, the attack is on the unconstitutional practice of racial discrimina-
tion .... [T]o require a school system to admit the specific successful
plaintiff Negro child while others, having no such protection, were re-
quired to attend schools in a racially segregated system, would be for
the court to contribute actively to the class discrimination .... 720
While the holding in Potts is unremarkable, there is something that
seems incongruous about its dicta suggesting both that individual relief
might be prohibited in an individual case and that, instead, class relief
might be required. But the Potts court recognized that there are situa-
tions in which the individual cannot be separated from the group to
which he or she belongs without causing or condoning substantial
injustice.
(4) A relational model: This model introduces notions of volitional
community and of intimacy. Cases like Singleton v. Wulff7 2 1 exemplify
this model. In Singleton, it is the doctor/patient relationship that is af-
716. 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
717. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee notes to the 1966 amendment (dis-
cussing Potls).
718. Potts, 313 F.2d at 288.
719. id
720. lId at 289 (emphasis in original).
721. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
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fected by the challenged state action, not the doctor as (money-making)
individual and the patient as (abortion-seeking) individual. The indi-
viduals seek out each other, and their complaint is that the state is im-
pinging on their activities as a unit, that is, on their relationship.
Important human relationships depend on intimacy, vulnerability, and
trust. These individuals share a stake in their interaction;722 the rela-
tionship they form is an entity that is richer than the sum of its individ-
ual, selfish parts.
(5) A constituent model: This model is familiar to us as the share-
holders' derivative suit that the early twentieth century Court first em-
ployed in considering citizen and taxpayer standing before Fairchild and
Frothingham.723 This model recognizes that, altogether, individuals are
the entity they constitute.724 Thus, they may sue on its behalf against
others. More importantly, constituents may sue the entity to make it con-
form to the law. Both derivative suits and the seventeenth through late
nineteenth century mandamus petitions served this purpose.
Current standing law is completely coherent only with the first of
these, the aggregative model. Standing law does not cohere with the
pure representational model, although, as in Havens Realty, a fiction can
sometimes make standing law do some of the work of a representa-
tional model.7 25 Standing law can accommodate the communal model
when a representative individual with a live claim sues, although Lyons
provides a disturbing counterexample. 726 Standing law cannot accom-
modate the fourth model unless the relational case is a sufficiently close
variant of the individualist prototype. 727 Standing law completely sub-
722. The relational model applies also to the situation in which two individuals share
something that each of them would have separately. For example, roommates share what
would otherwise be their individual privacies. Problems arise when the state conducts a
search targeted against one roommate and the other later seeks to invoke the fourth amend-
ment to protect herself. In fourth amendment doctrine, this raised an issue that used to be
known as "standing" until the Court figured out that "standing" and the substantive right
were really one and the same. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
The Court, however, invokes the individualist notion that fourth amendment rights are
personal to achieve the same disaggregating result fourth amendment "standing" previously
achieved. Id. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 591, at 367-69.
For extensive discussions of the problems presented by this individualist model and of the
development of a relational model in the fourth amendment context, see Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. - (1987)
(forthcoming).
723. See notes 393-412 supra and accompanying text.
724. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-18 (1980) (lawyer owes
duty of loyalty to corporate entity, and not to management who engaged his or her services or
to any individual stockholder, director, officer or employee).
725. Haven Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
726. City of Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
727. In Singleton, the plurality and dissent differed in ther assessment of how close the
doctors' self-interested motivation was to the individualist prototype. In his partial concur-
rence, Justice Powell argued that the doctors' concern for the patients' rights was only suffi-
ciently strong if the state had actually criminalized the procedure, placing the doctor and the
patient in exactly the same self-interested position. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 128-31. Justice
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verts the importance of the constituent model, as Valley Forge
illustrates. 728
Thus, "standing" obscures several important aspects of our every-
day reality. Standing law allows only the possibility that we act out of
self-interest; it ignores the fact that we often act out of concern for
others. By refusing to recognize altruism as legally cognizable, stand-
ing law devalues the social importance of altruism. Standing affirms
and reinforces values in modern culture that are disjunctive, frag-
mented, and alienating.
Our legal system is unable effectively to deal with those aspects of
society that the metaphor of "standing" and its doctrinal derivative ob-
scure. Because the law sees us only as individuals, it obscures the com-
munal and relational aspects of our experience. Thus, when presented
with public injustice or the claims of a victimized group, the law sees
"nothing more than a collectivity of private suits. .... -729 Standing law
disaggregates our interests and thus diminishes them. This process is
most apparent in the suppression of the constituent model, where the
price we pay is exacted in the diminution of the instrumental value of
the rule of law in a functioning democratic system. This, I think, is
whatJustice Brennan had in mind in his dissent in Valley Forge, where he
complained that the majority's standing decisions "tend merely to ob-
fuscate, rather than to inform, our understanding of the meaning of
rights under the law." '730
C. Standing and Self-Governance
Perhaps the reason the law of standing so often seems incoherent is
that it is superimposed on a process that is largely dialogical and nor-
mative. Standing is individualistic and, thus, merely aggregative in its
approach to groups. But both the dialogical and normative character of
the adjudicative process are inherently communal. The law is incoher-
ent because the metaphors involve mutually exclusive entailments.
One consequence is that a doctrine which is justified in terms of the
separation of powers and the protection of democratic, majoritarian
choice becomes instead, an undemocratic tool of exclusion. Rather
than a tool to maintain the legal balance of our system, standing law
becomes a principal mechanism for making constitutional guarantees
unenforceable and for subverting the rule of law.
Blackmun's plurality opinion argued that the doctors' self-interested concern for payment was
sufficient to motivate them as reliable representatives of their patients. Id. at 112-13.
728. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Seperation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
729. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 666 (1976) (suit by state as parens pa-
triae). For a better illustration of the Court's inability to appreciate a public injustice in the
context of standing law, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), or Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
730. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Dialogue is communal in that it is participatory. Normativity too is
communal in that it addresses, organizes, and often originates 73 1 from
the community. In the actual experience of our legal system, the pro-
cess of constitutional adjudication is dialogical both in its normative
methodology and in its processes. Both individual cases and substan-
tive constitutional doctrines are explicitly interactive in drawing from
other societal sources the sum and substance of the fundamental values
to be considered protected by specific constitutional provisions.732 In-
deed, large portions of modern constitutional doctrine are explicable
only in terms of "the dialogue between the Court and society over the
content of our norms and deepest values."' 73 3 And, constitutional adju-
dication is obviously dialogical in its process. It is largely appellate. As
we climb the appellate ladder, the briefs and oral arguments get longer
and the degree of participation by non-party amici curiae increases.
John Stuart Mill justified judicial review in part by observing that con-
stitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court is particularly dialogic:
"[I]ts declarations are not made at a very early stage of a controversy;
... much popular discussion usually precedes them; [and] the court
decides after hearing the point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of
reputation .... ,734
The dialogic nature of the Court's process is substantially at odds
with the conceptualization of the adjudicative process by means of
"standing" and the private rights model. Despite the persistence of the
Court's apparent dedication to the individualistic premises of standing,
it is less disciplined regarding its own self-governance. The Court
seems quite comfortable in its normative role73 5 despite the absence, in
731. See, e.g., Nashville Chatanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)
(Frankfurter, J.) (in considering the nature of law, one cannot "disregard the gloss which life
has written upon it. Settled . . . practice . . . can establish what is . . . law .... Deeply
embedded traditional ways of carrying out... policy .... are often tougher and truer law than
the dead words of the written text."); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 715 n. 48 (1975) (citing Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967))
(law "consists of the generally accepted social norms [to be] applied in the decision of the
cases, norms that are-contrary to the positivist's notion-best seen as 'part of the law,' quite
independent of their promulgation throught defined law making procedures.").
732. Winter, supra note 19, at 682-92.
733. Id. at 701.
734. J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 327 (New York 1863).
735. Justice White's dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966),
provides a candid statement of the Court's apparent comfort with its normative role:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by
the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and English legal
history, and involves a departure from a long line of precedent does not prove either
that the Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise in its
present reinterpretation .... IWIhat [the Courtl has done is to make new law and
new public policy in much the same way that it has in the course of interpreting other
great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically has done. In-
deed, it is what it must do and will continue to do ....
See also Bivens v. Six L'nkno'n Aqgents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan.J., concurring) (stating
that, in considering the remedies available for a constitt.tional violation. "the range of policy
considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the range of those a legislature
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many cases, of a traditional, bipolar legal controversy. Two recent ex-
amples are Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez736 and Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States.7 37
In Soto-Lopez, two American citizens of Puerto Rican origin chal-
lenged actions by the New York City Civil Service Commission denying
them a veterans employment preference. New York limited the prefer-
ence to veterans who were state residents at the time of their enlist-
ment. Both plaintiffs were long-term New York City residents, but both
were Puerto Rican residents when they enlisted. The plaintiffs sued the
city, arguing that the residency requirement violated their constitu-
tional right to travel. The New York State Attorney General intervened
pursuant to the applicable federal statute, section 2403(b) of the Judi-
cial Code.738 The plaintiffs won in the court of appeals. The State of
New York appealed. The City of New York, which was the only entity
from which the plaintiffs could seek any concrete relief, did not appeal.
Thus, appellant's only interest before the Supreme Court was in the
constitutionality of the state statutory and state constitutional provision
limiting eligibility for the veterans' preference.
Although counsel for Mr. Soto-Lopez raised the issue of jus-
ticiability at oral argument, the Court's opinion gives not the slightest
hint that it was even questioned. 739 The problem of justiciability cre-
ated by section 2403, however, was noted by commentators at the time
of its passage.740 When confronted with this problem, lower courts
would consider"). J. VINING, supra note 27, at 52-53, notes that this normative focus is not a
recent development.
736. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
737. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
738. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)(1982). This provision was added to § 2403 in 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-381, § 5, 90 Stat. 1120. It provides in relevant part:(b) In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the
State . . .is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State
affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to
the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presenta-
tion of evidence... and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State
shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party ....
Id Subsection (a) provides a right of intervention to the federal government to defend con-
gressional statutes from constitutional attack. That statute was passed in 1937, Pub. L. No.
352-50, -Stat. 751, and was originally a companion to the Roosevelt court packing bill,
S. 1392. See Cong. Rec. 1161, 7365 (1937). The statute was in large part a response to the
danger of collusive suits brought to declare New Deal and other progressive legislation un-
constitutional. See Legislation, 51 HARv. L. REV. 148, 148-49 (1937) [hereinafter, Legislation,
M-ARV. L. REV.]; Legislation, Revision of Procedure in Constitutional Litigation: The Act of 1937, 38
CoLur. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1938) [hereinafter Legislation, COLuM. L. REV.].
739. It is perfectly possible that the Court would have found the case justiciable. The
City of New York had agreed to provide relief to the plaintiffs, but that agreement was contin-
gent on the outcome of the state's appeal. See Nixon v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1982)
($142,000 settlement did not moot case because of agreement to make additional payment of
$28,000 contingent on outcome in the Supreme Court); but cf Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S.
928 (198 1) (questioning state attorney general's "standing" to seek stay of order addressed to
state in case in which Governor was true defendant).
740. Legislation, HARV. L. REV., supra note 738, at 150 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a));
see also Legislation, Colum. L. Rev., supra note 738, at 159-60. These contemporaneous com-
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had held that "the desirability of an advisory opinion is not a substitute
for justiciability.... There is a difference between permitting the [gov-
ernment] to play an active role during the pendency of private litiga-
tion, and permitting it to go forward with the litigation in its own right
after the private parties have composed their differences." 74 1
In Bob Jones, the justiciability problem ran even deeper than in Soto-
Lopez. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the litigation
was purely unipolar because the government had switched positions
and agreed with the plaintiff. The Carter Administration had denied
tax exempt status to a private religious school because of the school's
avowed policy of racial discrimination. When the case reached the
Court, however, the Reagan Administration indicated that it would re-
voke the relevant regulation denying tax exempt status to such schools.
The Court appointed a private individual, former Secretary of Trans-
portation William T. Coleman, Jr., as a special amicus curiae to argue
the government's former position. The government moved to dismiss
the case as moot.
The Court's discussion of the lurking problem of justiciability was
confined to a footnote.742 The Court stated that the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had enjoined the government from granting tax exempt sta-
tus to schools that discriminate, observing that the Reagan
Administration had informed the Court that it would not revoke the
regulation. But the justiciability question remained unresolved, be-
cause the government had not changed its position in the Bob Jones case.
Moreover, when the District of Columbia Circuit case was later ap-
pealed, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have stand-
ing to raise the question.743
Both of these decisions are good ones. Each reinforces notions of
community: Soto-Lopez reaffirms that, under the Constitution, our com-
munity is national and not state or local; Bob Jones declares that the na-
tion will not subsidize with favored tax status institutions that shun
segments of the community. But neither fits the ordinary model of ad-
judication that the Court so rigidly insists on in cases like Simon or Valley
Forge.
"[P]eople in power get to impose their metaphors. '744 The Realists
and post-Realists are partly correct that the Court manipulates stand-
ing, but theymiss the true focal point of that manipulation. Standing is
not an on/off switch that the Court flips depending on its feeling about
mentators saw the problem not in terms of "standing," but rather in terms of "abstract ques-
tions, or questions which are or have become moot, or which do not permit of a decree or
judgment." Legislation, HARV. L. REv., supra note 738, at 150; cf. Graddick, 453 U.S. 928 (198 1).
741. Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336, 338-39 (Ist Cir. 1978).
742. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585 n.9 (citing Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
18, 1982)).
743. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
744. G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 157.
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the merits of the particular case. The Court's actions only look calcu-
lated in that way because standing is not really separable from the mer-
its. The manipulation is different: The Court's invocation of standing
limits the normative work of the lower courts. But, the Court is more
flexible in the way in which it allows standing law to guide its own deci-
sions, partly because the Court appreciates that its role is inherently
normative. Who could be better to discuss the relevant norms with
than the New York Attorney General in Soto-Lopez or a "lawyer of repu-
tation" 74 5 like Bill Coleman in Bob Jones?
But this inconsistency permits "traces of self-government" only at
the Court,74 6 denying the citizenry at large the possibility of participa-
tion. If, however, our adjudicative process is about the "commitment
to the pursuit of mediative practical reason through normative dia-
logue. . ,,747 as I believe it is, then a commitment to democracy and
self-government implies citizen participation. An earlier generation
held this view, recognizing the constituent model and understanding
that every citizen "is interested, as a citizen, in having the laws exe-
cuted, and the right in question enforced." 748 Indeed, that generation
viewed citizen interference to "see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied" as a
duty, as well as a right; they saw it as the onus of democratic self-
government.74 9
This vision of the process of active self-governance by the citizenry
now marches down the halls of the legal academy under the republican
banner. 750 The republican vision is exactly contrary to the Court's
view, which rejects any possibility "that the Founding Fathers intended
to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New
England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Govern-
ment by means of lawsuits in federal courts. ' 75 1 But the republican
vision of participation and reason is closer to that of the first Con-
gress-which authorized uninjured and unaffected informers to enforce
in court legal restrictions on customshouse officials-than is the mono-
chromatic vision of current constitutional doctrine.
The real problem of the supposedly counter-majoritarian tendency
of judicial review is that so much of the normative work of the courts
occurs through a process that is exclusionary rather than participatory.
745. J.S. MiLL, supra note 734, at 242.
746. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreward: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARv. L. REv. 4, 74 (1986) ("Mhe courts, and especially the Supreme Court, seem to take on
as one of their ascribed functions the modeling of active self-government that citizens find
practically beyond reach.").
747. Id at 74.
748. County Commissioners v. People ex. reL Metz, I 1 Ill. 202, 208 (1849).
749. The People ex reL Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1837).
750. See, e.g., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TuSHNET, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
(1986); Michelman, supra note 746; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985).
751. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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The systematic destruction of the constituent model through modem
standing law denies the notion that, in a democracy committed to self-
government, the whole cannot be something more powerful than the
sum of its parts. This undemocratic denial is what renders unacceptable
much of current standing law, which disallows equally to each and every
constituent the possibility of asserting the rights of the group and of
the entity, as illustrated by Richardson, or Schlesinger, or Valley Forge. It is,
thus, an affirmation of authoritarianism in the guise of democracy; it is
a denial of self-governance.
The public rights model, in contrast, recognizes that we are the gov-
ernment and that we are entitled to decide our fate. We do so by
adopting communal norms and by enforcing them. The public rights
model is republican in both the particular, American, historical
sense752 and in the "deep" sense that Professor Michelman identified:
It is "participatory, conversational, inclusory, reasonable, and strongly
committed to immediacy." 753 By "immediacy," Michelman means that
"self-government is the business of the self, not to be displaced onto
any distanced force." 754
Thus, "freedom consists of socially situated self-direction-that is,
self-direction by norms cognizant of fellowship with equally self-di-
rected others. ' 755 Only the public rights model recognizes that we ex-
ist in a community with self-directing others. Only this model affirms
the ability of the individual citizen to be heard above the din of pluralis-
tic, self-interested, majoritarian politics, and to participate directly in
the normative process. The answer to the "baffling" question of
"where to find self-government under 'this Constitution' "756 is hidden
in that part of our history obscured by the law of standing: the public
rights model.
D. Managing Our Metaphors
The Framers' generation had a better understanding of the meaning
of rights in a democracy, in part because they were not restricted by the
monophonic "standing" metaphor. Today, the Court's dominant ide-
ology of standing doctrine allows us to hear with only one ear. Not
surprisingly, we hear less: "The fox knows many things, but the
752. "Americans began their history with a very intimate version of democratic local
government .... But there has existed, side by side with-indeed almost as an aspect
of-local democracy, the somewhat countervailing concept that the charter of a local
body is a legally enforceable compact among the citizens, a concept to which judicial
enforcement of the Constitution has given popular currency.
Jaffe, supra note 5 at 1282.
753. Michelman, supra note 746, at 36.
754. Id. at 42.
755. Id. at 75.
756. Id. at 57 (quoting Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contribu-
tions of Special Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 215 (1983)).
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hedgehog knows only one great thing."'75 7 The Framers' generation
was alert to citizen participation; the modern Court uses standing as a
defense against such participation in much the same way that the
hedgehog uses its porcupine-like quills against its enemies.
The advantages of the original participatory scheme were twofold.
First, with more models at its disposal, the law of justiciability could
accommodate greater portions of our reality as necessary. Second, the
original scheme was designed to maintain the constancy of political
(read: democratic) choice. Because the limitation of adjudication to
cases and controversies was only a limitation to the judicial forms, the
legislature could control the work of the courts by creating new rights,
new remedies, or new forms of action.75 8 Furthermore, the doctrine of
that era recognized that not all questions were equally suited to judicial
determination, even if the questions could be raised by one of the rec-
ognized forms. Marbury, which concerned a public rights model and
emphasized the common law's requirements, or the identity of rights
and remedies, 75 9 recognized that there were some "acts that are only
politically examinable. ' 760 This political question doctrine, with all its
doctrinal difficulty, preserved the constancy and immediacy of the un-
derlying political choice.
Professor Tushnet observed that "when the political questions doc-
trine fell into desuetude after Baker v. Carr, it was replaced ... by the
standing doctrine. ' 761 Standing law thus replaced a direct choice
about the uses of adjudication with a surrogate doctrine viewing the
adjudicative process by means of an abstracted vision of the process'
elements. But this abstracted vision fails in three ways: because
"standing" considers only one part of the process, the private rights
model; because standing is a surrogate, too far removed from the reali-
ties and policies it seeks to address meaningfully to accomplish its pur-
pose;762 and because the balance that standing law attempts to strike is
defined in putatively neutral, process-oriented terms. Even if this neu-
tral posture were possible, it would still be dysfunctional. Standing law
has no mechanism for adjusting the balance with changing times and
situations; it therefore presumes that the balance sought by Justices
757. Archilochus, Fragment 103, quoted inJ. BARTLnT", FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 68a (14th
ed. 1968).
758. The Framers handled the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a similar manner.
They left to Congress the question of the existence and uses of lower federal courts, and they
gave it the power of limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 &
§ 2, cl. 2.
759. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 102-03, (1803).
760. lad at 105, 107.
761. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET (2d ed.), supra note 14, at 231 (referring to Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
762. Standing law as a surrogate might have seemed to work in Frothingham. But even
Frothingham was in the context of a more fluid conceptual structure that allowed the Court to
address directly the separation of powers issue. Only now, having lost that structure, does the
separation of powers seem wholly dependent on standing law.
July 1988) STANDING 1509
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Brandeis and Frankfurter in the substantive due process era will be ap-
propriate for the twenty-first century. In contrast, the original par-
ticipatory scheme preserved choice, recognizing that some things are
better mediated by reasoned adjudication and others by the ballot box,
the legislative bargain, or executive discretion. The participatory vision
required an ongoing discrimination among areas of relative institu-
tional competence and effectiveness. 763 The original scheme allowed
the balance to shift with changes in society; it acknowledged that our
situation and our needs for governance are not static.
The cost of the current system is the cost of obfuscation. That cost
is manifest in cases like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, where human life and
constitutional constraint on state power were balanced against law en-
forcement's need for discretion to pursue its mission effectively.76 In-
stead, the Court focused on whether Adolph Lyons had a personal
controversy with the City of Los Angeles regarding the future conduct
of its police officers. That he had once been choked nearly to death was
irrelevant because, in the Court's view, that fact did not address the
likelihood that Mr. Lyons might be subjected to a chokehold again. That
others were dying while the case continued was irrelevant. Also irrele-
vant was that they too could not be present because the police had not
yet chosen them as victims. And most irrelevant was the political pro-
cess, which ultimately stopped the carnage, but not until another six
individuals had died. 765
Lyons was a case in which standing law disaggregated individuals
who shared an important, life-or-death interest. But equally impor-
tantly, Adolph Lyons and the other victims were also constituents
harmed by their own government. They depended entirely on the
"rule of law" to constrain that government from harming them un-
justly. When Adolph Lyons pressed their claim against government, he
was insisting on public rights. He was insisting on their behalf that gov-
ernment act only within the community's norms, as expressed in the
Constitution and in the normative process of its interpretation.
What gave Mr. Lyons the "right" to speak for others and insist on
legality in others' behalf? Is it not preferable that others assert their
own rights, as the Court acknowledged in Singleton?7 66 From the indi-
vidualist standpoint, Mr. Lyons' concern was officious, intermeddling,
and inappropriate. Standing law would permit him to act only in his
763. See Regan, Community and Justice in Constitutional Theory, 1985 Wisc. L. RFv. 1073,
1117-22.
764. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The allegation in Lyons con-
cerned the routine use of often fatal chokeholds against traffic violators. Thus, in Lyons, the
relevant aspect of the law enforcement mission was less immediately related to the protection
of human life than in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the question wa,
whether the police could use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing burglary suspect
There, the Court held that deadly force could only be used against dangerous suspects.
765. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 116 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
766. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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own self-interest. The Court could not see any such interest because
the Court thought it highly "speculative" that Mr. Lyons would be sub-
ject to the challenged police practice again.
But, a plaintiff like Adolph Lyons can be motivated by something
more than the Court allows. True, Mr. Lyons had been wronged and
he sought monetary relief for himself. And, as the dissent argued, his
concrete interest made him a reliable representative for the interests of
the as yet unidentified future victims. 76 7 But, one's motivation can be
broader, more generous. No doubt Adolf Lyons was angered about his
own mistreatment. But such anger can be expressed as concern for
others. Mr. Lyons' suit reflected such an extension of self-the identifi-
cation of the interests of the self with those of others-precisely what
the "law of standing" does not allow. 7 68 Standing law not only leads to
bad decisions, it represents bad sociology and bad morality as well.
Cases like Singleton, Geraghty, and Roper recognize that altruism may
be, if we will it. Rule 23, like its forebearer bills of peace in equity,76 9
acknowledges that communities of interest do exist and that the law can
recognize and address them. Acknowledging the altruistic, relational,
communal, and constitutive models I have suggested will raise other
questions: (1) How to save the meaningfulness of the adjudicatory pro-
cess after standing has been abandoned; (2) how to make representa-
tion work; and (3) how to decide who makes these determinations. The
answers to these questions are already implicit in existing legal doctrine
and theory.
To say that the essence of the process lies not in the private rights
model, but in the self-referring notion that a dispute is justiciable when
it is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties hav-
ing adverse legal interests" is not new.7 70 Courts at the dawn of the
age of standing recognized that "It]he prime object of all litigation is to
establish a right asserted by the plaintiff or to sustain a defence set up
767. "Because Lyons has a claim for damages... his personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy adequately assures an adversary presentation of his challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the policy. Moreover, the resolution of this challenge will be largely dispositive of
his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 126 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (footnote omitted).
768. Of course, standing law is not the only area of current doctrine that emphasizes,
even insists on, selfishness. See also Fischl, supra note 636.
769. [I]f one person is committing, or threatening to commit, torts against each of
many others, each tort involving the same questions of fact and law as every other,
the many (or a few of them representing themselves and all the others) may file a bill
against the one, and obtain an injunction; for otherwise each of them would have to
bring an action against him. In such cases the bill is commonly called a bill of peace.
Langdell, A Brief Survey ofEquityjurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REv., supra note 476, at 127. Mr. Lyons'
suit might conceivably have fared better under this old equity practice. But see text accompa-
nying notes 764-765 supra.
770. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); accord Havens Realty
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744 (1982).
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by the party pursued."'771 What we need for justiciability are parties
who have taken up adverse positions, a presentation of an abstract legal
question in a factual setting sufficiently concrete to inform judgment,
and "judicially discoverable standards" 772 -a question that fits the ex-
isting legal categories and is susceptible to the dominant modes of legal
thought. The Court asked only for these elements in Hayburn's Case. It
was not concerned that the Attorney General had no personal stake; it
was concerned that the outcome of the controversy would turn on exec-
utive discretion rather than the result of the Court's "mediative practi-
cal reason through normative dialogue." 778
The stripped-down definition of "case or controversy" that I have
just described is only the common denominator of the political ques-
tion and standing doctrines. It would account for virtually all of the
classic decisions in cases mounting generalized challenges to constitu-
tional amendments or congressional statutes. 774 If the definition
doesn't say very much, it is because there isn't much to say. Once we
recognize that legislation and adjudication are not dichotomous, but
are merely different points on a single normative spectrum, then we are
free to assume responsibility. In the meantime the courts hide, like
Professor Vining's octopus at the bottom of the ocean:
Inside the self-constructed home everything does not depend on every-
thing else and entities do not dissolve conceptually into some other
entity or some larger unity. The court can swim out into the great sea
around and dart back when frightened by its dark vastness.... Fear
may make it too difficult to admit, except by allusion, that one is swim-
ming in the sea and that one's behavior is a reaction to it. Denial is a
normal defense of the human mind against great fear; the legal mind is
not peculiar in this regard. 775
Cases like Lyons remind us that there is a real human cost to this partic-
ular defense-mechanism.
The answer to the second question-that of assuring adequacy of
representation-starts with the recognition that the problems of repre-
sentation are purely instrumental. For years, commentators have rec-
ognized that the broad equitable powers of the federal courts are
entirely sufficient to assure the competence and adequacy of represen-
tation.776 Nineteenth century law, as described in cases like Welling-
ton 7 7 7 and Hall,778 employed just such a flexible, instrumentalist
771. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900); see notes
329-342 supra and accompanying text; see also Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118 (1900).
772. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962).
773. Michelman, supra note 746, at 74.
774. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1938); Frothinghara v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130
(1922).
775. J. VINING, supra note 27, at 94 (footnote omitted).
776. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 90, at 1311-12; Monaghan, supra note 101, at 1392-97;
Spann, Expository Justice, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1983); Tushnet, supra note 14, at 1716-17.
777. Wellington, Petitioner, 33 Mass. (16 Pick) 87, 94 (1834).
[Vol. 40:13711512
approach. Rule 23 already provides a model less cumbersome than the
statutory informer suit with its multiple complications7 79 and more eas-
ily regulable than the English relator practice. 7 0
I do not mean to suggest, however, that we reconstitute standing in
the class action mode. Rather, in a democracy, the issue of how we
reconstitute models of justiciability should be open to discussion and
debate. The point of this article is not to advance a particular doctrinal
proposal as the solution to our problems, but rather to open the debate
on the occasions for public rights litigation. Standing in the shadow of
current doctrine,781 congressional power to determine appropriate jus-
ticiability models seems in doubt.78 2 It should not be. The answer to
the third question-who makes decisions about access to the courts-
lies in fundamental democratic premises: The elaboration of the public
rights model and the occasions for its invocation should be "a develop-
ment to which the courts contribute but in which the legislature has an
even greater hand. ' 783
If standing is really about the right to be recognized and its concom-
itant remedies, then Congress, and not the Court, should have the ulti-
mate power to define standing. Congress may recognize or create legal
rights; it may structure the most meaningful remedies to see their frui-
tion within a society of competing interests. If standing law seeks to
define the proper uses of adjudication in a democratic society, then the
democratic process should be the primary mechanism through which
the uses and limits of adjudication are chosen. The nineteenth century
Court explicitly acknowledged the primacy of Congress in determining
the limits of justiciability in mandamus cases like Kendall and Hall.78 4
The current system is democratically dysfunctional. The Court de-
cides how the judicial process is to be used and for what. In so doing,
the Court inevitably decides what rights citizens have to demand that
government behave according to the general will. Yet, the Court does
so without accounting to the public for its reasoning. This system is
more undemocratic than adjudicative norm-making; it takes control of
government out of the hands of government's constituents. Standing
law disaggregates the citizenry; it is a judicial version of divide and con-
778. Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1875); see notes 169-173 supra and
accompanying text.
779. For a discussion of the problems raised by informers' actions, see note 191 supra.
780. For a discussion of the relator practice, see notes 136-138 supa and accompanying
text. For a proposal for public actions via the class action device, see Doernberg, "We the
People" John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73
CAL. L. REv. 42, 110-17 (1985).
781. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1974).
782. l; see also note 672 supra; Federal Election Comm. v. Nat'l Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985). For a particularly sensitive and insightful reading of the social ideals
behind NCPAL, see Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 896-921 (1988).
783. Wechsler, supra note 100, at 7.
784. See text accompanying notes 169-173 & 177-183 supra.
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quer. Democratic politics-and republican participation-should have
a greater say in what the courts do and how they do it. We may ask less
of the courts than we do now; we may insist on more. But it is for us to
say.
VII. CONSTRUCTING NEW MEANINGS, CREATING NEW POSSIBILITIES
A new meaning is the equivalent of a new word. 785
The world grows smaller, and humans grow increasingly interde-
pendent on one another. A nuclear accident in the Ukraine taints the
milk in Oregon. A decision by the IRS in Washington may affect the
health care available to indigents in Kentucky. The ultimate price of a
decision regarding the training provided police rookies, or the disci-
pline imposed on an errant officer, may be exacted in the life of an
innocent citizen. 78 6
At the same time that we grow increasingly interdependent we are,
nevertheless, increasingly fragmented. We live in segregated neighbor-
hoods, but we cannot segregate the effects of innercity blight and un-
derclass status; these conditions impose costs that leave none of us
untouched. We are less and less capable of bridging the gaps of race,
wealth, and sectional need. We are increasingly unable to see our com-
mon needs, and less and less able adequately and meaningfully to pro-
vide for them.
The individualist ideology embedded in the social construct of
standing is a part of this problem. This constraint reinforces our false
sense of separation, and acts as a substantial legal impediment to sup-
portive and mutually protective action. Our ability to succeed as a sod-
ety in our third century under the Constitution will depend on whether,
as individuals, we can nevertheless recognize a shared stake in the com-
munity. It will depend on our willingness to stand up for the common
social good and for interests larger than our own. It will depend on our
commitment to provide fora that encourage relatedness. It will depend
on our capacity for community and for self-governance.
Yet, a utopian communitarianism might recreate the problem of col-
lectivism that individualism purported to solve. It might allow the whole
(read: government) to do things to the part (i.e., the individual) in the
name of the greater good. This critique, however, misconstrues the
communal enterprise that I am advocating. I do not argue that we
should discard individualism, nor that we should abandon the salutory
notion of constitutional rights. Rather, we need to find a way to inte-
grate a sense that we are, inescapably, individuals-in-communities.
Only in this way can we avoid the polar pitfalls of individualism and
collectivism. The dual model system of adjudication-recognizing both
785. W. STEVENS, Adagia, in Opus POSTHUMOUS 159 (1957).
786. Cf. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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private and public rights-provides one legal mechanism through
which we can seek and attempt to maintain a sense both that we are
individuals and that what happens to varied communities upon which
we depend matters very much to each of us.
The recognition of a place for altruism in our legal system, more-
over, does not require us to abandon notions of individualism.
Altruism need not depend on communitarian notions of moral respon-
sibility nor on long term self-interest.78 7 Altruism can be selfishness
turned around. Because I can see me in you (the self in others), I can
be motivated to act for you as if I were acting for myself. The stranger,
thus, can be metaphor for the self.7 8 We see the sameness and there-
fore can assimilate the needs of the other to our experience of our own,
and we can do so even in specific situations in which our needs are not
directly implicated. Altruism can be a form of transcendent
individualism.
We must recognize that we are both individuals and members of
communities, and grapple with the implications of individualism and
communitarianism. 789 I believe that this is still possible in our society.
My hope is that the standing metaphor is merely frozen and not petri-
fied in our law and social structure. I have tried, in this article, to thaw
the block of doctrine and miscast history to allow consideration of the
possibility of alternatives. If the metaphor can be defrosted, then per-
haps we can reanimate it. For the metaphor of "standing" is capacious
enough to encompass more than a sense of individualism; it can also
include a sense of altruism. No longer need we always stand alone,
apart from one another. Instead, we may stand up for one another; we
may stand by each other. We will still stand as individuals, but our
sense of ourselves will be changed. Then we will be able to answer the
questions Hillel asked some nineteen and one half centuries ago: "If I
am not for myself who will be for me? And when I am by myself, what
am I? And if not now, when?" '790
We are adrift. Life's random misfortunes lap at the gunnels; grey finned Chaos
swims around us. The storms of the moment toss and blow us about. From time to
time they threaten the more tyrannous typhoons that we observe on the horizon at a
787. See generally T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
788. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:18 ("Love thy neighbor as thyself.") (emphasis added). An ex-
cellent exposition of the role of this metaphoric reasoning from self to others as a basis for
moral reasoning is provided by the philosopher Richard Rorty. "[W]e all care quite a bit
about a koala when we see it writhing about.... Pigs rate much higher than koalas on intelli-
gence tests, but pigs don't writhe in quite the right humanoid way, and the pig's face is the
wrong shape for the facial expressions which go with ordinary conversation. So we send pigs
to slaughter with equanimity, but form societies for the protection of koalas." R. RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 190 (1979).
789. See Regan, supra note 763, at 1131-32.
790. ETHICs OF THE FATHERS 1:14. The version quoted is my own translation from the
original Hebrew Mishnah. For English versions, see PIRKEI ABOTH, THE ETHICS OF THE TAL-
MUD: SAYINGS OF THE FATHERS 1:14 (R.T. Herford ed. 1945); A TREASURY OFJEWISH FOLKLORE
105 (N. Ausubel ed. 1948).
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distance. We watch that horizon for intimations of rescue. But mostly we are
parched by the sun's harsh light of indifference, its reflection of our alienation. The
rubber of our craft bakes and blisters. We are alone in the end. Together. Row-
ing. No one stands in a lifeboat.
